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Abstract 
Decentralisation is a growing phenomenon worldwide. However, the detail of its 
implementation determines whether desired objectives are achieved or not. The thesis 
extensively interrogates this concept from economic, philosophical and political 
theoretical perspectives, with emphasis on the economic rationale. An international 
perspective has also been utilised for informing the investigation. Reference is made, 
in this regard, to both federal and unitary states of the developed and developing 
world. 
Botswana, a unitary and developing African country, has been found to be facing 
more or less the same challenges that undermine the desired benefits of fiscal 
decentralisation in all developing countries. However, political maturity (which is a 
prerequisite for decentralisation reforms) - a predictably stable commodity in 
Botswana -sets it apart from most other developing, if not all, African countries. 
With regards to decentralisation, a number of considerations framed the analysis. 
Firstly, the established consecutive approach to Botswana 's centralised economic 
planning and management has been found to be counter-productive to the financial 
decentralisation process. This has resulted in an over-regulated local public sector 
that is not conducive for taking stock of local initiative and being innovative in local 
affairs, mainly due to an ambiguous institutional framework. Secondly, an ad hoc 
financial transfer mechanism, that is neither stable nor predictable, clearly 
undermines integrated financial management and strategic fiscal planning at 
municipal level. Thirdly, a one-size-fits-all approach to the assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities to all municipalities, small and large, as well as urban and rural, 
serves as another constraint. Finally, a lack of stable and buoyant sources of own 
revenues, as well as inadequate capacity to utilise fully the already existing internal 
revenues, has created grant economies that survive on a principle of beggar-thy-
neighbour to actualise their mandates. This? in turn undermines their? significance 
for the electorates at local level who turn to the national government even for minor 
local issues that should be addressed within the areas of local jurisdiction. 
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The thesis concludes with recommendations regarding a redesign of the institutional 
framework, intergovernmental financial transfers, expenditure assignments and 
generation of internal revenue. 
It is critically important that the Government of Botswana should develop a strong 
policy framework, build a strong consensus within the political and bureaucratic 
circles and coordinate and integrate these reforms through strong capacity-building 
mechanisms at local governments. Finally, the capacity of the national government to 
monitor the process cannot be overemphasised. That is, the decentralisation process 
should initially be centralised with gradual decentralisation processes to allow for 
flexibility well aware of the fact that decentralisation structures are always in 
transition. 
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Opsomming 
Desentralisasie is wel 'n wereldwye verskynsel, maar suksesvolle implementering 
vereis aandag aan detail. Die desentralisasiekonsep word in hierdie tesis grondig 
ondersoek vanuit 'n ekonomiese, jilosofiese, sowel as politieke perspektief Die rol 
van ekonomiese beginsels in die desentralisasieproses geniet spesiale verwysing. Om 
die ondersoek so omvattend moontlik te maak is internasionale bronne geraadpleeg, 
afkomstig vanuit sowel federate as unitere state asook uit ontwikkelde en 
ontwikkelende lande. 
Botswana, 'n ontwikkelende Afrika land met 'n unitere staatsvorm, ondervind 
uitdagings wat, soos in enige ander ontwikkelende land, die voordele van fiskale 
desentralisasie ondermyn. Politieke volwassenheid en stabiliteit is van die 
voorvereistes waaraan 'n staatsbestel moet voldoen om desentralisasie suksesvol toe 
te pas. Gelukkig skiet Botswana in die opsig geensins tekort nie, inteendeel, dit is juis 
hierdie eienskap wat horn van die meeste - indien nie alle ander - Afrikalande 
onderskei. 
Heelwat oorweging is geskenk aan die bepalende faktore random desentralisasie. 
Botswana se gevestigde gesentraliseerde ekonomiese beplanning- en bestuurstelsel is 
gei'dentifiseer as die belangrikste teenproduktiewe struikelblok wat die finansiiile 
desentralisasieproses ontspoor. Kenmerkend van 'n sentralistiese institusionele 
raamwerk is 'n oorgereguleerde plaaslike openbare sektor wat nie die skep van eie 
inisiatief en ondernemende bestuur bevorder of ag op die belangrikheid daarvan 
slaan nie. Tweede in belangrikheid is 'n onstabiele, ad hoc finansiiile 
oordragmeganisme waarop daar nie peil getrek kan word nie en wat pogings om 
gei'ntegreerde finansiiile bestuurspraktyke en strategiese jiskale beplanning op 
munisipale vlak te vestig, belemmer. Die derde hindernis is die owerhede se 
onwilligheid om te besef dat daar geen pasklare benadering bestaan wat by al die 
uiteenlopende tipes (in terme van grootte en ligging, plattelands tot stedelik) plaaslike 
besture verantwoordelik bestedingspraktyke sal vestig nie. Laastens is 'n wydlopende 
gebrek aan stabiele en lewenskragtige, eie inkomstebronne, sowel as onvoldoende 
kapasiteit om reeds beskikbare, interne belastinginkomste doeltreffend aan te wend, 
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nadelig vir plaaslike regering. Pogings om te verseker dat 'n eie plaaslike raad so 'n 
groat as moontlike toekenning uit die staatskas ontvang, veroorsaak dat aanliggende 
rade dan nie hulle regmatige deel ontvang nie. Plaaslike rade se oormatige 
ajhanklikheid van die sentrale regering vir finansiele oorlewing, ondermyn die 
legitimiteit van plaaslike politici. Laasgenoemde soek gewoon te maklik die oplossing 
vir 'n plaaslike probleem by die sentrale regering, eerder as om dit self aan te durf 
Die tesis sluit met aanbevelings oar 'n herontwerpte institusionele raamwerk wat kan 
lei tot sinvoller finansiele tussenregeringsoordragte, taakgedrewe uitgawes en die 
skepping van eie, interne belastingbron. 
Dit is van kritieke belang dat die regering van Botswana 'n stewige beleidsraamwerk 
ontwikkel en dan konsensus daaroor verkry tussen die politici en burokrasie. Die 
integrasie en ko-ordinasie van hierdie hervormings kan slegs geskied indien dit 
gepaard gaan met lewenskragtige kapasiteitsontwikkeling op plaaslike bestuursvlak. 
Die sentrale regering sal egter eweneens eie kundigheid moet ontwikkel om die proses 
te monitor, want die desentralisasieproses sal aanvanklik vanaf die middelpunt 
geskied en geleidelik uitkring. Dit sal buigsaamheid en begrip verg omdat 
desentralisasie in wese voortdurende oorgang impliseer. 
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Chapter 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The perceived role of the public sector and its reciprocal relationship with other 
sectors in meeting the needs of the society have changed in recent years. These 
changes were brought about by shifts in emphasis from government to governance, as 
well as external environmental developments, such as economic and technological 
development. In developing countries these shifts, and especially the shift from 
agriculture to industry and services and the accompanying trends in urbanisation, have 
overstretched the ability and efforts of central governments to serve from the centre. 
Hence, the prominence of local governments as service providers of choice is a 
logical consequence. As such, they should have the ability to meet their peculiar 
constituents' highly individualised and specialised service requirements of quantity, 
quality and time correctly. It is for this reason that decentralisation has become 
synonymous with a new thinking in the public sector: efficient, effective, responsive 
and politically accountable service delivery. 
It is, however, worth mentioning that the fiscal decentralisation debate among 
academics, local government experts and practitioners is premised on the notion that 
the " ... devolution of taxing and spending powers to lower levels of government" 
(Fjeldstad, 2003:133) is a sine qua non for sustainable democratic governance that 
flourishes on a nourished, broader participation of voters-cum-tax-payers in 
government decision-making. Advocates of this notion are of the view that 
decentralisation brings government (local government) closer to the people and thus it 
becomes relatively feasible for local authorities to identify people's needs and 
respond to their needs effectively, timeously and more responsively. The decisions are 
more likely to be appropriate and acceptable (for example tax increases) because of 
the direct relationship between them and the services received (Fjeldstad, 2003:133). 
The service/cost interplays that are characteristically the preferred modes of service 
delivery today (ostensibly referred to as the cost-recovery/cost-sharing or public-
1 
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sector pricing) identify, in general, with the New Public Management theory and 
philosophy, major components of decentralisation and governance reforms. 
This rationale for fiscal decentralisation, amid high expectations from the public and 
general scarcity of financial resources, is forcing governments in general, and local 
governments in particular, to contemplate and adhere to good governance in financial 
management. Innovative financial management, in an effort to meet the expectations 
of parsimonious taxpayers, has thus become the rule through such measures as 
performance measurement and integrated financial management. It is nevertheless 
important to note that good financial management is not a process in itself. It is rather 
a product of carefully crafted measures, processes and - in particular for this 
discussion - the result of a comprehensive multi-government system. The system 
must be compatible with the objectives pursued within the framework of the overall 
national and, specifically, local government policy content, policy context, capacity 
and constraints in policy implementation. There should be commitment and the ability 
to blend government views with those of other stakeholders, such as the business 
community and civil society, commonly referred to as the social capital (Putman, 
1993:167). 
These broad theoretical and practical developments have very particular 
manifestations in circumstances typically found in developing countries, and this 
thesis serves the purpose of exploring the situation in Botswana, taking its specific 
context into consideration. 
1.2 Botswana at a glance 
Botswana is at the epicentre of the Southern Africa sub-continent. Despite measuring 
some 581 730 square kilometres (about 220 000 square miles), more or less the size of 
France or the state of Texas in the United States of America, it is scarcely populated 
by only 1. 7 million people. Although scholars such as Mangcu (2003) generally 
regard Botswana's population as homogeneous, it is in fact comprised of several 
ethnic groups. These include the Tswana (60 per cent) and other non-Tswana-
speaking minorities such as the BaKalanga, San, Whites, Indians and Coloureds 
(Botswana Tourism, 2001:1-6). 
2 
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The country attained independence in 1966, following 81 years of colonial rule by the 
British. It is therefore not coincidental that an inherited British Westminster system 
designates the national Parliament as the supreme law making body in the country. 
For this same reason, a unitary system of state was also adopted from the British. The 
two-tier government system is comprised of the central and local governments. The 
former is the higher level, whilst the latter is the government at grassroots level, 
closest to the people - an ideal world in terms of fiscal decentralisation theory. 
The multi-level government system in Botswana is inextricably linked to the pre- and 
post-independence developments that largely and in many ways shaped the present 
setting of government at all levels. According to Mfundisi in Edge and Lekorwe 
(1998:163), Botswana blended the Westminster and the executive presidential 
systems. The executive powers in Botswana are vested in the President as the head of 
state and government. The President heads a Cabinet made up of the Vice-President 
(VP) and the Ministers who are the political heads of their assigned ministries. 
Information about Botswana's economic growth and development, associated with its 
democratic credentials as well as its natural-resource driven economy (more 
especially the sale of rough diamonds), abounds (Mogae, 2003; Clover, 2003; (Reuss, 
2002; Johnson, 2003:2; Standard and Poor's, 2001-2005; Lamb, 2005; Freedom 
House, 2002). Socio-economic and political information about Botswana can fairly be 
summarised as follows: 
• the economy narrowly relies on the revenue from rough diamonds sales which 
account for 35 percent of Gross Domestic Product, 80 percent of exports and 
about 45 percent of government revenues. In fact, the economy is better 
described as a two-sector economy with the public sector as the main 
employer, whilst the mineral sector is the primary generator of government 
revenues (Standard and Poor's, 2004:2-3); 
• economic development in Botswana has been remarkable since independence 
in 1966, characterized by: improved life expectancy, improved health care, 
reduced mortality rates, improved personal income, rapid infrastructural 
development and rapid growth of GDP per capita income, among others, until 
3 
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the HIV I AIDS epidemic eclipsed these achievements in the late 1990s 
(Botswana Millennium Development Goals Status Report, 2004:14; Botswana 
Human Development Report, 1997:1&2; Clover, 2003:3); 
• an agriculture-based economy was transferred into a mineral-based economy. 
The fruits of the structural changes of the economy triggered an expansion of 
the non-agriculture-based workforce concentrated within the periphery of the 
towns and cities, attributable to rapid urbanisation in Botswana (NDP 9, 
2003:16; Campbell in Edge and Lekorwe, 1998:262-267); 
• despite rapid economic growth and development over three decades, 
Botswana's economy is characterised by affluence in the midst of poverty 1• 
An analysis of the patterns of poverty in Botswana indicates that poverty 
directly correlates with the rural-urban village dichotomy, township-town 
dichotomy and town-city differentials (Mosha in Edge and Lekorwe, 
1998:292-3) (See Section 4.2.3); 
• economic planning2 had been highly centralised (top down) until in 1997 
when District Development Plans (DDPs) were introduced to run concurrently 
with NDPs. Yet, Nordas, Sekgoma and Somolakae (1998:6&36) still maintain 
that top-down planning remains the cornerstone of Botswana's successive six 
multi-year budgeting system; 
• arable farming has been declining over time since independence, due to lack 
of investment in agriculture, lack of agricultural diversity too heavily 
dependent on beef exports, and persistent droughts coupled to the fact that it is 
largely a semi-desert country (Donaldson, 2003:1; Clover, 2003:1 0; Standard 
and Poor's, 2002:3& 11; Lamb, 2005: 1-5-6; Freedom house, 2002: 1-2); 
• this Southern African country has the reputation of being the longest-lasting 
multi-party democracy on the continent. Furthermore, it is rated the least 
corrupt country on the continent and number 24 in the world by Transparency 
International; 
1 Botswana recorded a drop of the human development index (HDI) during the period 1990-200 I with 
simultaneous rapid economic growth making her one of the only 2 I countries that depicted such an 
economic paradox. (Clover, 2003:1). 
2 See NDP 7 (I 991 :79) Planning and budgeting is housed in the ministry of Finance and Development 
Planning. The involvement of the Cabinet and senior government officials (Economic Committee of 
Cabinet) in the plan preparation, policy formulation and implementation clearly indicates the 
significance and control that is vested in the aforementioned team in national economic planning. 
4 
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• The majority of the people live in the south-eastern part of the country for 
climatic reasons. The region encompasses the southern region, home to the 
capital city, Gaborone, with the largest concentration of Botswana's urban 
population living within a radius of 100-200km from the city (NDP9, 2003:4 
& 14); 
The purpose of this short precursor about Botswana is not only to serve as an 
overview of the country, but also to explain the national framework of economic 
planning in Botswana. Economic planning is directly linked to the overall operations 
of the public service and has a profound influence on intergovernmental relations. The 
implication of these for local government financial administration and management is 
the purpose of the overview. 
1.2.1 The institutional relationship between central and local government structures 
The civil service in Botswana is hierarchically structured. The administrative heads of 
the ministries are called Permanent Secretaries (PS) and are the most senior civil 
servants. All the public service departments, in one way or another, report to them 
through established bureaucratic channels. The most senior civil servant is the 
Permanent Secretary to the President (PSP) who is also an ex-officio member of the 
cabinet. There are, however, notable factors dating back to the colonial period that 
better explain the current state of affairs in the public service (Mufundisi in Edge and 
Lekorwe, 1998: 162-166). 
Firstly, before independence both the executive and political powers were the 
preserve of the civil servants. Secondly, colonialism neglected local administration 
and institutions. In fact, local administration was entrusted to the tribal 
authorities/administrations under the respective Chiefs. Tribal administration(s) was 
(were) responsible for social services such as education, health and welfare, as well as 
road construction and maintenance. Thirdly, because the private sector was small and 
undeveloped, the colonial administration considered the participation of the state in 
the economy as fundamentally critical to the development and progress of the 
economy. This became even more evident during the 1970s after the discovery of 
diamonds, when the Government of Botswana (GoB) became aggressively involved 
5 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
in the development of infrastructures. Roads, electricity, telecommunications, water 
and industrial developments characterised the contours of Botswana's development 
policy (Mufundisi in Edge and Lekorwe, 1998:162-166). 
It is for these reasons that government functions expanded qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Ministries established thereafter, partly reflected the "political and 
administrative needs and priorities of the government" (Mufundisi in Edge and 
Lekorwe, 1998: 166). Among the first eight ministries established in 1966 was the 
Ministry of Local Government and Lands. The decentralisation of service delivery to 
the district administration (which was formed shortly after independence) was critical 
to ensure enhanced delivery of quality and better services to suit the heterogeneous 
geographical features of each locality. However, because of the precarious nature of 
the economy that was characteristically underdeveloped, owing to negligence by the 
colonial administration, Botswana carefully treaded according to the planning model 
which had been pragmatically designed to attract as much in donor grants and 
preferential treatment as possible. This augmented the limited resources that the 
government had and better explains the long-established tradition of development 
planning in Botswana that the country still maintains. 
Planning still remains the most critical component of Botswana's economic 
development strategy. It is centred on six-year development planning, referred to as 
National Development Plans (NDPs). The overriding goal of NDPs is to ensure an 
equitable distribution of nationally-raised revenues (more particularly revenue 
accruing to state coffers (raised from the sale of minerals and taxable mineral 
royalties). This arrangement has been maintained/kept in place since independence, 
because the Government of Botswana (GoB) acknowledges that few regions are 
endowed with natural resources, more specifically/especially minerals. The national 
government was faced by an indispensable need to centralise such revenue sources 
and distribute them equitably in accordance with its political, economic and social 
policies. 
According to Lekorwe in Edge and Lekorwe ( 1998: 1 7 4 ), the over-centralisation of 
planning in Botswana was premised on the notion that "planning and bureaucratic 
centralisation complemented each other". The creation of a consultative body like the 
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Economic Committee of Cabinet (ECC) and the merging of the Ministries of Finance 
and Development Planning indicate the degree to which centralised planning was 
considered critical to coordinated development planning and effective implementation 
at national and district levels. The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
(MFDP), through the Division of Economic Affairs, coordinates development 
programmes across the entire spectrum of government structures. Staff from this 
division are seconded to ministerial planning units. They are responsible for project 
preparation and evaluation, plan preparation and policy advice at ministerial level 
(NDP7, 1991:81-89). 
Through the District Development Plans (DDPs), multi-year planning was also 
introduced at district level in the late 1960s with the aim of placing local authorities in 
a strategic position in the economic and social development of their areas (districts) 
(NDP 7, 1991: 80). This did not in any way compromise the centralised approach to 
development planning that characterised the preparation of the NDPs. The District 
Commissioners' (DCs) offices have an upper hand in the preparation of the DDPs. 
This appears to be undermining the basic thrust of decentralising local financial 
decision making to local governments without undue interference from the centre. 
The DC is the government agent at district level. In the words of Mfundisi in Edge 
and Lekorwe (1998:164) the DC is the "ears and eyes" of central government at local 
level. The DC is the head of the District Administration and thus, has a staff 
complement, including the District Officer Development (DOD), to ensure that there 
is better coordination and leadership from the DC at local government level. 
There is, however, growing concern that the role of the offices of DCs retards own 
initiative at local government level. The dominant role of the DOD and Councils' 
Planning Officers (CPOs) in preparing development plans for councils, undermines 
the consultative processes between the constituents and local politicians (councillors). 
An analysis carried out by Lekorwe in Edge and Lekorwe ( 1998: 177-1 79) and 
findings by SPCLGSB (2001:35-41) indicate that: 
• previously programmes at local government level were biased towards social 
services and infrastructural projects; 
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• social services were mostly provided at no cost to recipients by both tiers of 
governments. This practice, more often than not, confined the consultative 
processes between the communities and ward councillors to the provision of 
social services and infrastructural projects by the latter. Public expectations 
and demands have thus been heightened to an unsustainable level because 
communities expect their local political representatives to continue providing 
durable services at no cost; 
• contents of the DDPs were so similar that they failed to capture the priorities 
pertaining to the peculiarities of each council . The contents of the DDPs in 
most cases reflect the nationally-determined policies and priorities rather than 
those of individual local authorities; and 
• the council Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are said to decide the direction of 
the councils. This inhibits the political heads of councils to take adequate 
control of the overall direction and vision of their councils. 
As the institutional framework defines the level of interaction and relations between 
both tiers of government, its significance in facilitating proper planning, informed 
budgeting and own initiatives at local government level cannot be underestimated. 
The essence of fiscal decentralisation is achieving economic efficiency through the 
application of innovative measures. Thus the institutional framework may facilitate 
the achievement of own initiatives and affairs but at its worst, may create an enabling 
environment for poor planning and budgeting, as well as an ambiguous 
intergovernmental financial transfer mechanism -both recipes for financial improbity 
at local government level. Thus a properly administered institutional framework is a 
necessary ingredient for the successful design and implementation of a fiscal 
intergovernmental strategy. 
1.2.2 Local government administration in Botswana 
Local government3 is a creation of Parliament's statute. It can therefore theoretically 
be dismantled at the discretion of the latter without resort to public consent. (The 
Report of the Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in 
3 Local governments, municipalities, district or urban councils and subnational governments will be 
used interchangeably. However, the commonly used words in Botswana are district or urban councils. 
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Botswana (2001 :46) (Latter referred to as second SPCLGSB). Councils (district and 
towns/cities) were established under the Local Government (District Councils) Act 
Chapter 40:01 of 1966 and the Township Act Chapter 40:02 of 1955 respectively. 
They (Councils) are statutory bodies democratically elected for a five-year period. 
Local political representatives are elected every five years or whenever general 
elections are held (Lekorwe in Edge and Lekorwe, 1998: 176). Despite the fact that 
councils are statutory bodies, elected by people to carry out their mandates, they are 
not necessarily autonomous. Both Acts that established councils give the President 
extensive powers such as establishing a council in any area that the aforementioned 
finds or thinks fit, as long as the designation is published in the Gazette. 4 
Nevertheless, councils have permanent staff that are appointed, developed and 
promoted by the Unified Local Government Service (ULGS) under the Department of 
Local Government Service Management (DLGSM) as well as the Unified Teaching 
Service (UTS) for primary school teachers (Lekorwe in Edge and Lekorwe, 1998: 176; 
Wunsch, 2004). DLGSM falls within the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) at 
central level. This arrangement has been credited for building a highly-qualified pool 
of officers within the municipals establishments. Municipalities in Botswana have a 
wide array of statutory responsibilities, but they also have a wide pool of 
professionals in their employ to help them carry out their statutory and permissive 
assignments. These include medical doctors, engineers, economic planners, physical 
planners, chiefs of staff and others (Wunsch, 2004). 
It is nevertheless relevant to point out that the administrative challenges that local 
authorities are faced with in Botswana restrict the extent to which decision-making 
powers could be devolved to them. This includes the extent to which decision-making 
powers to generate own revenues and determine own expenditure priorities is decided 
by the financial and human resources capacity In fact, the report by the SPCLGSB 
(2001:55) stated that the positions where the DLGSM is still the employing agent 
constitute the highest vacancy rates at municipal level. 
4 See Section 4 Part II of Local Government (District Councils) Act. 
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It is critical to note that the main purpose for adopting fiscal decentralisation reforms 
is to achieve and increase allocative efficiency in the provision of local public 
services, through the devolution of expenditure responsibilities from the higher tier of 
government to local authorities (see section 2.4.3). Therefore it should, as a matter of 
course, be ensured that the implementing capacity of the local authorities is not in 
doubt. Inadequate capacity would not only prevent local authorities to carry out their 
functional responsibilities diligently but, because of lack of administrative human 
resources, technical and managerial capacity, undermine their revenue-generating 
initiatives. Hence, lack of institutional capacity would certainly have a double-
barrelled constraining impact on the implementation of fiscal decentralisation (See 
section 2.5.5). 
1.2.3 Local government finances 
Due to the heavy reliance of local governments on central government for their 
recurrent and development budgets, . the notion that local authorities in Botswana 
exist at the mercy of Parliament seems even more real. This reverses the very basic 
thrusts of decentralisation: accountability and a responsiveness of the local authorities 
to their constituents (National Development Plan 8, 1997:467; Sharma in Reddy, Sing 
and Moodley, 2003:233). Findings by the Botswana Institute for Development of 
Policy Analysis (Salkin, 2004) overwhelmingly point to ambiguous vertical 
intergovernmental financial relations, poor financial management and poor 
uncoordinated service delivery, not fine-tuned to local priorities, as the outcomes of a 
weak management system. Lack of programmatic focus at local level in various 
sectors in Botswana (Oluwu and Wunsch, 2004:1 00), failure by the local authorities 
to timeously and accurately account for the funds allocated them, poor standards of 
financial management and their incapacity to manage finances compounded the state 
of financial management (SPCLGSB, 2001 :46). 
Inadequate political accountability to the electorate, ansmg from the vertical 
intergovernmental funding mechanisms and internal revenue generating measures, 
contribute to poor financial management in, as follows: 
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• local governments do not have access to tax revenue, except urban councils 
that levy property taxes. Taxation still remains the prerogative of the national 
government (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:93); 
• line ministries set fees on behalf of local authorities . This erodes their (local 
authorities) authority within their areas of jurisdictions to own up for any 
financial misdeeds. Local personnel have thus developed a tendency to expect 
that the national government will cover their financial shortfalls whenever 
they fail to plan and execute within their resources constraints. (Peters-Berries, 
1995 referred to by Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:93); 
• high default rates and arrears in service levies, indicative of ineffective 
administration, exacerbate the already limited revenue sources ( Sharma in 
Reddy et al, 2003:234); 
• the absence of clear, transparent and predictable criteria to guide the allocation 
of funds budgeted for both recurrent and capital budgets for local governments 
by the Ministries of Local Government as well as Finance and Development 
Planning respectively. The criteria are supposed to indicate the methodologies 
that guide the distribution of nationally raised revenues for both recurrent and 
development expenditures among all councils. The current arrangement is 
indicative of a (SPCLGSB, 2001 :60), top-down decentralisation strategy for 
the following reasons: (a) no effort is made to build the capacity of local 
authorities to run their affairs according to the peculiar needs of their 
constituents (SPCLGSB, 2001 :48); (b) Poor planning and budgeting, as a 
result of unpredictable and uncertainty of revenue availability, are provided. 
The annual accumulation of unspent and substantial balances at the end of municipal 
financial years exemplifies a centralised approach to decentralisation. The tremendous 
growth of financial transfers (support grants), at 31.7 per cent during the period 
1994/5 and 2001/2, (bumper years of diamond boom in Botswana) clearly indicates 
an ad hoc-dominated transfer mechanism that does not augur well for local finance 
planning and administration (SPCLGSB, 2001 :54). 
Based on the informative points mentioned above, it is therefore suggested that the 
sustainability of local governance, and in particular decentralised governance, is 
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threatened. Sustainable governance here refers to the " availability of finances to 
provide the services needed but refers to the overall capacity of the organisation to 
deliver such services and adapt to changing circumstances over extended periods of 
time, maintaining and improving the service concerned' as conceptualised by Cloete, 
Merrifield and Masiteng (2003:3). The likely threat in Botswana emanates from the 
fact that the main source of revenues for the national government is diamonds mining 
which is vulnerable to the fluctuations of the global natural resources prices that 
depreciate in value over time (Nordas and Gergis, 2000:9). This will have a direct 
bearing on the district/urban council economies, as the financial transfers will be 
reduced drastically. It will be especially severe when there is an extraordinary 
economic slowdown, ultimately resulting in centralisation that will further worsen the 
top-down economic planning (multi-year budgeting) that is still prevalent at the 
expense of local government (Nordas, Sekgoma and Somolakae, 1998:6 &36). 
Olowu and Wunsch (2004:97) in their research found that the top-down tendency of 
decision-making on local government affairs is so established that the Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) determines the amount of capital 
development and retains final authority to approve or disapprove of any specific 
project, and that local governments are/remain subject to decisions made at the central 
level through complex and cumbersome processes. 
Whereas there is general concern that local authorities cannot account accurately for 
funds allocated them, it is essential to indicate that in accordance with section 124(2) 
ofthe Constitution ofthe Republic of Botswana LN 83 of 1966; section 38 of Finance 
and Audit Act Chapter 54:01 of 1970 and the Local Government (District Councils) 
(Amendment Act 10 of 1999) section 3, municipal councils are required to submit 
their accounts to the Auditor General within three months from the end of each 
financial year upon which the latter completes the audit of accounts within the 12 
months of their submission. 
However, local authorities fail to account for funds allocated them, as indicated in 
Appendix 7. Their books of accounts, as at the end of 2005, were at least two to four 
years in arrears. Yet, the local government (District Councils) (Amendment) Act No. 
10 of 1999, section 48, established the Local Authorities Public Accounts Committee 
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(LAP AC) in order to examine, among others, the accounts of every district/urban 
council and examine the reports of the Auditor General and audited financial 
statements. 
It is essential at the end of this section to indicate that the implicat~ons of centralised 
planning, centralised local revenue generation, and centralised allocation of financial 
resources, mainly from the centre to local authorities, cannot be underestimated. 
These factors have a direct bearing on the extent to which the objectives of a fiscal 
decentralisation strategy can achieve financial probity and innovation. 
1.3 Rationale for the study 
As explained in the previous section, local government in Botswana is characterised 
by centralised administrative structures, expenditure priorities and revenue generation. 
The result of such centralisation has been weakness in planning and local initiative, as 
well as poor service delivery at unaccounted for, exorbitantly high cost (Oluwu and 
Wunsch, 2004:1 04). It is therefore fitting to state that the justification for this study 
emanates from a number of factors in Botswana that are not necessarily unique to the 
country. The experiences of many other countries that have had to review their 
intergovernmental fiscal relations resemble the following development characteristics 
that Botswana is currently experiencing: 
• global economic pressures resulting in reduced government revenues (Bennett, 
1990:3). Indeed, Botswana is experiencing an economic slow-down because 
of the current plateau in diamond production. Economic growth declined from 
as high as 13.9 per cent per annum in 1999 to just over five percent in the 
years 2003/2004. The trend was expected to continue in the financial year 
2005/2006. Projected growth was between four and five per cent (Budget 
Speech, 2005:4 &21); 
• welfarism; when the rapid rise of public expectations outpaces the available 
financial resources ("the principle of entitlement"), often from a stagnant and 
narrowing financial base (Bennett, 1990:6). Botswana has a reputation of 
substantial annual budget surpluses, yet there has been a consistent reversal of 
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the status quo over the past few years. During the NDP8, there were 
substantial budget deficits despite forecasted surpluses (Draft National 
Development Plan 9, 2002:3; Salkin, 2005). Welfarism, coupled to sustained 
and unplanned budget deficits, constitutes what in this discussion is referred to 
as fiscal stress5; 
• the "grant economy", where decisions taken by local authorities do not 
necessarily reflect the needs of the constituents within a given jurisdiction, but 
those of the revenue sources (national government) (Bennett, 1990:6). For 
example, local authorities in Botswana during the economic boom in the late 
1990s and early years of 2000, enjoyed substantial growth of financial 
transfers from the national government (Oluwu and Wunsch, 2004:92), 
growing tremendously at 31.7 per cent during the periods 1994/95 and 2001/2. 
The accumulation of substantial unspent resources (PCLGSB, 2001:48 & 54) 
clearly indicates that there is an established top-down grant economy that 
reflects the financial capacity of national government, as opposed to the 
economic state and financial and administrative capacities of local economies, 
to adjust to the changing needs and expectations of their constituents. The 
usual undesirables of a grant economy are: (i) lack of political ownership of 
the council's financial decisions or projects, (ii) endemic corruption in the 
tendering and procurement processes, and (iii) soft budget constraint that often 
results in excessive financial mismanagement; 
• inaccurate budget projections: the difference between estimated income and 
actual income is as high as over 200% in some district councils (Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004:100; Wunsch, 2004; Peters-Berries, 1994:19) 
• poor cost-recovery system for local services (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:1 00; 
Peters-Berries, 1994: 14/15); 
• most district councils made frequent applications for supplementary budgets 
(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:100; Peters-Berries, 1994); 
• The central government covers their capital/development and recurrent 
expenditures (Sharma, in Reddy et al, 2003:233). For example, NDP 8 
(1997 :467) states that the councils receive 100 per cent of their development 
funds in the form of grants from central government, whilst revenue support 
5 Fiscal stress is "the coincidence of an unusual concentration of expenditure needs and a diminishing 
resource base" (Bailey, 1999: I 09). 
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grants for local authorities stand at 70 per cent for town and city councils and 
90 percent for district councils (SPCLGSB, 2001 :46); 
• Local government tax: an income tax revoked at the height of the diamond-
mining boom jeopardised the financial independence of local authorities. 
(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:93). In short, local authorities in Botswana do not 
have access to tax revenues, except urban councils (in the form of property 
tax); taxation still remains the prerogative of the national government; and 
• line ministries set the fees on behalf of the local authorities. The role of the 
"parent ministry" (Ministry of Local Government (MLG)) in the financial 
affairs of local authorities undermines local governance. This has resulted in 
service-costs mismatch, borne out of service fees levied at below service costs; 
ultimately an ineffective system to determine the actual costs of services has 
become the norm rather than the exception within the local governments 
(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:93). A 'paternal-like relationship' between the 
national and local governments seems to restrict the development of 
sustainable local governance, resulting in the agentification of municipalities 
(views municipalities as extensions of the national government departments' 
'physical decentralisation'). 
The seriousness of the economic downturn in Botswana cannot be overemphasised. 
The fact that government's main revenue source, the export of rough diamonds, is 
denominated in terms of United States of America dollars (US$) has many 
implications for government budgeting and economic planning. The depreciation of 
the US dollar and currencies of other major trading countries since 2002 has resulted 
in decreased foreign currency inflows, prompting the government to devalue the 
currency against a basket of currencies in February 2004 (by 7.5 percent), followed by 
another sharp devaluation of 12.5 per cent in 2005 that took the markets by surprise 
(Moody's Investors Service, 2004:3). In face of the looming budget deficits, the 
government of Botswana went as far as selling listed shares in the Anglo-American 
Conglomerate, introduced cost-recovery measures across the board for all the 
ministries, including the Ministry of Education (who subsequently introduced modest 
and negligible school fees at secondary and tertiary levels). However, the government 
is under fiscal stress that will take time to subsidise. The HIV I AIDS scourge cost over 
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P400 million in financial year 2004/5 against an original estimate cost ofP183 million 
in 2003. In the financial year 2005/6 the fight against HIV I AIDS fiercely ballooned to 
over P600 million (Budget Speech, 2004:16,17,19; Budget Speech, 2005:2,4-
5,19,21,23; Draft NDP9, 2002:3-4, 7-8). 
The socio-economic developments in Botswana, as briefly discussed above, partly 
necessitated this study because of the profound and causal relationship between them 
and the comprehensive implementation of fiscal decentralisation. After thorough 
discussion and analysis of the issues, problems and opportunities that the current 
fiscal decentralisation system exhibit, the discussion was intended to highlight areas 
where it is necessary to initiate policy recommendations. Such recommendations 
should be instrumental in actualising genuine and economically feasible fiscal 
decentralisation strategy in Botswana, within the prevailing socio-economic 
environment. 
1.4 Statement of the research problem 
In order to address the study on a fiscal decentralisation strategy for innovative local 
government financial management in Botswana adequately, the research problem is 
formulated as follows: 
The current framework of Botswana's fiscal intergovernmental relation system is 
premised on the historical demarcation of districts; as such the allocation of functional 
responsibilities and/or expenditure assignments, revenue assignments and 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer formula, is inconsistent with the prevailing socio-
economic conditions in various districts, in the process creating an imbalance between 
the aforementioned three variables. Hence, the following common problems are 
identifiable in the current fiscal decentralisation strategy: 
• the revenue base of both district and urban councils remams narrow and 
insignificant, despite measures taken to improve the revenue- generating 
capacity of local authorities; 
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• the assignment of functional responsibilities to district and urban councils is 
not aligned with the revenue-generating capacity of local authorities. As such 
a blanket or national approach to the allocation of expenditure assignments to 
local authorities has created vertical and horizontal gaps between the levels of 
governments; and 
• finally, a fiscal intergovernmental transfer mechanism does not take into 
account the gap between expenditure assignments and revenue-generating 
capacity of local authorities, but the capacity of the national government to 
fund functional assignments on a yearly basis. This has resulted in an 
uninformed financial transfer mechanism that gives local authorities room to 
be imprudent in the management of their finances and budgeting, as well as be 
lackadaisical in their quest to increase their own revenue generation. 
It is within the confines of this discussion to investigate the effect of the current fiscal 
intergovernmental relations system (more especially the fiscal transfers because they 
constitute major components of both recurrent and capital budgets of municipalities) 
on financial management at municipal level. That is, whether the current 
intergovernmental arrangements provide incentives for innovative revenue generation 
and spending or inhibits revenue generation whilst being conducive to wasteful 
spending. The hypothesis therefore is, that lack of innovative financial management at 
local government level in Botswana is the outcome of an ambiguous, as well as 
homogeneous, limited and inflexible fiscal decentralisation system. 
Therefore the independent variable here is, "A fiscal decentralisation strategy" which 
outlines the expenditure and revenue assignments, the institutional framework 
between sub-national and national governments and the financial intergovernmental 
transfer mechanism. 
The dependent variables or the observed phenomena are the financial probity and 
innovations that are influenced by 'a fiscal intergovernmental strategy'. Therefore, 
financial innovation is measured in terms of the following factors: 
• alignment between planning and budgeting; 
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• robustness of marginal revenues through tax innovation that takes into account 
the economic developments that have taken place since 1966, alternative 
charging methodologies, as well as costs saving and costs-recovery 
mechanisms; 
• flexibility of the local authorities to expend their financial resources in 
accordance with their specific pressing needs, rather than those articulated by 
the national government. 
1.5 Research objectives 
It is the aim of this research to analyse the existing fiscal intergovernmental relations 
that govern the relationship between the national and local governments in Botswana. 
This is aimed at establishing the criteria that are followed in assigning expenditure 
and revenue responsibilities to local governments; finding out whether the current 
arrangement enhances innovative financial management and political accountability 
on the part of local authorities and assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
planning and budgeting- all amid heavy reliance by the municipalities on the centre. 
This is even more important today, at a time when Botswana's economy is 
experiencing a slow-down in economic growth rate, dictated by the unpredictable 
global economic developments, as it has direct impact on the ability of national 
government finances to provide for increased financing of local affairs by the centre. 
The objectives of the study are to: 
• Assess and review the fiscal decentralisation strategy adopted by the 
government of Botswana in view ofthe objectives it seeks to achieve; 
• Find out whether the current fiscal decentralisation strategy is compatible with 
the objectives that the government has set to achieve; 
• Recommend the necessary reforms that the government should embark on in 
order to cultivate a culture of financial probity and innovation at municipal 
level thus ensuring sustainable local governance as well as generating new 
research areas that could facilitate a smooth transitional period between the 
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reform period and full scale implementation of the necessary reforms that will 
stir local authorities to their best performance since independence. 
1.5 Research design and methodology 
Welman and Kruger (2001 :46) postulate that research design is a plan or a blueprint, 
according to which researchers "obtain research participants (subjects) and collect 
information from them". In order to ensure that the study will generate scientifically-
valid findings and conclusions by adequately answering the research problem and 
hypothesis, a research design has been devised, as indicated below. 
Firstly, given the time, human and financial resources constraints required to 
adequately address the research question at a macro level, a case study approach will 
be applied on the basis of the advantages that it offers, without necessarily 
jeopardising the quality of the findings or their interpretations in a scientific fashion. 
That is, the selection of the subjects of study (district and urban councils) will be 
based on the following conditions as recommended by Welman and Kruger 
(2001: 182): 
• individual cases to be studied will be highly representative; and 
• there will be an intensive study on a limited number of units of analysis as 
indicated below. 
Secondly, an intensive literature study will be undertaken in order to obtain clarity 
about local government, with specific reference to the powers and responsibilities 
assigned them by legislations establishing local authorities. The literature study will 
be undertaken in order to understand the dynamics of the assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities, as well as the powers to generate marginal own revenues and the 
vertical fiscal transfer mechanism. A literature review on the institutional framework 
will also form an integral part of the study. The institutional framework indicates the 
extent to which local authorities may run their own affairs. In essence, the study will 
assume that the assignment of expenditure and revenue responsibilities and the 
intergovernmental transfer mechanism are largely influenced by the institutional 
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framework that delimit the extent to which local authorities can generate funds, 
predict vertical transfers and run their own financial affairs, all without undue 
interference from the centre. 
Thirdly, a sample frame of the population of study will be drawn. A representative 
sample from the target population will be designed in such a mar.ner that the study 
will generate findings that will not compromise the population validitl and 
7 ecological validity tests. A stratified random sampling will as such be designed by 
way of outlining stratification variables. Stratification variables that will be used in 
order to come up with clearly distinguishable strata are as follows: (a) the level of 
economic development of each district/urban council studied; (b) the level of 
urbanisation; (c) closeness/ proximity of the district/urban council to the major 
primary centres; (d) population distribution within the district/urban council; (e) 
poverty and affluence levels; and employment and/or unemployment levels. 
This design will be chosen on the basis of the fact that a smaller sample is applicable 
and, as such, less time will be required to undertake the study. In order to carry out an 
empirical study on fiscal decentralisation in Botswana, relatively broad longitudinal 
data, covering financial years 2001/02 to 2005/06, on each case study will be 
analysed. Such data will include budgetary information (recurrent) on a range of 
services. The thesis will investigate and analyse local spending on selected individual 
expenditure items, income from government grants, own incomes and demographic 
information, as well as the overall economic environment in each locality, in order to 
establish whether fiscal decentralisation reforms in Botswana acknowledge the socio-
economic and population changes that have characterised the country since the 
establishment of councils. In order to carry out an empirical study, the following 
municipal councils will be used as case studies: 
Gaborone City Council (GCC), a town council established through the Township Act, 
has more or less the same characteristics as other towns, except that by virtue of it 
being the capital, it enjoys more attention than the rest of the town councils in terms 
6 According to Welman and Kruger (2001 :120) population validity is "the generalisation of the results 
obtained to the population to which the research hypothesis applies." 
7Ecological validity is defined as the degree to which obtained results may be generalised to all 
circumstances that are implied by the research hypothesis. (Welman and Kruger, 2001:120) 
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of infrastructural developments and economic opportunities. However, because GCC 
has access to the same revenue sources assigned to other town councils, the same 
expenditure assignments and is subjected to the same vertical intergovernmental 
system in the same manner as other urban councils, it is equally a good candidate for 
this study. Problems, issues, challenges and opportunities identified here can be 
successfully replicated in other town councils, with little modifications, where 
necessary, to suit specific areas or/and towns (See section 3.5.1 ). 
K weneng District Council (KDC) was established through the Local Government 
(District Council) Act. KDC represents an intriguing category of districts that depicts 
both the rural and urban elements that are characteristically the differentiating features 
between the district and urban councils respectively. This category of councils 
represents a new trend of historically rural villages that are progressively being 
transformed into townships and towns within the periphery of major towns, especially 
within the vicinity of the capital and second largest city. 8 However, the current 
decentralisation system classifies them as district councils and thus they enjoy the 
same status accorded other rural district councils in terms of vertical fiscal transfers 
from the national government. Hence, their capacity to generate their own internal 
revenues is defined in the same manner as with other rural district councils. By 
implication they are expected to generate only limited own revenues, as do other rural 
districts, despite their enhanced capacity to do so. The same approach is adopted here. 
Findings made in KDC are considered representative of other districts that fall within 
this category (See section 3.5.2). 
The third case study will be done in Kgalagadi District Council (KgDC). KgDC is one 
of the districts populated by the impoverished majority, located far away from the 
major primary centres9 and, generally, sparsely populated in terms of the number of 
people per square kilometre. This study considers this district council to be one of the 
few that marginally benefited economically from the country's rapid economic 
growth and development, urbanisation and population growths since independence. 
As opposed to the majority of councils that are located along the eastern corridor of 
8 The City of Francistown is the second largest city in Botswana in the north eastern part of the 
country. 
9 
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Botswana where a high potential for arable farming served as a pulling factor for the 
majority of the citizens, KgDC lies within the Kalahari Desert. It is for this reason that 
district continues to be scarcely populated. This has had many other repercussions that 
are developmental in nature and these are attended to thoroughly in chapter 3 (See 
section 3.5.3). 
Fourthly, efforts will be made to ensure that secondary information collected from 
various sources is validated for credibility by comparing and contrasting such 
information through various methods. Hence, data will be collected using diverse 
methodologies. These include newspaper clips, academic journals, papers and text 
books, government policies and documents, questionnaires and interviews as well as 
through participant observations. 
Semi-structured questionnaires will be designed and sent to the Ministries of Local 
Government (MLG), Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) as well as to the 
two municipal governments, GCC and KgDC. Semi-structured questionnaires will 
outline areas of interest, as outlined in the research problem statement and research 
hypothesis, with special reference to the findings of the Second Presidential 
Commission on Local Government Structure in Botswana Report of 2001. In order to 
clear up some issues that may not be adequately answered in the questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews will be arranged with the MLG and MFDP, and at least one of 
the three case study local authorities. More attention in the follow-up interviews will 
be focused on the MLG, because the ministry has a lot of influence in both the 
recurrent and development budgets of the local authorities, as indicated above. 
A purposive sampling method will be used in the selection of interviewees. This 
methodology will be chosen in order to ensure that key informants will be selected to 
provide all the necessary information regarding local government finances in 
Botswana, vis-a-vis the design and implementation of a workable fiscal 
decentralisation strategy. Where possible, workshops on capital projects at municipal 
level will be attended in order to have better insights into fiscal decentralisation and 
its impact on financial management at local government level. 
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1.6 Definition of concepts 
In order to avoid ambiguity and create an in-depth understanding of this discussion, 
concepts that are considered to be fundamentally the hallmarks for undertaking this 
research are conceptualised and contextualised by definition and significance and/or 
justification. These are decentralisation and/or fiscal decentralisation and innovative 
financial management. 
1. 7.1 Decentralisation 
Cameron (2002: 115) best summarises the justification for decentralisation as follows: 
The local authorities, as the representatives of the electorate, have the duty to account 
for their decisions. Hence, they should be held accountable and responsible for the 
policy decisions that the law mandates them to carry out. It is therefore logical to say 
that the significance, or perhaps the extent, of decentralisation is without substance if 
local authorities remain financially incapacitated to exercise their developmental and 
constitutional mandates. The capacity of local government to be autonomous and 
accountable depends on its ability to create a substantial tax base with a high degree 
of discretion to vary the rate of the tax collected. Moreover, the grants from national 
government, though desirable, may be a source of the insubordination of local 
government -depending on the nature of the grants. For instance, general grants are 
desirable in that local authorities determine the way in which they are utilised, no 
matter how limited they are, as opposed to specific grants which come with 
conditions, spearheaded by the funding sphere, demoting local governments into 
implementing the designs of authorities accountable solely to the central government 
through the Ministry of Local Government. 
However, as Fjeldstad (2003:133) rightly remarked, the results and approaches, as 
well as the extent of decentralisation, vary from country to country. Hence, the word 
itself is a blanket term encompassing diverse approaches (Cameron 2002:114). 
Approaches to decentralisation reforms can be summarised as follows (Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004:5): 
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• Deconcentration: the transfer of responsibilities and authority from national 
government to local government. 
• Devolution: the transfer of responsibilities, resources and accountability from 
national government to local government by law and other formal actions. 
• Delegation: the transfer of only responsibility, authority and resources from 
national government to local government, with accountability 
being/remaining? the preserve of the national government. 
According to Vosloo et al in Cameron (2002:114), devolution is the extensive form of 
decentralisation. It is the 'conferment of rule-making and executive power of a 
specified or residual nature on formally constituted sub-national units' (Vosloo et al, 
1974:10, as referred to by Cameron, 2002:114). The decentralisation strategy 
postulated in this research therefore refers to the substantive democratic (devolution) 
reforms that have the following characteristics (Mawhood, 1993:9-1 0) (adapted from 
Cameron, 2002: 114): 
• Local government should be separate constitutionally from central 
government. It should be responsible for a significant range of services. 
• Local authorities should have their own treasury, separate budget and 
accounts, and their own taxes to produce a significant part of their revenue. 
• Local authorities should have the right to allocate substantial resources, 
including the power to decide over expenditure, to vary revenue collection and 
to appoint and promote staff. 
• Local councils, consisting predominantly of elected representatives, should 
decide policy. 
• Central government administrations should play only an indirect, advisory and 
inspection role. 
A thorough analysis of the multi-level government system requires a review of several 
aspects that give a vivid picture of the state of fiscal decentralisation. These include 
an examination list of the intergovernmental fiscal relations, as recommended by the 
Institute on Governance (1998:2): expenditure responsibilities; local authorities' own 
revenue sources - including taxation; the criteria for fiscal transfers and the 
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institutional aspects such as measures put in place to enforce the fundamental 
principles of good governance. These include, but are not limited to: the legal 
framework for governmental finances, capacity building at local government level, 
accountability measures and monitoring systems. 
1.7.2 Why decentralise? 
The benefits, as well as the possible costs of decentralisation, are wide ranging. Below 
is a summary of the envisaged benefits (an extrapolated version of both costs and 
benefits of decentralisation is explored in chapter 2) arising out of decentralisation, as 
referred to by Sagbas (1997-2004): 
• Political: promotion of diversity in public choices; closer congruence between 
the preferences ofthe public and public policy. 
• Economic: allocative efficiency; production efficiency. 
• Administrative: the close proximity of local governments to their jurisdiction 
provides for efficiency. 
This research focuses on fiscal decentralisation, albeit not at the absolute exclusion of 
the political and administrative aspects. For the purpose of a clear conceptualisation 
of this terminology, a concise definition of fiscal decentralisation is as follows 
(Sagbas, 1997-2004): 
"Fiscal decentralization is the diffusion of fiscal power from center to localities. 
Diffusing fiscal power means assigning expenditure responsibilities and either 
allowing local authorities to collect their own revenues and/or allocating transfers to 
meet these expenditures". 
However, it is important to note that in this discussion, while appreciating that many 
authors use the words 'fiscal federalism' and 'fiscal decentralisation' 
interchangeably, the latter is preferred here. This is for the reason that federalism is an 
advanced form of decentralisation found mostly in larger and more progressive 
countries, whilst decentralisation is associated with unitary states where the extent of 
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devolution is still within the 'control' of the national government. Botswana 1s 
certainly one such as the latter. 
Because local authorities are never in a position to fully finance all their expenditure 
responsibilities from their own revenue sources, national government grants are used 
to balance the fiscal gap. Hollies and Plokker ( 1995: 13 2-141) identified three models 
of grant allocation systems: centralised tax sharing; decentralised tax sharing and a 
hybrid allocation that is characterised by strong local taxation. 
1. 7.3 Innovative financial management 
Financial management has under gone tremendous transformation since the beginning 
of civilisation. The concept of good governance has not only changed the dynamics of 
political governance but has played an equally pivotal role in shaping the democratic 
management of finances. The traditional principles of good governance have, as is 
widely known, been aimed at creating and maintaining transparency and 
accountability from the authorities entrusted with managing public monies. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example, 
developed the best practice for budget transparency through periodic budget reports, 
specific disclosures (for example tax expenditures), in an effort to ensure the integrity, 
control and accountability in the same manner as public sector activities are 
undertaken by executing authorities (OECD, 2001). As such the generation and 
utilisation of public resources in an economical, efficient and effective fashion, 
influenced by the reigning economic ideology, have given birth to what is referred to 
as innovative financial management (Burger, 2004:6). 
Due to the scarcity of financial resources, amid high expectations from the public, 
most governments have since been compelled to pay homage to the principles of good 
governance in financial management mainly to ensure the sustainability of 
predetermined service levels within the financial constraints of such local authorities. 
The desire to maximise the conversion of inputs into outputs and outputs into 
outcomes dictates the need to adhere to the so-called principles of good financial 
management such as: 
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• Transparency: this entails openness about policy intensions, formulation and 
implementation (Burger, 2004; Blondal, 2003:20; Gildenhuys, 1997:35); and 
• Public accountability: demonstrated in part by accounting standards " ... that 
require fair presentation and full disclosure" (Allen, 2002:11 ). 
To give further impetus to the principles of transparency and accountability, already 
mentioned, the challenges of financial scarcity, amid a surge in public expectations of 
delivery from their governments, have precipitated the adoption of the following 
(innovative financial management) techniques : 
• Performance measurement and management: this technique derives its 
authenticity from the notion that "what gets measured gets managed" 
(Blondal, 2003: 18). Performance indicators are thus reconciled to financial 
performance (Burger and Ducharme, 2000:50) in what may be referred to as 
'efficiency measurement and management'. 
• Integrated financial management: includes-
a Multi-year spending (Schick, 2003:8) or what Bouckaert (2000:64) refers 
to as "super budgeting" (Quoted from Burger, 2004:31 ). In Botswana, the 
multi-year budgets manifest themselves as National Development Plans at 
national level and District Development Plans and Urban Development 
Plans at local government level. 
o Fiscal rules-driven budgeting: the following are some of its core features 
as identified by Schick (2003:8): 
);> "lengthening the time frame from a single year to the medium 
term; 
);> baseline projections (or forward estimates) of future budget 
conditions; 
);> estimates ofthe impact of policy changes on future budgets; 
);> procedures for monitoring budget out-turns and for taking 
corrective action when necessary; and 
);> enforcement mechanisms to insure that opportunistic politicians do 
not breach the rules". 
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However, it is worth mentioning that the successful implementation of such good 
financial management techniques is subject to the balanced intergovernmental fiscal 
relations between national and local governments. Such relations should be based on 
the following principles (Gildenhuys, 1993: 182): financial accountability; right of 
existence of each sphere; integration of functions; coordination of functions; adequate 
revenue; equal adjudication; adequate increase in revenue; revenue security and 
certainty and, finally, adaptability. 
Cameron (2002: 115) argues that, " ... the most autonomous of local revenue is when 
local government has a substantial tax base and has wide discretion to vary the rate of 
the tax collected". As such, the relative autonomy of local governments to run their 
affairs amounts to the availability of sufficient financial resources to exercise their 
functions, yet pursuing the principle of 'allocative efficiency'. According to Bailey 
(2003 :21) this principle itself underpins economic efficiency and decentralisation in 
that the allocation of resources requires local rather than central decisions. Bailey's 
view of allocative efficiency is incongruent with the decentralisation principle 
adopted by the Council of Europe's Charter of Local Self-Government (Article 4), 
that 'Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those 
authorities which are closest to the citizen" (Adapted from, Bailey, 2003:21) (See also 
Bird, Litvack and Rao, 1995:1-3). 
Contrary to theory, the reality on the ground is that local authorities do not wholly 
finance all the services that they provide. This reality therefore goes against the 
requirement of absolute financial autonomy as a prerequisite for allocative efficiency 
at local government level. Hence: "The greater the dependence of local governments 
on central sources of finance, the more likely they are to be subject to central 
controls" (Bailey, 2003:27). Therefore, as explained above, the continued flow of-
and in particular substantial - financial transfer from central government to local 
government is an impediment to the notion of innovative financial management 
enshrined in NPM philosophy. 
The extent of innovative financial management is thus dependent on the degree of the 
effectiveness of the fiscal decentralisation system that takes cognisance of the 
capacity of local authorities to generate their own revenues, run their own financial 
28 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
and developmental affairs within their financial and administrative capacity. It also 
relies on their ability to independently assess the state of their economies in relation to 
national developments (integration of national and local government budgeting and 
planning). This implies that the above-mentioned financial strategies require a 
reciprocal relationship with the proposed innovative ways of providing services at 
local government if they wish to have a lasting impact on the local economies and 
those the local authorities seek to serve. Innovative financial management will, for the 
purpose of this study, be limited to the following factors that in part reflect the state of 
affairs in any central-local relations: 
• Cost reduction and savings through such methods as contracting out, 
where necessary, to reap the benefits of economies of scale as well as 
initiating horizontal intergovernmental relations - especially when 
undertaking costly projects that may have a crowding-in effect on 
private-sector investment; 
• The principle of correspondence in service delivery; 
• Cost recovery and cost sharing in service delivery; 
• Variations of service across different categories of demands, such as 
for the business community, the wealthy and the poor. 
• Alternative charging methodologies; 
• Tax innovation reflecting the economic developments that have taken 
place since 1966 in Botswana (for example the reclassification of 
settlements as either urban or rural) and 
• Designing fiscal intergovernmental transfers m such a manner that 
local authorities may successfully budget within the hard budget 
constraints. 
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1.8 Contents of the thesis 
Firstly, this research succinctly outlines and substantially discusses the broad 
background and the rationale for undertaking this empirical study, particularly in the 
context of the local governance finance and global economic developments that have 
a direct bearing on the sustainability of local governance in Botswana. 
Secondly, a relatively thorough review of the fiscal decentralisation literature from an 
international perspective (theory and empirical experience), with specific reference to 
its successes and failures in both the developed and developing countries constitutes 
chapter two. 
Thirdly, before embarking on three case studies, this discussion highlights an 
overview of the fiscal intergovernmental relations and the structure of Botswana's 
economy. One of the case studies is an urban area (the capital city), while the other 
two are district councils. One of the district councils is in the vicinity of the capital 
city. 
The fourth chapter discusses and analyses the findings of chapter 3. 
The fifth and final chapter concludes the discussion and provides a systematic outline 
of recommendations specifically suited for Botswana. 
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Chapter 2 
2. FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: THE PHILOSOPHICAL, POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
The popularity of fiscal decentralisation as a multi-pronged field of study by, inter 
alia development economists, political scientists, public finance theorists and 
generally an array of administrative science-related subjects' experts is no doubt 
associated with the significance of the public sector in achieving sustainable 
development in any given country. Among some of the internationally renown subject 
experts from these fields of study are included, amongst others, Oates (Fiscal 
federalism, 1972); Musgrave (The theory of public finance, 1959) and Tie bout (A pure 
theory of local expenditure, 1956), whose theories continue to enjoy rigorous debate 
in the world of everyday life and lay knowledge, the world of science and scientific 
research, and the world of meta-science. 10 
Recently new dynamic individuals have since in the late 1980s emerged who have 
thus far navigated this concept at various levels of governance, including at the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund and national and sub-national levels. The 
persistent theoretical and empirical studies of this concept have had notable impact on 
the perceptions, some of them positive and negative over time, about the potential 
benefits and dangers of fiscal decentralisation. The paradigm shifts in reasoning about 
the perception of fiscal decentralisation are reflective of a number of factors including 
the rapidly-changing global economic conditions, subsequent reforms of national 
economic planning emanating from the influence of the former, deepening 
democratization, population diversity, growing economic affluence (increase of 
incomes associated with the superior good) (Tanzi, 2001:1-3) and, finally, the 
repositioning of local government as a strategic and autonomous level of government 
(Smoke, 2001 :3). A better understanding of decentralisation and, in particular fiscal, 
decentralisation requires a solid background knowledge of the public sector reforms 
that have characterised the world for some decades now. 
10See Mouton (200 1: 138) for further explanation of common- sense knowledge (world 1 ), world 2 is 
where common-sense knowledge is subjected to systematic and rigorous enquiry whilst world 3 (Meta 
science world) refers to the research methodologies and theories that are used to reflect upon scientific 
researches undertaken. 
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2.1 Globalisation and the public sector reforms 
The repercussions of the end of the Cold War cannot be underestimated. A new trend 
of economic and political thinking emerged that reinvigorated the social aspect of 
economic planning and political decision making. The magnitude of socio-economic, 
ideological and technological developments and innovations has had intrinsic impact 
on the perceived role of the state (Larbi, 1999 referred to by McLaughlin, Osborne 
and Ferlie, 2002:213). New concepts were conceived such as governance as opposed 
to government, network approach to governance as opposed to representative 
government, digital governance/individualised governance as opposed to collective 
government, interdependent nations as opposed to sovereign governments and, 
finally, a global village/borderless world against the background of rigid, politically-
motivated international relations11 (Cloete, 2003: 14-24; Raga, 2003). 
According to Burger (2004:25) the effects of globalisation have been profoundly felt 
by governments across the world. The traditional sources of revenue generation for 
governments, more especially taxation and loans, have been persistently retrograding. 
The conventional methods that guaranteed the reception of taxes have been eroded by 
globalisation. The basis of "territoriality" and the inability of taxpayers to equivocate 
politically-imposed taxes within jurisdictions that the taxpayers may have been 
residing in, due to the ephemeral nature of the latter (taxpayers) across the borders, is 
effectively epitomised by the unmonitored mobility of the citizenry to move from one 
local authority to the next. The vulnerability of the developing countries cannot be 
overemphasised. Global tax competition has been found to be dogmatically 
overbearing for the developing economies. The uncertainty with which revenue 
anticipation can be prognosticated through the traditional economic theory and 
applications has caused panic within the economics community across the world 
(Burger, 2004:25-27). George Soros is captured by Burger (2004:29) while (IFR, 
1998(e)) expressing the mixed and the often unpredictable outcomes of globalisation 
as follows: 
11 According to Shah (2004:4) "The culture of governance is also slowly changing from a bureaucratic 
to a participatory mode of operation; from command and control to accountability for results; from 
being internally dependent to being competitive and innovative; from being closed and slow to being 
open and quick; and from that of intolerance for risk to allowing freedom to fail ~r succeed". 
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"The global capitalist system, responsible for our remarkable prosperity, is coming 
apart at the seams... The pain at the periphery has become so intense that individual 
countries have begun to opt out of the capitalist system or simply fall by the wayside". 
Governments, in their attempts to deal head on with the globalisation phenomenon, 
adopted various financial management strategies and techniques, many of them 
influenced by the New Public Management philosophy that precipitated a paradigm 
shift in public service delivery, such as (Taylor in McLaughlin, Osbome and Ferlin, 
2002: 110): 
• An emphasis in efficiency through the introduction of business management 
techniques 
• Client orientatedness and customer-driven services 
• The introduction of competition into the public sector and market mechanisms 
• A smaller role for governments at all levels and increased private sector 
participation and reduced tax burdens. Herein referred to as civil service 
reforms by Minogue in Minogue et a!, (1998:156) or commercial market 
enterprises (deregulation, privatisation and marketisation) (Toonen, 1998:86) 
• An entrepreneurial approach to governance. 
The following strategies have been adopted by various states in different forms to 
facilitate effectively the successful implementation of the above-mentioned public 
service deliveries (Taylor in McLaughlin et a!, 2002:11 0): the restructuring of the 
public sector; restructuring the public service; making public management more 
efficient; introducing competition into the public service; creating a regulatory state 
and, addressing ethical issues. Subsequently, what the Canadians termed alternative 
service delivery mechanism. These constitute amongst others: corporatisation, 
outsourcing, joint ventures, partnerships and alliances, privatisation and 
decentralisation (Cloete, 2000: 125). 
Several authors are of the view that these reforms, in all their manifestations, 
emphasise "the use of economic markets as a model for political and administrative 
relationships" (Hope, in McLaughlin et a!, 2002:211 ); "seek to reconfigure the 
relationship between states, markets and societies by giving prominence to market 
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forces" (Bangura, 2000:5) and, the more visible yet, subtle feature of the approach is 
its comprehensive and rigorous application of the private sector principles to the 
public sector. (Jenssen in Christensen and Laegreid, 2002:295). These reforms have 
been found to be attending to the economic values and norms, while downgrading 
other equally important values. Hence Christensen and Laegreid (2002: 15) have come 
to the conclusion that the reform modes have been largely one dimensional. 
The United Kingdom offered a good example of a one=dimensional, economically 
obsessed public sector reform during the early 1980s, ostensibly referred to as the 
"Thatcherite dogma of 'public bad, private good"' (Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett, 
1994:5). First of all, huge financial support to local authorities was slashed and, 
worse, the government was determined to reduce revenue raised locally. Secondly, 
local government became politicised. Thirdly, the political landscapes of local politics 
changed quite drastically: (a) rate-payer democracy/local tax payers were introduced 
to bolster individual rights in local democracy (b) participatory democracy, concerned 
with the promotion of sectional interests. Thirdly, good management as the way 
forward in local government, is the final such development of Thatcherism (Burns et 
a!, 1994:20). The latter two changes are explored in more detail later. 
However, an assertively holistic written text on the reinvention of the government by 
Osbome and Gaebler (1992:20) drew conclusions that are often overlooked by many 
analysts from different professional backgrounds. The duo ague that government 
cannot be run like a business and so governance cannot be privatised like services. 
But, most importantly, that there are areas where governments perform better than the 
private sector, just as much as private-owned businesses perform better at other 
service deliveries that cannot be effectively and efficiently delivered by governments 
(Osbome and Gaebler, 1992:45-48). In other words, it is in the best interest of every 
country to identify where the private sector fits better than the government and hence, 
de jure transfer of the service delivery to the rightful service provider should follow. 
This rather moderate tone does not appear to rule out the public sector's role in 
service delivery. It has, in an effective and efficient way, reinvigorated the concept of 
decentralisation and, in particular, intergovernmental fiscal decentralisation, with a 
view to redesigning the revenue assignments and expenditure responsibilities between 
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the national and sub-national governments. This then is the focus of this chapter: the 
theoretical grounds of fiscal decentralisation and its practice across the world and, in 
particular, the fiscal intergovernmental relations framework for innovative financial 
management, with widespread economic and social benefits at local government 
level. 
The public sector reforms, referred to above, conform to the notion of fiscal 
decentralisation (especially its benefits) in many respects. The introduction of 
competition in the public sector can be equated with the Tiebout model; client 
orientatedness and customer-driven services can be associated with the Pareto-
efficient output, production efficiency as well as accountability; an emphasis in 
efficiency, through the introduction of business management techniques, is clearly 
related to the notions of allocative efficiency And, finally, an entrepreneurial 
approach to governance is a major characteristic of financial innovation (See section 
2.3.1). 
2.2 Fiscal decentralisation: theory, rhetoric and practice 
Fiscal decentralisation generally refers to the transfer of financial (especially the 
expenditure responsibilities and taxation) and political decision making, from the 
national government to the sub-central spheres of government and, in particular, to 
local authorities in two-tier government systems. However, as it has already been 
highlighted in the preceding chapter, it is the intensity with which decentralisation is 
approached that gives it a unique meaning. Notwithstanding that though, it is 
important to note that there are different kinds of decentralisation documented by 
Bums, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994:5), such as neighbourhood-based 
decentralisation, decentralisation of projects, devolution of power to voluntary 
organisations, pure managerial decentralisation and intergovernmental 
decentralisation. 
There is no absolute consensus as to what exactly constitutes decentralisation. 
According to Bums et al (1994:5) there are still antithetical = or strongly opposed? 
views, particularly from the so-called right wing, who contend that the introduction of 
markets into the public sector is but the starting point of decentralisation, because 
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there are elements of citizen voice, choice and exit that form the cradle of this 
concept. Despite the polemic nature of this concept, it still remains an area of interest 
because of the potentials it holds for good govemance. 12 It is nevertheless not the aim 
of this discussion to dwell on the appropriateness of the philosophical or the 
ideological basis underlying this concept. Fiscal intergovernmental relations, with 
emphasis on the finances of local government are at the epicentre of this discussion. 
Empirical evidence, from the international trends and policy repertoire, proves that 
decentralisation has not only been present in the domain of academic experts, but has, 
in practice, been on the rise over the past three decades. In reality, more governments 
across the world have adopted decentralisation mechanisms in one way or the other 
(Arora and Norregaard, 1997:3). The only difference being that the magnitude of 
decentralisation is varied from country to country (Bahl in Roy, 1995:74; Bahl, in 
Yusuf, Wu and Evenett, 2000:94; Smoke, 2001:1; Bums et al, 1994: 3; Bahl and 
Linn, 1992). Whereas the resurgence in interest expressed for fiscal decentralisation 
and local government development has been met with enthusiasm, it is the costs and, 
at times, the paltry (as compared to the expectations) progress made towards the 
achievement of the initially sketched-out reform objectives that seem to mushroom 
and create new tunnels of questions and doubts about its astuteness for good 
governance and sustainable development. 
According to Prud'Homme (1995:209) statistical analysis attests to the fact that 
decentralisation appears to be increasing along with income levels. That is to say that 
some of the negative issues, attributed to the decentralisation reforms, are less likely 
to be experienced in middle and high income countries as compared to low income 
nations. Bahl and Linn (1992:393) in their classic treatise concluded that "for the 
lowest income countries decentralisation may be limited to rhetoric". 
This argument is backed by the so-called critical mass principle. According to this 
principle, as postulated by Prud'Humme (1995:209), in order for the potential benefits 
(more especially efficiency) of decentralisation to be maximised, the decentralised 
12 See Bailey (1999:37) decentralisation as an aid to political stability, for example it facilitates nation 
building (used for nation building in South Africa and Uganda, see World Bank, 1999:107-124) See 
Bird, Litvack and Rao (1995) decentralisation used as a poverty reduction strategy in Vietnam. 
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units must be sufficiently large in terms of the population, activities and incomes. Put 
differently, this means that the more developed and urbanised units of sub-national 
units are more likely to reap the benefits of decentralisation than the less developed 
rural municipal governments. That is, if economic efficiency is to be achieved in the 
production and provision of local public goods the concept of critical mass should be 
taken into consideration whenever the fiscal decentralisation reforms are undertaken. 
It is for this reason that revisiting the benefits and, obviously, the dangers of 
decentralisation, that are often overlooked, should be expanded, given that the former 
were presented only in a condensed format in the previous chapter (section 1.7.2). 
2.2.1 The benefits of decentralisation 
The justifications for decentralised public service delivery are wide ranging from 
country to country. Some of them are political whilst others are economic, yet the 
rationale for fiscal decentralisation addresses both the political and economic 
dimensions of decentralised public services delivery. 
As indicated in section 1. 7.2 the political justification for decentralisation is to ensure 
that the political mechanism is able to serve a diversity of local preferences. This is 
achieved when there are demarcated wards or local constituencies that are represented 
by elected local politicians to ensure that ". . . expenditure decisions are tied more 
closely to real resource costs in smaller jurisdictions" (Smoke, 2001 :6). It is assumed 
that by devolving political decision making to the local political representatives, local 
governments would achieve allocative efficiency through decentralised expenditure 
decisions because local expenditure patters would be reflective of the preferences of 
local constituents. Hence there would be little if any waste of resources in pursuit of 
local service delivery because of clearly defined and demarcated political 
jurisdictions. Local public goods and services would as such be provided to a "clearly 
limited geographic region" (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggiero in Ter-Minassian, 1997:30) 
(see section 2.3.3). 
The demarcation of political jurisdictions can also solve the demand revelation 
problem in the provision of local public goods and services. Decentralised 
37 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
expenditures are aimed at unbundling the aggregated preferences of the entire 
country's population in centralised democracies in order to determine the differing 
preferences of each political jurisdiction. The preferences of urban constituencies are 
different from those of rural areas hence, through decentralised expenditures local 
authorities are in a better position to assess and supply desired levels of each public 
good according to the demand of their local constituents. This ensures that through 
decentralised expenditures, governments are able to reap the benefits of the Pareto 
efficient output. In the same vein, governments would be able to achieve production 
efficiency because their spending decisions would be tied to demand of such goods as 
may be demanded by their constituents (Ahmad et a! in Ter-Minassian, 1997:30; 
Inter-American Development Bank, 1997: 154). 
The desire of local governments to meet the needs of their peculiar constituents also 
provide for increased efficiency in local service provision through increased 
competition between local governments to match the supply of local goods and 
services with the demands of the local voters. It is assumed that increased competition 
between municipal governments results in the movement of residents from one 
political jurisdiction to another in search of better local services that would satisfy 
their preferences. This is called the Tiebout Model. Through choice, exit and voice 
local constituents are in a better position to express their preferences and tastes by 
voting through the ballot and voting through their feet. This ensures that through 
decentralised expenditures local political accountability is promoted (Ahmad et a! in 
Ter-Minassian, 1997:31; Inter-American Development Bank, 1997: 154). Municipal 
governments would strive to provide durable services to their constituents in the 
lowest possible cost. 
Fiscal decentralisation also enhances economic efficiency in local revenue generation 
because of the close proximity of local governments to their political jurisdictions (see 
section 1.7.2). For example, resource mobilisation would be enhanced through the 
taxation of some sectors in the urban economy by local governments rather than 
central government (Bahl and Linn, 1992:387). It is administratively efficient to 
provide, charge and collect such revenues generated through public charges at 
municipal level. Hence, decentralisation is the preferred way of providing local public 
goods and generating local revenues through among others user charges and charging 
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local property taxes. For example in decentralised setting, local authorities, more 
especially in urban areas, have the privilege of charging residents the full marginal 
cost of urbanisation13 as opposed to partial or lower public charges (partial or lower 
charges in comparison to the costs associated to the specific service provided by the 
municipal government to its residents) in rural areas (Bahl and Linn, 1992:387). 
Moreover, "One argument for the decentralisation is that states and localities can 
serve as laboratories for testing national policy changes-systems-systems can be tested 
on a small scale and perhaps be better tailored to local conditions"(Gramlich, 
1987:309). The provision of local public goods and the generation of revenues 
through local public charges and other revenue generating avenues at local 
government level promote innovation and experimentation at local level without 
disrupting the provision of services at a larger scale should such experimentation be 
applied at national level. 
It is important to highlight that the outstanding justification for fiscal decentralisation 
as indicated in the preceding paragraphs is to achieve allocative efficiency in the 
provision of local public goods and services through political accountability and 
revenue generating mechanisms that are sympathetic to good financial management 
and innovative financial management (see section 1.7.3). 
This is still merely a summarised version of the perceived benefits of decentralisation. 
However, to instil a better understanding of this concept, in terms of the 
aforementioned benefits, it is critically important to have an overview of the 
implications of these benefits. Some of them are economic whilst others are political, 
yet a re-look at the abovementioned benefits blurs the political-economic benefits 
dichotomy, because of the inter linked nature and interrelatedness of both economic 
and political factors. In fact, they feed into each other. The visibility and tangibility of 
decentralisation reforms however remain polemic. This often compromises the 
applicability of the concept in the developing world with the concomitant results, 
because of the following reasons: 
13 
-See Wellish (2000:14-15): Because of the preference for expanded and high quality programs by 
some residents against the other section of society who prefer less taxation for smaller public budgets, 
eventually the preferences between local governments should vary very strongly but preferences within 
them should vary little (Bailey, 1999: 19). 
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• In order for sub-national governments to satisfy the preferences of differing 
tastes, there has to be larger differences in preferences. This implies that the 
country has to be highly heterogeneous and this is highly likely in larger 
countries with big Gross Domestic Product and bigger populations (lnter-
American Development Bank, 1997:153/4). Many ofthe developing countries 
have fragmented and smaller populations. For example Botswana and 
Namibia. 
• In order for taxes and services to mirror the tastes of existing population, there 
has to be high mobility that depicts the notions of choice, exit and voice. 
Theory suggests that the degree of homogeneity in jurisdiction is increased as 
a result. King, in Fisher (1997:20), links this kind of thinking with high 
mobility by residents from one jurisdiction to the next, as follows: " ... citizens 
in any area who find they dislike the services provided in their area can, if they 
feel strongly enough, move to another area that would suit them better". This 
is fundamental to the Tiebout Model (Ahmad, Hewitt and Ruggerio in Ter-
Minassian, 1997:31 ). Given the trying economic situations in developing 
countries, it is quite doubtful to assume that residents can move from one area 
to another because of poor service delivery or higher taxes, except for a few 
affluent citizens. Furthermore, the readily availability of quality information is 
critical to matching the preferences of the population with services (Joumard 
and Kongsrud, 2003: 168-9). Indeed, the availability of information m 
developing countries still remains a challenge that will take time to 
subsidise/address; and 
• The efficient provision of services, according to the decentralisation theory, 
brings about increased accountability that, in turn, provides incentives for 
constituents to monitor their elected councils closely. The building blocks for 
such a relationship between citizens and politicians are only sustainable as far 
as a larger part of services is financed from own revenue (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1997: 154 ). The reality in the developing world is that the 
bulk of services provided at local government level are funded from the top 
through fiscal transfers. In actual fact, according to Oates ( 1993 :23 7), " In 
terms of public revenues, the average share of central governments in the 
developing countries was in excess of 90 percent!". 
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What emerges quite clearly above is, what may be referred to as, the decentralisation-
economic development discourse in the social and political economic development or, 
what Oates (1993:238) refers to as, the Bahl-Linn thesis. According to this theory a 
relatively developed country, with a reasonable level of income and ability to create 
conducive political, administrative, organisational and behavioural conditions, has an 
increased probability for successful implementation of the decentralisation reforms, 
because local authorities would have sufficient resources to carry out the 
decentralisation functions 14 . 
2.2.2 The Perils of decentralisation15 
Against the odds, Tanzi (2001) and Prud'Homme (1995) defied the widely held 
academic norm of pervasively appraising the decentralisation theorem as the ultimate 
solution in addressing the inefficiencies associated with the public sector service 
delivery, albeit without the trivial or obvious benefits that the academia postulate 
about. Indeed, decentralisation (and in particular fiscal decentralisation) is often a 
difficult journey for any country to embark on. However, the duo does not in any way 
suggest that there are no potential benefits to be derived from the decentralisation 
drive. What comes out clearly in their literature is that many public policy failures -
be they economic, socio-political or environmental - may not necessarily be as a 
result of poor arrangement of the spheres of government, but because of inefficient 
and unfair national policies in the activities that can be better performed by the private 
sector (and the overextended public sector requiring an improvement of the existing 
policies) and privatisation or divesture of the public sector, among others (Tanzi, 
2001 :3-4). 
In order to appreciate the pitfalls that the countries undertaking decentralisation may 
be exposed to, it is appropriate to refer to the so-called Musgrave's Three-Function 
Framework (McLure, 2001:3), often considered the conventional public finance 
theory, based on the Richard M us grave classic treatise: The Theory of Public Finance 
14 This view is also held by Rondinelli (1981: 142). 
15 The proponents of centralised public sector justify their position on the basis of economic, social and 
economic benefits of a centralised setting, as such maintaining macroeconomic stability, improved 
income redistribution from the centre, national building and unity and equitable distribution of 
developments across regions. 
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( 1959). Traditionally, the functions of government are separated into three branches: 
macroeconomic stabilisation; income redistribution and resource allocation. These 
functions are not mechanical and static. A lot of inconsistencies and policy deadlocks 
occur as a result of the contradictions incurred by the different spheres of 
governments m their policy design and implementation, reflecting unclear 
specification of functions. This is the domain of fiscal intergovernmental 
decentralisation. This will be discussed in detail later (see sections 2.4.1; 2.4.2; 2.4.3; 
2.5.1). The potential shortcomings of decentralisation are, for now, as follows: 
• According to Tanzi (200 1:11) decentralisation could be a recipe for deepening 
regional disparities, particularly if some regions are blessed with natural 
resources whilst others are resource poor. This is discussed extensively by 
Prud'Homme (1995:201) who argues that decentralisation makes it difficult 
for the central government to pursue the redistributive policies. In their efforts 
to redistribute income, local governments tend to overtax the rich, redirecting 
the benefits to the poor, with the concomitant results of the former migrating 
to lowly-taxed areas. Eventually, when the poor move in to the high-benefit 
areas, the generous jurisdiction ultimately fails to sustain its redistributive 
policies. The United States of America (US) offers a good model of a 
segregated nation with the rich enjoying the fruits of decentralisation at the 
expense of the economically disadvantaged citizens. Hence, "centralisation is 
not a sufficient condition for redistribution but a necessary condition for 
redistribution" (Prud'Homme, 1995:201). Analytical and empirical research 
concludes that, "any reduction in the importance of national budgets relative to 
those at the subnational level (a definition of decentralisation) therefore 
increases inter-jurisdictional disparities by reducing the impact of national 
policies designed to correct regional inequities" (Prud'Homme, 1995:202). 
• There is a high probability that decentralisation could be a recipe for increased 
corruption. Reasons advanced by Tanzi (2001 :7) for this are: (a) the capacity 
of local institutions is normally not sophisticated enough to build strong 
institutions that could deter corruption. (b) national governments in most cases 
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attract the most technically skilled and trained individuals, leaving local 
governments with narrow labour markets; 
• Highly decentralised governments may pose senous threat to economic 
stability because the sub-central governments may run policies that counter 
those of the centre. Such a scenario may arise if local governments adopt 
expansionary economic policies, countering the national contractionary fiscal 
policies and, in the process, undermining the monetary policy as well, creating 
macroeconomic coordination problems. This is more likely when subnationals 
face soft budgets, more especially when borrowing is not tightly restricted 
(Prud'Homme, 1995:203; Tanzi, 2001:1 0); and 
• Because of their small size, local governments may not enJOY production 
efficiency. The lack of economies of scale and scope therefore escalates the 
costs of service production (Prud'Homme, 1995:207). 
The list of dangers that may arise out of the decentralisation strategy is not exhausted. 
These are but some of them. It is also important to highlight that some of these 
concerns have been adequately debunked and rebutted with such excellent subject 
proficiency by Smoke (200 1: 13-15). The aforementioned dangers, according to 
Smoke (2001 :13), cannot be conclusively blamed on fiscal decentralisation reforms. 
In fact, empirical evidence shows that the perceived macroeconomic dangers of 
decentralisation are far and few between. Such uncommon incidents are limited to 
countries with substantially decentralised subnational governments, like Argentina, 
Brazil and Russia. Generally, the fiscal weight of local governments in the overall 
public sector, even in developing countries, is such that they cannot cause remarkable 
macroeconomic upheavals. 
In addition to that, tax competition in the developing world cannot justifiably be said 
to be problematic. Local government taxation is quite modest, most buoyant tax 
revenues being the prerogative of the national government (Smoke, 2001: 14 ). 
Basically, the traditional public finance theory, still the hallmark of multi-government 
financial relations, unequivocally restricts the mcome redistribution and 
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macroeconomic stabilisation functions to the national governments. Resource 
allocation is preferred for the sub-central governments, more specifically local 
governments (See section 2.4.3). 
Smoke (200 1: 15) does not only delimit the fiscal decentralisation debate on the 
decentralisation-centralisation dichotomy, but raises equally intellectually-stimulating 
policy recommendations to bolster the fiscal decentralisation drive from country to 
country. Indeed, the " ... policy conclusion should be that the decentralised fiscal 
system ought to be structured in a way that both prohibits such potentially growth-
constraining local taxation and provides local government with viable alternatives for 
raising revenue". The conclusion that can be drawn from this quotation is that the 
fiscal decentralisation concept has been held captive by the decentralisation-
centralisation dichotomy, thereby limiting research to two opposing camps. 
Indeed, the challenge for every country is to redirect the resources to replenish the 
existing policy implementation lacuna that is to blame for poorly designed and 
executed fiscal decentralisation systems that are not country specific in their 
approach. In short, there is no one-size-fits-all. It is therefore important for the 
governments designing the intergovernmental fiscal structures to take into account 
such factors as: regional or inter-municipal socio-economic inequalities; the capacity 
of the national machineries to monitor local authorities on the implementation of the 
decentralisation reforms; technicity 16; chargeability17;. ability to decentralise only 
services that have limited externality effects reducing regional inequalities; efficiency 
at, respectively, minimising incidents of corruption at municipal level and increasing 
the production efficiency to provide local public goods . 
2.3 Intergovernmental fiscal relations 
Now that the critical significance of the public sector in any country's pursuance of 
economic, social and political values has been established, the perennial question still 
16 The level of technical and managerial expertise required to provide services. The lower the technicity 
the higher the production efficiency achieved in the provision of local goods and services 
(Prud 'Homme, 1995:21 0). 
17 Refers to, "the ease with which the service can be fmanced by charges as opposed to taxes" 
(Prud'Homme, 1995:21 0). 
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persists: "what form of government promises the ~reatest success in resolving the 
allocation, distribution and stabilisation problems?" (Oates, 1972:3). Indeed, the 
desire to concisely redefine the role of the public sector to meet the new challenges of 
poverty reduction, sustaining good governance, intact local economies (micro 
economies), macroeconomic stability, income redistribution, responsive and 
accountable governance, among others, through political and economic means, has 
ignited the academic interest in studying the role of different tiers of government in 
achieving the aforementioned policy objectives or economic and political values at 
the lowest possible cost ( efficient and effective public sector). 
Whereas the intergovernmental systems in many countries reflect the historical and 
geographical characteristics of such countries; the degree of heterogeneity of the 
population and the extent of government intervention in the economy (Fjeldstad, 
2001 : 1 ), it is fundamentally important that a reorganisation of the vertical and 
horizontal intergovernmental system, sympathetic to an effective and efficient public 
sector, is in place. The intergovernmental system defines the relationships between 
the structure, functions and finance. Figure 1 (derived from Hollis and Plokker, 1995: 
76) illustrates that. 
However, to keep the discussion focused, a brief overview of the traditional public 
finance theory, as referred to earlier, conceptualised by Richard Musgrave (1959), 
forms the basis of an analytical framework defining the role of the national and sub-
central spheres of government in the economy. This framework consists of three 
aspects that characterise the intergovernmental relation systems. These are 
macroeconomic stabilisation, redistribution of income and resource allocation aspects 
which are extrapolated below. 
2.3 .1 Macroeconomic stabilisation 
Textbook theory suggests that macroeconomic stability is better left to the national 
government. It is generally accepted within the economic community that the 
macroeconomic policy standard objectives include economic growth, a high and 
stable level of employment, a stable average price level, balance of payments 
equilibrium and distributional and equity objectives (Fourie, 1997:213). The principal 
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reason for the national government's firm grip on the fiscal and monetary policies, is 
the duos ability to act as the lever and gear in influencing the overall economy of the 
country in a preferred fashion. Mclure (2001 :4) advances the following reasons for 
the national government to maintain the overall steering of macroeconomic stability: 
• an attempt by local government to affect the conditions of macroeconomic 
policy would 'spill' beyond its area of jurisdiction, defeating the essence of 
decentralised governance; 
• local government's power to borrow and print money is limited and so is its 
ability to engage in expansionary policy that is constrained by prohibited 
deficit financing; and 
• corporate income tax and progressive individual income tax are treated heavy-
handedly by the national government of most countries, if not all, hence any 
other tax at local government's disposal would not have as much effect on the 
overall national economy. 
The macro-economic stabilisation process to a large degree reflects the ability of the 
government to influence the economy through its borrowing and taxing capacity, as 
well as its capacity to influence the monetary policy through its expenditure decisions. 
All these factors are at a macro level and therefore have an impact on the entire 
economy. They should not be left to the local authorities or else the decentralisation 
reforms may risk exposing the country to economic instability, as discussed in section 
2.3.2. 
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The macro-economic stabilisation process to a large degree reflects the ability of the 
government to influence the economy through its borrowing and taxing capacity, as well as its 
capacity to influence the monetary policy through its expenditure decisions. All these factors 
are at a macro level and therefore have an impact on the entire economy. They should not be 
left to the local authorities or else the decentralisation reforms may risl~ exposing the country 
to economic instability, as discussed in section 2.3.2. 
2.3 .2 Redistribution of income 
The undesirable implications of income redistribution at local government level have already 
been highlighted above (see section 2.3.2). Below is a summary of them: 
• high taxation of the affluent citizens meant to redistribute income to their 
economically disadvantaged counterparts is likely to drive out the former whilst 
attracting the latter. Eventually, the local government concerned would fail to sustain 
the policy as the supply side would be drying up amid surging demand (Tiebout effect) 
(King in Fisher, 1997:34); and 
• Tiebout's assumption derives its legitimacy from the perceived high mobility of tax 
payers in search of sub-central governments that can satisfy their preferences (Wilson, 
1984: 16-17). As much as this view may have its merits in industrialised countries, it 
clearly lacks logic in developing countries where the challenge that still dominates 
economic planning within political circles, is finding ways to meet the basic needs of 
the inhabitants. Hence, national government becomes the natural level of government 
that can effectively redistribute income between jurisdictions without necessarily 
putting the entire economy at risk. 
2.3.3 Resource allocation 
Resource allocation has to do mainly with the provision of services by the public sector and is 
the essence of the decentralisation concept. The degree to which the benefits of 
decentralisation could be realised is increased here, especially for those services that are 
geographical in character. The perceived outcomes of decentralised government, and in 
particular decentralised expenditures, require that the allocation of resources be devolved to 
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the local government. Such an arrangement would facilitate the benefits of decentralisation, 
e.g. allocative efficiency, because local governments: 
• are in a better position to satisfy the varying preferences of citizens as opposed to the 
national government. Local governments are in a better position to have quality and 
more often reliable economic and social information about their constituents, hence a 
better match of supply to demand (Fjeldstad, 2001 :4-5; Inter-American Development 
Bank, 1997: 154 ); 
• are politically more accountabie in a decentralised expenditure setting, as the financial 
and political decisions of the council have a targeted impact on the constituents. 
Decentralisation would be nurtured as a consequence; and 
• where the local public sector is not big enough to enjoy the quite substantial savings of 
the economies of scale and scope in the provision of public services, they (local 
governments) can be innovative enough to engage large private firms, where 
substantial economies of scale could be tapped, to produce services. For example, by 
providing local public goods through joint local government efforts. (King in Fisher, 
1997:35-36). 
The Musgrave public sector role framework presents a complex and a conflicting mechanism, 
with no clear-cut trivial implications of the government policy decisions on the general 
welfare of the society, the economic development, macroeconomic stability and many other 
important issues pertaining to good governance. A panoply of issues emerges that remain 
unanswered. These include inter alia: 
• the degree of political autonomy afforded local authorities; 
• the appropriate alternative system (for example, federal or unitary); 
• identifying adequate revenue sources (especially taxation) for local governments to 
carry out their mandates effectively, without necessarily undermining macroeconomic 
stability; 
• balancing the structure, functions and finances between all the levels of government; 
• how inter-jurisdictional income disparities are objectively and sustainably dealt with, 
without necessarily undermining microeconomic and local economic development; 
and 
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• improving coordination of functions between all levels of government, especially in 
the provision of joint services. 
Notwithstanding the complexity in finding a balance between all the three competing, and 
often uncomplimentary, framework approaches to public sector spending and revenue 
generating structure, there is no doubt that the devolution of spending decisions to local 
governments is critical for any government to achieve economic efficiency in the provision of 
public goods. 
2.4 The intergovernmental fiscal issues 
In order to architect a suitably adequate structure vide the functions-finance equilibrium that 
provides incentives for innovative and responsible local government fiscal behaviour, it is 
important to address what Inter-American Development Bank (1997: 152) refers to as the 
dimensions of decentralisation or the major parameters of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
(Gandhi in Roy, 1995:40). These are (Institute on Governance, 1998:2): 
• expenditure responsibilities 
• taxation and other own-source revenue 
• design of intergovernmental transfers 
• borrowing capacity; and 
• institutional aspects 
2.4.1 Expenditure assignment 
Assigning functions and finances to different levels of government is a starting point for 
addressing the intergovernmental issues within the Musgrave framework concerning the 
division of vertical intergovernmental structure (Fjeldstad, 2001 :2). In fact, Musgrave's three 
point framework provides a platform for the division of power and authority, between the 
centre and the peripherals in accordance with the objectives of the decentralisation policy, yet 
within the constraints of the public choice school. In view of the fact that both the national 
and subnational spheres of government face financial constraints in pursuance of service 
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delivery, the following principles are generally considered important for the optimum 
performance of an intergovernmental fiscal structure: 
(a) finance follows functions: according to this principle, it is fundamentally important, first 
and foremost, to assign the expenditure responsibilities to local governments and, on this 
basis, determine their revenue responsibilities. The following reasons necessitate the 
justifications for this principle: 
• Central governments are in a better position to assign revenue responsibilities 
objectively for each local government, once expenditure needs are established (BahL 
1999:7); 
• Because tax assignment is guided by spending requirements for each local 
government, spending responsibilities for various levels of governments must be 
determined first before tax assignments (Institute on Governance, 1998:3); 
• Such an arrangement, as described in the preceding two points, will ensure a better 
match between taxing and spending powers. Hence, the national government and the 
electorates will be in a better position to hold local governments to account for their 
financial and political decisions, since theoretically, an over-reliance of the local 
governments on transfers will be curtailed. 
In reality it is difficult to determine expenditure responsibilities precisely, because of the joint 
administration of certain services, more specifically merit goods, that require setting 
minimum national standards in the provision of education and health care (Vita, 2001 :8). 
(b) beneficial principle: the benefits of local government expenditure should fall within its 
jurisdiction. That is, their impact should be felt by the local tax payers in such a way that the 
electorate see themselves as the sources of local government finances - hence the principle of 
correspondence (Murphy, Libonatti and Salinardi In Murphy, 1995:6). Unquestionably this 
principle fits well into the allocation function that is traditionally the preserve of local 
government from an economic point of view, since it could be instrumental in achieving the 
chief objective of fiscal decentralisation: economic efficiency in service delivery. However, 
the benefit principle is only effective in so far as the following conditions are observed 
(Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003:173-181): 
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• local economies should be able to exploit the economies of scale and scope. However, 
if they are too small to take advantage of that, contracting out to big firms is one such 
mechanism that could bolster them sufficiently to enjoy economies of scope and scale; 
• territorial spillovers should be avoided as much as possible, unless there are other 
centrally-determined mechanisms to internalise them through financial transfers from 
the national government; 
• welfare benefits and redistributive services should not be under-provided and this can 
only be achieved if such responsibilities are not financed by local governments. 
Locally-financed arrangements would destabilise local government finances, resulting 
in 'welfare induced migration' that would eventually overburden the socially 
philanthropic local governments. According to Ahrnad et al in Ter-Minassian 
(1997:26) "A country's social preference, rather than economic theory, should be the 
major guide to defining the appropriate level of expenditure decentralisation for mixed 
public goods". 
• local preferences should be reflected in the expenditure patterns at local government 
level in order to determine the quality, quantity and ultimate charge for services. This 
should be applied according to the ability-to-pay principle, among others, to avoid free 
rider incidents. 
The beneficial principle emphasises the need for sustainable local government finances, over 
an extended period of time, in order to provide them a safety valve or marginal revenues that 
are generated on the basis of the correspondence principle. That is, local constituents should 
receive the quality and quantity of goods that corresponds with what they have paid. The 
service provision relationship between the constituents and their local governments would 
based on the quod pro quo principle among others, thus inculcating political accountability 
and stimulating incentives to restraint local spending while steadily broadening local 
government finances. This is what is referred to as fiscal decentralisation at work. 
2.4.2 Taxation and other own-source revenue 
Although Mclure (2001 :5) states that the assignment of taxes between the national and 
subnational government levels cannot be prescribed rigidly, it is undoubtedly so that the 
manner in which subnational governments are resourced or funded, chiefly influence their 
spending behaviour (Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003:182). Conventional public finance wisdom 
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has it that for the optimum performance of financing sources, public service delivery costs 
should be at margin of taxation and other revenue sources. That is to say revenue-raising 
powers should reciprocate spending responsibilities. The traditional theory, on the other hand, 
hastens to raise the possible macroeconomic destabilisation and income redistribution 
implications of balancing finances to expenditure responsibilities at local government level, 
since this would require a transfer of buoyant taxes from the national government (Joumard 
and Kongsrud, 2003: 182). 
The basic rule therefore is: local government taxation should be limited to non-mobile taxes, 
non-redistributive taxes; evenly distributed tax bases (taxation of natural resources should in 
principle be restricted to national government) and taxes that are not subject to cyclical 
fluctuations, like income taxes, because they are progressive in nature (Joumard and 
Kongsrud, 2003: 182). Because central governments have the luxury to borrow from the 
markets (deficit budgeting), it is not surprising that unstable revenue sources are better left to 
them, whilst the opposite is true for local authorities. (Fjeldstad, 2001 :5; Shah, 2004:11 ). The 
following principles of taxing assignments are therefore ideal for stable local government 
finances and the overall macroeconomic stability (Fjeldstad, 2001 :6): 
• central government should have access to taxes that are suitable to economic 
stabilisation, whilst lower-level taxes should be cyclically stable; 
• central government should be assigned progressive re-distributional taxes; 
• Personal taxes with progressive rates should be levied by jurisdictions most capable of 
implementing a tax on a global base; 
• low-mobility tax revenues are ideal for lower-level governments; 
• highly-uneven taxes, that may reflect regional or jurisdictional resource distribution, 
should be centralised; and 
• user charges and benefit taxes are eligible for all levels of government. 
To realise the political benefits of tax assignment, such as subnational sovereignty, tax 
assignment at municipal governments should be characterised by (Mclure 2001 :7): (i) own 
revenues emanating from their assigned taxes, safeguarded by constitutional provisions and 
objectively determined grants that are relatively predictable over time; (ii) marginal revenues 
whose level they can control. No matter how limited this revenue source in relation to the 
53 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
expenditure responsibility assigned, it nevertheless, signifies some level of political autonomy 
that local governments enjoy, and (iii) subsidiarity in taxation reinforces the sovereignty of 
local governments as it requires that the ~xpenditure responsibility should "reflect geographic 
scope of benefits of public service and achieve economies of scale ... , expenditure 
responsibility should be assigned to the lowest level of government" (Mclure, 2001 :7-8). 
There are limitations on the taxes that can be assigned local governments, because of a 
number of important factors that have to be given thorough consideration. One such factor is 
the administrative capacity in tax design that may undermine the buoyancy of the given 
revenue sources. The technical skills required for its efficient collection, or administrative 
costs that may be prohibitively high, could make it difficult to sustain its viability. 
In view of the technical skills required to administer taxes, there is an overwhelming 
consensus that property tax is the most appropriate source of local government revenues 
(Bahl, 1999:13; Shah, 2004:12; Spahn in Roy, 1995:228; Smoke, 2001:23; Bird, 2001:21). 
The following reasons are advanced for such optimism about property taxation at local 
government level (Bahl, 1999: 13): 
• property owners and occupants tend to benefit from local governments' services, as it 
clearly exhibits the beneficial element; 
• the burden of the tax cannot be easily exported; 
• it is a tax on wealth and is highly visible in the local area; and 
• identifying local property wealth is practicable, given the comparative advantage that 
local assessors have in identifying local property wealth. 
Yet, property taxation is not without its limitations. Although it is generally perceived to be a 
potential revenue spinner for local government, it rarely produces significant revenue - more 
especially in developing countries - because it is administratively demanding and costly and 
hence politically unpopular. It is for these reasons that property taxation revenues remain 
insignificant in developing countries (Bahl, 1999: 14). 
User charges are currently adduced as important sources of revenue for local governments. 
According to Bird (2001 :58) the utilisation of user charges other than taxation has become the 
alternative essential source of local government revenues that is still to be fully utilised. In 
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fact, user charges are ideal for local public service delivery because they have clear benefit 
model characteristic. The appropriateness of the levels of user charges is what matters most in 
determining the level or standard of public services. The three types of local user charges 
identified by Bird (2001 :58) are (i) service fees, (ii) public prices and (iii) specific benefit 
charges. The philosophy of public charges also has an element of correspondence between the 
qualities of local public goods provided and the charges imposed by the local authorities on 
their constituents. 
2.4.3 The design of fiscal intergovernmental transfers 
International expenence suggests that there is no ready-made model in designing fiscal 
intergovernmental transfers. In fact, there is no model that can be labelled as being either good 
or bad, unless it is appraised against the objectives it was designed to achieve. The design of 
fiscal intergovernmental transfers is guided by several, often conflicting, factors emanating 
from the need to achieve a balance between the macroeconomic stabilisation (see section 
2.4.1 ), equitable redistribution of income (see section 2.4.2) and allocative efficiency through 
appropriate resource allocations (see section 2.4.3). 
The main justification for designing appropriate intergovernmental transfer mechanism is to 
maximise potential benefits (see section 2.3.1) offered by each of the three factors mentioned 
above, while mitigating such shortcomings (see section 2.3.2) that may arise as a result of the 
decentralisation reforms adopted. Hence, intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be used as 
effective control mechanisms against the likely undesirables of fiscal decentralisation. That is, 
"Trade-offs must be identified and compromise reached" (Prud' Homme, 1995:9). 
It is nevertheless, important to bring to attention the underlying fact that there is not a single 
sub-national government (more specifically local authority) that has enough financial 
resources to meet all its expenditure needs. That is, first and foremost, the main reason for 
designing intergovernmental fiscal transfers: to address a mismatch between local finances 
and functions. Such an imbalance arises as a result of the factors briefly referred to below. 
First of all, traditional fiscal federalism theory assigns buoyant taxes, such as income tax, 
value added tax and corporate tax, to the national government for stabilisation reasons (see 
section 2.4.1 ). Secondly, national government has been found to be better placed to 
redistribute resources economically, fairly and equitably, hence the latter retains control of 
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major revenue sources, such as taxable natural resources, in order to avoid inter-regional 
disparity resulting from unequal natural resource distribution (see section 2.4.2). The result: 
fiscal deficit forever remains a permanent feature of local governments' finances. It is worth 
noting, though, that national government intervention is not necessarily bad by nature, but by 
design. Hence, the centre's intervention, in the form of fiscal transfers, is what constitutes this 
subsection of intergovernmental issues. 
There are two types of financial imbalances at local government level. They are effectively 
vertical and horizontal. Vertical imbalances exist where one of the spheres of government has 
inadequate financial capacity to meet all its expenditure assignments. Local governments are 
the de facto governments in this category. Sub-national governments are said to be 
experiencing horizontal fiscal imbalances when they are characterised by financial 
inequalities amongst themselves, emanating from differences in per capita taxable resources 
and per capita local expenditure needs. In order to address these anomalies, two dimensions 
of transfers form the integral part of intergovernmental financial transfers system. They are 
the vertical and horizontal transfers (Bahl, 2000: 1-3). 
The vertical dimension of intergovernmental transfers is defined as the total distributable pool 
of revenues between the central and sub-national governments. Horizontal transfers constitute 
the allocation of financial transfers amongst sub-national governments, in order to equalise 
their financial capacities to meet their expenditure needs. In most cases, if not all, vertical 
imbalances, arising out of relatively low per capita locally taxable resources and high 
expenditure needs at local government level, reflect what the Layfield Committee of inquiry 
into local government finance in the United Kingdom (1976) calls a basic choice between the 
"localist" or "centralist" approach in deciding the appropriate level of financial autonomy 
(King in Fisher, 1997:44-46). However, before getting into the details of determining both the 
vertical and horizontal transfers, the discussion briefly highlights the justification/objectives 
for both dimensions of transfers and methods for determining both types of transfers, with 
reference to both developed and developing countries. 
Whereas the objectives of intergovernmental fiscal transfers are wide rangmg, there are 
effectively four major reasons that are universally accepted as factors in deciding the 
appropriate mechanism. These are generally to (a) achieve vertical equilibrium, (b) achieve 
horizontal equilibrium, (c) to offset externalities/inter-jurisdictional spillovers and (d) address 
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the administrative inefficiencies in the assessment and collection of taxes and the managing of 
other revenue sources at local government level (Bahl, 2000: 1-4; Schroeder and Smoke in 
Bahl and Smoke, 2003:21; Bird and Smart, 2002: 899; Ma, 1997: 1-2). 
Firstly, vertical fiscal transfers from the centre to the peripheral governments (total 
distributable pool) are meant to equalise revenues and expenditures of each level of 
government. Alternatively, vertical fiscal gaps that reflect the revenue-raising capacity and 
expenditure responsibilities mismatch at local governments, may be closed by increasing 
revenue-raising capacity at local government level, transferring expenditure responsibilities 
from local governments to the central government and, finally, by reducing local expenditures 
or by raising local revenues through other means that are feasible (Bird and Smart, 2002:899). 
Not all these alternative means of gap-filling are as viable as theory suggests. In fact, they 
have implications that are often undesirable. For example, by increasing the revenue-raising 
capacity of the local governments with relatively low per capita taxable resources and 
simultaneously increasing the scope of already existing user charges may have adverse social 
impacts. The economically-marooned individuals may find themselves in a worse economic 
situation because of their inability to afford the public goods provided by their governments. 
This is meticulously argued by Prud'Homme (1995:2002), who states that "Poor people in 
low-income regions are poor for a good reason". Poor people find themselves in areas offering 
limited economic activities; this results in relatively low per capita taxable resources. 
Increases in taxes and introduction of revenue-generating instruments in these areas would 
merely result in higher tax levels per capita. In the same vein, by transferring some of the 
expenditure assignments to the central governments would be against the notions of allocative 
efficiency (See sections 1.7.2; 1.7.3; 2.4.3) and innovative financial management (see section 
1.7.3) that are supposedly the offspring of fiscal decentralisation. 
Vertical fiscal equilibrium (balance between local expenditures, own revenues and transfers) 
is therefore generally assumed to be achievable in the richest local governments, because of 
the latter's high revenue raising capacity or relatively high locally taxable resources (Bird and 
Smart, 2002:900). However, this does not hold true for poorer local governments. Because of 
their unfavourable socio-economic status, poorer local governments will continue to be 
characterised by fiscal incapacity to provide public goods and services at acceptable or 
nationally-determined standard levels despite receiving vertical transfers. This unfavourable 
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state of affairs arises out of horizontal imbalances amongst local governments and therefore 
can be addressed only through horizontal equalisation transfers, over and above vertical 
transfers (Bird and Smart, 2002:900). 
Designing vertical fiscal transfers is quite a complex process. An effective vertical transfer 
system should ensure that local authorities retain equity and have adequate revenues to 
undertake their assigned responsibilities, promote local tax effort and control expenditure at 
local government level. Equity is only achievable in as far as the transfers can directly vary 
with local fiscal needs and, inversely, with local fiscal capacity (Ma, 1997:3). Inadequate 
information on expenditure needs and fiscal capacity may have unintended consequences, 
producing results that are contrary to the elements of financial probity, equity and financial 
innovation. For instance, if excess gap-filling financial transfers are made to richer local 
authorities, on account of failure to objectively estimate their fiscal capacity, local political 
representatives may be tempted to under tax their electorate. 
In essence, the fiscal transfer system would have subdued local taxation, thus undermining the 
very reason for adopting fiscal decentralisation reforms -to increase own revenues relative to 
the level of local population affluence, through innovative means, in order to promote 
economic efficiency in the provision of local public goods (See section 1.4). According to 
Bahl (2000: 3) inappropriately excessive financial transfers may result in "some services that 
should be tax-financed being covered by grants. Ultimately, over-expenditure by some 
subnational governments is likely to be stimulated, because external grants would be used on 
services that should be financed with user charges and local taxes. Various governments, in 
their effort to avoid the pitfalls of intergovernmental transfers, therefore use several criteria to 
measure the financial capacity and expenditure needs of local authorities. In the United 
Kingdom, an estimation of expenditure needs and revenue-raising capacity is guided by 
nationally-determined standards and quality of public goods. Standard Spending Assessment 
and Standard Local Tax Income are used to estimate the expenditure needs and financial 
capacity of local authorities effectively (Ha, 1997 :9-15). A fiscal gap at local government 
level is thus objectively closed. 
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Several governments across the world use one or a combination of the following vertical 
transfer methods (Bird and Smart, 2002:900-901) (See Table 118): 
• local government transfers may constitute a fixed proportion of central government 
revenues (a share of some central government revenue source). This may create 
stability at local government level whilst, on the other hand, causing inflexibility in 
central government budgeting. The latter scenario is quite evident during an economic 
slowdown that may require limited centralisation of budgeting (reduced transfers 
dictated by the declining revenues at central government. This transfer method is 
represented by symbol A in table 1 below; 
• transfers to local government could be on an ad hoc basis. That is, they will be 
determined during the annual budgeting process. This creates a lot of flexibility for the 
central governments, because transfers can be slashed at any given time, depending on 
the central government budget constraint, whilst local government planning is entirely 
jeopardised because of uncertainties about the potential transfers; 
• local governments may receive revenues on a formula-driven basis. One way of doing 
this is for central government to reimburse local governments. This may be based on 
the proportion of specific local expenditures, or by using general characteristics that 
the recipient jurisdictions exhibit, such as population or area size. The Philippines 
government, for example, determine their transferable pool as follows: population 
70%, area 20% and equal share 1 0% for each local government. 
It is not possible to discuss all the pros and cons of vertical transfer methods now. A brief and 
applied discussion of this aspect of the intergovernmental transfer system is dealt with in 
Sections 3.4; 3.5.1; 3.5.2; 3.5.3 and section 4.4 in the final analysis of Botswana's transfer 
system. 
Achieving fiscal equalisation among local authorities is the second major justification for 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. According to Bailey ( 1999:191) central governments are 
obliged to provide fiscal equalisation in their fiscal decentralisation initiatives in order to: 
avert potentially severe fiscal stress in poorer local government units, in their effort to provide 
durable local public goods and services; improve and provide infrastructural developments as 
18 This table will be discussed in detail in section 2.5.3.1 
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incentives to ensure equitably spread private-sector investment in all regions and ensure that 
the local welfare state does not 
TABLE 1 
Alternative Forms of Intergovernmental Transfer Programmes 
Allocation of 
Transfer Pool 
Among Subnational 
Governments 
Method of Determining the Total Pool 
Share of National Annual Budget Reimbursement of Government 
Tax Decision (Ad Hoc) Approved Spending 
Origin of Collection A General Purpose 
Formula B General Purpose 
or Sectional Purpose 
Cost reimbursement C Sectional Block 
(partial or total) or Specific Purpose 
F General Purpose 
or Sectoral Block 
G Sectoral Block 
or Specific Purpose 
Ad hoc (based on D General Purpose, H General Purpose, 
Annual decisions by Sectoral Block or Sectoral Block or 
Granting government Specific Purpose Specific Purpose 
K Sectoral Block 
or Specific Purpose 
Source: This an adaptation of a slightly modified table developed by Bahl and Linn (1992) by Shroeder and 
Smoke (2003:28) 
According to Bird and Smart (2002:901), the argument for not adopting a gap-filling approach 
to horizontal equalisation stems from the fact that there are differences in local needs, 
different costs in service provisions across the regions and, invariably, unequal revenue-
raising capacity of local governments (these differences, in most cases if not in all, are as a 
result of the variations mentioned in the last sentence of the preceding paragraph). Hence, a 
gap-filling grant system may not create desirable incentives for local governments to raise 
their own revenues 19 because "equalising actual outlays would discourage both revenue-
raising effort and local-expenditure restraint since, under this system, those with the highest 
expenditures and the lowest taxes get the largest transfers" (Bird and Smart, 2002:901). In 
other words, a gap-filling system by itself, in a country characterised by inter-regional or 
inter-municipal socio-economic inequalities, may be counter-productive to the notion of 
innovative financial management and financial probity at local government level, because the 
desire to close the financial gap may lead to unnecessarily increased and excessive 
19 Bailey (1999: 185) calls the subdued interest on the part of local authorities to increase revenue-raising effort or 
the declining trends in local revenue generation, as a result of the transfer system, displacement. 
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expenditure levels20 . This would stem mainly from the fact that expenditure needs are vast. 
Yet, proper allocation of resources, based on established expenditure assignments and 
revenue-generating capacity of each locality, may provide a nursery for restrained overall 
expenditures on service provision, whilst increasing revenue base for local authorities. Such 
an ideal situation would result in the achievement of a basic thrust of intergovernmental 
transfers: direct net additionality21 • Better planning would also be the ultimate achievement, 
since municipal government would be afforded a high degree of certainty, knowing about the 
to-be-expected financial transfers from the centre over an extended period of time. 
Notwithstanding this, it is important to underscore the underlying fact that "At best, an 
objective system of expenditure-needs assessment can only control, rather than eliminate the 
degree of subjectivity in the distribution of needs-equalising grants" (Bailey, 1999: 194). It is 
for this reason that the degree of fiscal equalisation varies from one country to another. Some 
use full equalisation through grants systems. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway fall 
into this category. Other countries such as France, Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland and Ireland 
prefer partial equalisation in order to safeguard local autonomy. After all, the most important 
factors that should be reflected by the equalisation system should mirror variations in local 
governments' abilities to generate local tax revenues per head of population, largely on the 
basis of the following issues (Bailey, 1999: 192): 
• uneven distribution of economic activities, such as large businesses, that may boost 
local governments' property taxes and local population incomes; 
• the size of disparities in the local tax base per head of population and 
• the amount of potential local tax revenue per head of population at a given tax rate. 
If all these factors are taken into consideration, fiscal equivalence would be achieved across 
all categories of municipal governments, thus creating a platform for fair competition between 
all municipalities in all regions. Local government financial innovation would be the ultimate 
outcome. It is nevertheless important to state that there are several equalising methods for 
both vertical and horizontal inequalities, as well as types of transfers that have an impact on 
20 Bailey ( 1999: 184) terms this indirect net additionality. This occurs when an intergovernmental financial 
transfer system achieves its unintended consequences. Such an occurrence may include inducing increased 
expenditure at municipal level. 
21 Direct net additionality occurs when the transfer system finances services that would otherwise not be 
provided without grant in aid from the centre, which is the main objective for grants (Bailey, 1999: 184). 
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the objectives for which fiscal decentralisation reforms are introduced. In order to understand 
their potentially facilitating influence on financial probity and accountability at local 
government level, as well as possibly their undesirable consequences, they are briefly 
discussed below (See Section 2.5.3.1). 
Furthermore, the justification for intergovernmental transfers is to offset externalities or inter-
jurisdictional spillovers. It has been established that certain services of local governments 
generate spillovers in the form of benefits or costs beyond the borders of their areas of 
jurisdictions. Of all the services provided by local governments, it is the merit or mixed goods 
whose benefits or costs are notorious for disregarding the established boundaries of local 
governments. Education, health services, road networks and fire departments are some good 
examples of services that have an element of externality. To ensure that local governments do 
not under-spend on these essential services because they may be benefiting the neighbouring 
jurisdictions, central governments step into the breach with substantial transfers that are 
clothed with conditions that they be spent only on the services classified as 'boundary blind 
services' (Own citation) (Shroeder and Smoke in Bahl and Smoke, 2003:21/22). 
Notwithstanding this view, Bahl (2000:3-4) raises the two salient concerns in policymaking, 
with regard to funding or subsidising externalities, that are often ignored. These are, (i) how 
the size of the grant is determined (subsidy required and "expenditure response ... required by 
the local governments) and (ii) how the resources will be allocated to the local governments 
by the intermediate level. The latter, is however, irrelevant for this discussion, because 
Botswana is a two-tier government system. The former, whilst important, will be discussed 
under Botswana's fiscal intergovernmental system, with references to case studies (sections 
3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). 
Finally, achieving administrative efficiency in the management of taxes is one other 
justification for intergovernmental transfers. The centralisation of tax administration at central 
government enhances efficiency through centralised collections within the local government 
area of jurisdictions on the tax bases and tax rates determined by the latter government. 
Although, Mikesell (2003 :2) argues that experience from the international practice does not 
automatically rule out the local administration of taxes on technicality, it appears that, where 
the principle of complete localisation of tax administration seems too big for the lower level 
of government to efficiently administer, there are a plethora of economically viable tax 
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collection alternatives that simultaneously enhances efficient tax administration and local 
governance autonomy. The benefits of centralised tax administration include (Mikesell, 
2003:3-6): 
• the provision of high quality service at low cost in favour of local government; 
• the probability of increased cost savings will be heightened through the economies of 
scale, realised in tax administration; 
• tax payers across the country will be dealt with through a single structure, hence it will 
be easier to track defaulters vide a single information system; 
• it may make economic sense to adopt more sophisticated configurations of some taxes 
and, 
• finally, the facilitation of revenue transfers to subsidise horizontal fiscal inequalities 
across the local government units justifies centralised administration of taxes. 
Japan is one such country that levies local transfer taxes on behalf of local authorities in order 
to reap the benefits of economic efficiency in the assessment and collection of local transfer 
taxes. Local transfer taxes are levied by the central government on local governments, rather 
than on central government, in Japan. Indonesia also has a centralised tax system meant to 
minimise the administrative inefficiencies associated with the assessment and collection of 
taxes at municipal level by municipal governments (Ma, 1997:21-32). However, this does not 
mean that centralised taxation is a sufficient condition for achieving administrative efficiency 
on the assessment and collection of taxes and any other revenue sources due to the local 
authorities. Where local authorities display the required technical and managerial capacity to 
administer their taxes and allocated revenues, such a function is better performed by them, 
because the national government may not give this function adequate attention, thus leading to 
under collections, for the simple reason that their incentive to do so may be dulled by the fact 
that such revenues would not accrue to them. Hence, decentralised tax revenues would mean 
more financial autonomy for local authorities. The more decentralised revenue sources, the 
better for local government financial management, because more effort would put into 
coming-up with innovative ways of increasing their coverage ratio and collection ratio, whilst 
restraining local spending. 
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2.4.4 Types of intergovernmental transfers 
Intergovernmental transfers are broadly divided into two categories. They are: (a) 
conditional/categorical/earmarked or specific grants; and (b) general /unconditional/block. 
These categories of grants are applied by different methods, in accordance with the objectives 
for which the transfers are designed to achieve. (Refer to Appendix 2for a typology of grants 
designed by Bailey (1999: 181 ). 
Conditional transfers: this type of transfer system is used on services that are considered 
more important to the central government. Such services may include those with substantial 
spill-over effects and those meant to achieve national objectives. Reducing unemployment 
through national infrastructure programmes at municipal level is one ofthe common examples 
for which conditional transfers to municipal governments are used in order to implement 
nationally determined programmes on behalf of central governments. Earmarked transfers 
may also be used to finance specific services in order to achieve minimum standard for 
services, as determined by the central government at sub-national level. As such, they are said 
to have redistributive elements (Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003: 182). 
Conditional transfers are further categorised into three types. They may be used as: (a) 
matching open-ended grants, (b) matching closed-ended grants; and non-matching grants. 
Open-ended grants are limitless. On the one hand, central governments grants in this regard 
are influenced by the spending patterns of local authorities, while on the other hand, in closed-
ended matching grants there is a ceiling on the maximum amount that central governments 
can make available to local authorities through conditional transfers. Non-matching 
conditional transfers represent a fixed sum of money, with the requirement that it be spent on 
specified public goods. The recipient government here is not required to match financial 
grants from the central government (Bailey, 1999: 181 ; J a, 1997:3). 
It is important to note that conditional grants are by nature, restrictive to local authorities. 
Perhaps, open-ended matching grants may be seen to be giving local authorities a reasonable 
degree of latitude to decide their expenditure decisions with limited interference from the 
centre. Yet, this type of transfer would certainly disadvantage poorer municipal governments 
from enjoying the same level of transfers from the centre because of their limited financial 
capacity to generate more own revenues that would in turn attract more transfers. The richest 
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local authorities would certainly benefit most from such a transfer system. In the end, 
horizontal inequality would be increased in favour of the richest local authorities. 
Closed-ended matching grants, on the one hand may disadvantage poorer local municipalities 
because they may not be able to generate the required revenues in order to be eligible for the 
grants. On the other hand, non-matching or fixed grants would more likely be more 
redistributive and equitable. The downfall of this grant is that local authorities lose their 
financial decision-making autonomy. So, the desire to be innovative would on probability be 
diminished, because they would be reliant on central governments for directions and 
specifications of projects to be undertaken in their areas of jurisdictions. 
A summarised version of the disadvantages of the conditional transfers is as follows (J oumard 
and Kongsrud, 2003: 194): 
• there are high administrative costs involved in managmg them. Governments of 
Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are good examples of countries that 
incur high administrative costs in managing specific transfers; 
• excessive spending and poor cost-effectiveness in many countries. Botswana is a good 
example of those countries incurring excessive spending on development projects 
financed through specific transfers (See section 4.5.2); 
• grants are in some cases based on ex post actual costs instead of a priori standard 
costs. Hence, restraining/containing local government expenditure is a difficult task to 
achieve. 
• In concluding their arguments Joumard and Kongsrud (2003: 194) state that 
conditional grants "may limit a sub-national government's ability to be innovative", 
because expenditure must be defined precisely. Hence, many countries including 
Japan and Ireland have reduced their reliance on conditional grants in favour of 
general grants. The effects of the above-mentioned shortcomings of conditional 
transfers on the notion of fiscal decentralisation will be illustrated in section (see 
section 4.5.2). 
General Grants: unlike specially-earmarked grants, general fiscal transfers places no 
restriction on local authorities on their use. They are used to finance a broad range of services 
provided by local authorities in line with their statutory or constitutionally defined 
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expenditure responsibilities. Block grants may be used to achieve both horizontal and vertical 
equity through financial equalisation schemes. There are two types of general grants. These 
are: (a) lump-sum grants; and (b) effort-related grants (Bailey, 1999:181). 
Effort-related grants are intergovernmental grants that are related to the revenue-effort of the 
local authorities. Revenue effort is measured in terms of tax effort. The more revenue raised 
by local authorities, the more grants the former receives (Bailey, 1999:181). Effort-related 
grants are deliberately designed to stimulate more own local revenue generation in order to 
ensure that local authorities are able to finance a significant amount of their expenditures with 
their marginal revenues. This is another innovative method of upping local revenue 
generation, while increasing discretion on how they provide local public goods to their 
constituents. 
It is critically essential, nonetheless, to bring to the fore the fact that block or universal grants 
are not by nature the most appropriate type of intergovernmental transfers in order to achieve 
the positive attributes of fiscal decentralisation. The determining factors of their design play 
an equally important part in their effectiveness or ineffectiveness. General grants may be 
transferred to local authorities as a specified share of the national revenues on the basis of 
origin of collection. That is, local authorities would be allocated a specified percentage of 
general grants derived from within their areas of jurisdictions (refer to symbol A in Table 1 ). 
Alternatively, a formula may be used to allocate local authorities general grants. Such a 
formula may be based on the expenditure indicators, fiscal capacity, and cost of providing 
services, as well as on the tax effort among others. The formula may constitute a specified 
share of the national revenues (B) for an extended period of time or on an ad hoc basis (F) 
(Bahl, 2000:5-19). 
General grants may also be decided on an ad hoc basis as a share of the national revenues (D) 
or worse, decided on anew by the central government every financial year (H) (Bahl, 2000:5-
19). Each method of deciding general grants has shortcomings as well as positives. However, 
there is consensus among several experts that formula grants would ideally be a better choice, 
should the benefits of decentralisation be maximised. It allows for better planning through 
increased revenue certainty and does not erode the autonomy of local authorities\. This instils 
an element of political accountability because local authorities decide the expenditure 
priorities (Bird and Smart, 2002; Ma, 1997; Bailey, 1999; Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003). 
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2.4.4 Borrowing capacity 
Alternative financing for local government expenditures remains one of the difficult issues in 
local government finance. To avoid heavy reliance by local governments on financial transfers 
from the central government, that normally come with strings attached, and which often 
compromise local agenda settings in local economic development planning, (is but a thorn to 
the decentralisation initiatives, especially in developing countries) municipal governments 
should be allowed to borrow financial resources from the private sector markets in order to 
augment their limited financial capacity to deliver their mandates. Indeed, big infrastructural 
developments that require substantially heavy. capital injection into the local economies 
remain pipedreams in the developing countries because of local governments' limited, if any, 
access to the capital markets. Although, Smoke (200 1 :28) postulates that loans and bonds 
should be used as financing alternatives in capital investment for fiscally sound local 
governments and in self-financing projects, the fact is that this view is generally irrelevant in 
so far as development budgets are concerned in many developing countries, because capital 
markets in those part of the world remain largely undeveloped. 
However, this is not to suggest that borrowing should not be carefully looked into as an 
alternative source of capital in the developing world, in the near future, as and when the 
general economic development reaches an ideal stage. Deficit budgeting at local government 
level may otherwise have devastating repercussions on the general economy because the 
national government is morally obliged to bail out debt-trapped municipalities. 
2.4.5 Institutional framework 
Adopting an appropriate institutional framework is a critical component of a potentially-
successful fiscal decentralisation strategy. Fiscal decentralisation involves all spheres of 
government and as such the role of each government should, where possible, be explicitly 
defined to allow for better coordination of the entire public sector. There are several reasons 
why there is a need for an institutional framework that is sympathetic to the implementation 
of a given fiscal decentralisation system. The most fundamental prerequisite for good 
institutional framework is to ensure that there are clear accountability lines between all 
spheres of government, between sub-national governments and businesses, sub-national 
governments and taxpayers /electorates. 
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According to the Institute on Governance (1998:9), the institutional framework should address 
institutional issues such as performance measures that attempt to measure outputs at 
municipal level, more specifically programmes funded through conditional grants. Initiatives, 
such as performance measures, may play a role in the objective stru;;turing of conditional 
grants in order to create a competitive environment in which local authorities operate 
(Institute on Governance, 1998:9). This means appropriate conditional transfer types may be 
adopted by the central governments in order to inculcate a competitive culture at municipal 
level. Such a culture may create an enabling environment for the employment of financial 
innovation measures meant to maximise the programme outputs through intergovernmental 
conditional grants (Refer to section 2.5.3.1 for types of conditional transfers). In addition, 
performance measures would create a platform for the national government to benchmark the 
performance of each municipal government through fair comparative methods in order to 
ensure effective accountability lines between all stakeholders indicated above. This would 
ensure that each local authority is assessed on its level of commitment to achieving economic 
efficiency through such measures as cost saving and recovery initiatives. 
However, measuring the level of commitment of each local authority in order to ensure 
political accountability is not an easy task, unless other facets of fiscal decentralisation have 
been carefully addressed. The Institute on Governance (1998:9) 
indicates that the intergovernmental transfer system should make clear the role of audit, 
programme evaluation and other monitoring tools on the performance of sub national 
governments. According to Ahmad, in Ahmad (1997:10), the first question that should be 
addressed is specifying the body or bodies that should organise fiscal equalisation transfers. 
Several countries use various bodies to perform this task. In India a constitutionally created 
body, the Finance Commission, is responsible for determining the distribution and sharing of 
finances between the federal government and states from the Consolidated Fund. Such grants, 
awarded by this body, are unconditional. Another body, the Planning Commission, makes 
grants and loans available for the implementation of development plans. Central ministries 
also provide grants for their counterparts in specified projects, either as wholly funded or 
requiring the contribution of states (Singh, 2004:8-10). 
Other countries use only one agency in the equalisation transfers. In Australia the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission, established in 1933 by the central government, 
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distributes general purpose grants to states, using a system that measures their fiscal capacities 
and fiscal needs (Ma, 1997:9). A constitutionally established body in South Africa, the 
Finance and Fiscal Commission, is also mandated the responsibility to recommend to the 
national government on all issues regarding the intergovernmental grants. The 
intergovernmental transfer system in South Africa is helped by the notion of cooperative 
government that recognises the existence of all three spheres of government as distinctive, 
interdependent and inter-related. 
Another set of countries prefers the Ministries of Local Government and Finance to allocate 
grants on their own, without interference from other agencies. Local governments are 
expected to bargain for equalisation transfers. Whilst these ministries may have a dominant 
role in the determination of grants to local authorities, in some instances such a system 
encompasses the direct intergovernmental relations between all national sectoral ministries 
and local governments on sectoral issues that are performed by the latter on behalf of the 
former. Botswana and India use this system. 
On account of the variety of methods followed by different countries, as discussed above, the 
Institute on Governance (1998:9) recommends that at least one independent agency, appointed 
by the government, should be tasked to design and distribute grants or equalisation transfers at 
municipal level in an objective fashion. 
On a different note, the institutional framework is not only expected to rationalise the 
intergovernmental transfers but be guided by a strategy specifically designed to strengthen the 
institutional capacities of subnational governments (Institute on Governance, 1998:9). Such a 
strategy would ensure that local authorities are able to cope with increased scope of functional 
responsibilities that come with the devolution of functional responsibilities and increased 
revenue assignments. In other words, the institutional framework should be seen to be 
addressing, what Dillinger (1991 :29) terms, the decentralisation dilemma of "a trade-off 
between indifference and incompetence". This arises when municipal governments are 
considered the rightful tier of government to achieve allocative efficiency in providing local 
specific public goods yet are without the capacity to do so. Such a body, as may be assigned 
the responsibility to oversee the interaction between all spheres of government, should 
therefore ensure that local authorities have the human capacity to undertake the assigned 
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functional responsibilities, as well as the capacity to tap into additional revenue sources 
allocated them as a result of the decentralisation reforms. 
Finally, in order to ensure proper planning, coordination, budgeting and implementation 
between all spheres of government, the intergovernmental fiscal relations should be reformed 
in such a manner that there are comparable institutional arrangements of the four 
aforementioned. For example, if equity is to be achieved, common accounting practices 
should be used across all the sub-national governments. 
On account of the expected benefits of a properly designed institutional framework, Smoke, in 
Yusuf, Wu and Everett (2000:101), identified several problems that are often not addressed by 
the institutional framework in the developing countries. There tends to be no incentives, 
systems or procedures to guide the interaction between all tiers of government. As such, poor 
performance of local authorities goes unnoticed. This is, more often than not, the case when 
powerful ministries such as that of Local Government and Finance have the greater control on 
the decentralisation process. This becomes even more problematic when there are several 
powerful agencies that have differing views on what constitutes decentralisation. Moreover, 
poor bureaucratic incentives to decentralise may hold the decentralisation process to ransom. 
Immature local democracy (even when the local political representatives are elected) that 
gives only limited local autonomy to the political representatives may be acting 
counterproductively to the process and ideals of decentralisation. Smoke, in Yusuf, Wu and 
Everett (2000: 1 02), is of the view that as long as local decisions can be overridden by the 
centre, local accountability, which is the essence of decentralisation, would shrink. 
Local accountability may be undermined in many ways that are not obvious. This includes the 
appointment of local political representatives by the central government minister, despite the 
existing arrangement for local elections (refer to section 3.3 .2). On the basis of the 
institutional bottlenecks discussed above, Bird (2001 :5) concludes that the institutional 
framework may results in an over or under-controlled, but over-regulated local public sector. 
Local governments are left with little initiative, if any, on such local issues as whom they hire 
and what they pay. This may develop to such an extent that "citizens look to the central 
government to fix pot holes". This may undermine the basic thrust of fiscal decentralisation-
local autonomy to decide about own affairs - and the resultant ideals of local self 
determination and local political accountability. 
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2.5 Conclusions and deductions 
In concluding this chapter, the following factors need to be noted as trendsetters in fiscal 
decentralisation: 
(a) International experience indicates that there is a positive correlation between the level 
of economic development and the rate at which the benefits of decentralisation could 
be maximised. In this regard middle and high-income countries stand a better chance 
to implement the fiscal decentralisation reforms successfully. Therefore, Botswana as 
a middle-income country also stands a better chance to increase economic efficiency 
in the provision oflocal public goods through fiscal decentralisation initiatives; 
(b) In order for the benefits of fiscal decentralisation reforms to be realised to the best 
potential of a given country, local government units should be sufficiently large in 
terms of income, economic activities and populations. Urban centres are therefore the 
best candidates to reap the benefits of decentralisation because they, in most cases 
display these features. Therefore, on the basis of the fact that urbanisation has grown 
tremendously between 1971 and 2001 in Botswana, a reasonable number of local 
governments can be subjected to the fiscal decentralisation reforms in order to achieve 
allocative efficiency and inculcate financial innovation in the management of local 
governments' finances. Hence, fiscal decentralisation reforms require that municipal 
governments be differentiated or classified according to their expenditure needs, 
revenue-raising capacity, population size, level of income and level of development; 
(c) Fiscal decentralisation reforms should appreciate the fact that there are inter-regional 
and/or inter-municipal socio-economic inequalities within all countries and that these 
should be taken into consideration when designing intergovernmental equalisation 
fiscal transfers, so ensuring that each locality is capable of providing a nationally 
determined, minimum standard of basic services This is only possible when each 
locality has achieved fiscal equivalence. Therefore, the national government should 
have information on the potential total taxable resources in each municipality as well 
as the costs differentials (arising out of among others, rural population sparsity or 
urban density) of providing a 'basket of local public sector goods' in accordance with 
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the nationally established expenditure indices. This would ensure equity in the transfer 
system. Therefore an equitable intergovernmental transfer system would ensure fair 
competition between all municipal governments in Botswana, in the process providing 
a platform for them to be innovative enough to restrain their expenditures and 
max1m1se their revenue-raising efforts from the limited revenue sources allocated 
them;# 
(d) Different types of intergovernmental transfers have impacts on the spending behaviour 
of local authorities. Conditional transfers appear to bear the brunt of most of the 
disadvantages associated with intergovernmental transfer systems, especially non-
matching grants. As such there has been a shift in recent years to general or universal 
grants. The shift in emphasis from specific to block grants is precipitated by the 
national government's desire to give local authorities a fair amount of discretion on 
how best to utilise their funds to meet the expectations of their constituents. This is 
intended to promote local financial autonomy and create a favourable environment for 
local political accountability. Block grants would ensure that local political 
representatives in Botswana take the blame and/or credit for the overall outputs and 
outcomes of their spending decisions, without passing the blame to the national 
government; 
(e) There are several methods used to decide the magnitude of both the total vertical and 
horizontal transfers to each locality. Notable among them are the ad hoc and formula-
driven intergovernmental transfers. Formula-driven transfers have been credited for 
bringing revenue security and certainty at municipal government level because they 
are transparent. This enhances their multi-year planning system, because local 
authorities are in a better position to prognosticate the amount of revenues due to them 
over a long-term period of 3-5 years. By adopting formula-driven transfers, 
Botswana's intergovernmental transfer system would be capacitated to make long-
term planning at local government effective, thus providing local authorities with 
incentives to be less wasteful in expending grants from the centre as budgeting would 
be decentralised; 
(f) I it is considered a best-practice scenario for governments to establish the technical, 
administrative and managerial capacity of each local government unit, before 
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devolving the expenditure and revenue generating powers to them. This ensures that 
local authorities are not overwhelmed by an increased number and scope of 
expenditure responsibilities, as well as increased revenue sources which they may not 
tap into, because of inadequate administrative capacity. Therefore, decentralisation 
reforms should begin with building the institutional capacities of both tiers of 
governments rather than increasing the revenue raising powers and the expenditure 
assignments; and 
(g) There would be a need for a clear, coordinating strategy between all spheres of 
government in order to ensure that local governments' autonomy is not trampled on by 
various national agencies and ministries. Such a task requires the establishment of a 
single institution, based on a transparent system, assigned with the responsibility to 
recommend or allocate grants to local authorities. This would ensure that bureaucrats 
who would like to retain control of municipal governments, in the process frustrating 
reforms, do not have an opportunity to do so. 
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Chapter 3 
3. FISCAL DECENTRALISATION: A BOTSWANA PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
Botswana is a middle-income, developing country. Like many other developing countries and 
transitional democracies in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe, Botswana's multi-level 
government system has many limitations. These have direct impact and implications that need 
detailed analysis should there be a desire for appropriately designed, flexible and successful 
fiscal decentralisation strategies. These include inter alia: (a) economic structure, (b) the level 
of economic development, (c) poverty and affluence levels (and patterns), (d) trends in 
urbanisation, (e) economic planning, (f) population distributions and concentrations, (g) 
natural resources patterns and distributions, (h) the extent of ethnic heterogeneity, and (i) the 
political profile of the country. It is for this reason that some of these factors have been 
discussed in sections 1.1 and 3.2, whilst others are briefly discussed in this chapter with a 
view to building a solid background and a better comprehension of Botswana's economy as a 
whole, in order to locate local government as a level of government at which the country 
could derive economic efficiency through fiscal decentralisation. 
Briefly, the following sub-headings address some ofthe challenges referred to above: national 
framework, local government structure, overview of fiscal decentralisation in Botswana and, 
finally, the case studies on Gaborone City, Kweneng District and Kgalagadi District councils. 
3.2 National framework 
From humble beginnings as one of the poorest countries in the world, 22Botswana is today 
classified as a middle-income country by the World Bank, largely due to the discovery of 
diamonds,23 prudent macroeconomic policies and political stability, as well as substantial 
investment in education, health and public infrastructure. Botswana's political profile stands 
22 Diamonds fuelled an uninterrupted and phenomenal economic growth of 14.2 per cent in the period 1965-80 
and almost 10 per cent between 1980 and 1990. Between 1965 and 1990 the country had the highest rate of 
growth of Gross National Product per capita in the world at over eight per cent per year. (See, Edge in Edge and 
Lekorwe, 1998:337) 
23 Botswana has the highest output of high-quality gem diamonds anywhere in the world. Diamonds are the 
mainstay of the economy. (Standard and Poor's Sovereigns, 2002:7). 
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out prominently in Africa, a continent associated with dictatorial governments, civil wars, 
colonial and apartheid regimes, civil and political strife. While various academics and 
practitioners (Mangcu, 2003; Sokhulu, 2004; Somolakae, 2005) engaged themselves in 
gauging the nature and extent of Botswana's democracy, none doubted its genuineness. At 
least eight free-and-fair general elections have been held in the countr~' since independence, 
the latest in October 2004. Members of Parliament and Councillors are voted directly into 
political office every five years, based on universal adult franchise through the First-Past-the-
Post System (FPPS). Both the national and local elections are held at the same time. 
The prevailing conducive political environment at national level has thus been credited for the 
impressive development of local governance in Botswana (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:92), 
albeit with limitations. Some of the major noteworthy positives that the national government 
may duly be credited for are: the functioning of the local government machinery as a result of: 
sustained flow of financial transfers from the national government; the employment of highly 
educated and capable personnel in various fields who are remunerated by the government at 
the centre and the prevailing political environment conducive to free elections. 
The role of the President, Cabinet, Parliament and (especially) the Ministry of Local 
Government (MLG) in running the affairs of the local authorities is such that it undermines 
'self-governance'. This they do primarily through the Local Government (District Councils) 
Act Chapter 40:01, Township Act Chapter 40:02, Unified Local Government Service Act 
Chapter 40:06, Act 13 of 1973 and the Town and Country Planning Act Chapter 32:09 of 
1977. The extensive involvement of the MLG in the affairs of local authorities cannot be 
downplayed. The Minister responsible for local government has the power to nominate 
councillors over and above those elected by the constituents. Of the 476 councillors across the 
country, the Minister of Local Government nominated 101 councillors in the 2004 general 
elections. Only 3 (three) out of the 101 were from the combined three opposition parties, the 
rest were drawn from the ruling Botswana Democratic Party that has been in power since 
independence (Somolakae, 2005 :25). 
Commenting on the significance of elections at local government level in the United 
Kingdom, a constitutional lawyer, Sir Ivor Jennings (1947: 17), as quoted by Foster, Jackman 
and Perlman (1980:14), remarked that "Under this historic system of local self government, 
local authorities even now have a substantial amount of discretion. They consist of persons 
75 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
responsive to the local electorate .... within the limits laid down by Parliament and of central 
control, they adopt a policy which accords as they think with the views of the local 
electorate". On the one hand the enthusiasts of responsive local governance are of the view 
that local political decisions should be reflective of the views of the majority of their 
constituents, while on the other hand the realities of local politics are not necessarily 
determined by local communities but are creatures of the national government's making. The 
ironic and almost dejected observation made by Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980:16) (as 
indicated in the latter part of the previous sentence) implies that, in most if not all cases, 
national issues decide local elections in the United Kingdom and in many other countries 
because local governments are constrained by the former. This view appears to apply to the 
local political environment in Botswana. 
This thesis therefore suggests that the appointment of such a large number of councilors by 
the minister responsible for local governments is not healthy for decentralised political 
decision-making and political accountability, because the appointees owe their loyalty and 
allegiance to the minister who appointed them to represent the national government 
constituency. This is contrary to the notion of fiscal decentralisation that "accountability to the 
electorate is the essence of local democracy" (Sir Frank Layfield' committee, 1976:1 02) as 
quoted by Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980: 15) and that instead the decisions of locally-
elected politicians should prevail and mirror the differing preferences and tastes of their 
constituents. 
3.3 Local government organisational structure 
The local government system in Botswana is constituted of: (a) District and Urban Councils: 
(b) Tribal Administration24; (c) District Administration; and (d) Land Boards25 . However, 
district and urban councils constitute a major element of the Local Government Structure. 
Councils (both urban and district) are statutory bodies. According to Section 5 of Local 
Government Law "A council shall be a body corporate having the name by which it is 
established and capable of suing and being sued under the said name". Both acts state that "it 
24 Tribal administration facilitates development at local level and is composed of chiefs, sub-chiefs, village 
headmen, local police service and administrative staff. This is where a lot of consultations between government 
officials, political leaders and the public take place through the kgotla system. 
25 Land boards are by law responsible for the administration and planning of tribal land. There are currently, I 2 
main land boards and 39 sub land boards across the country. 
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shall be the duty of a council to perform the functions it is required to perform and otherwise 
exercise its powers so as to secure and promote the health, order and good government of the 
area for which it has been established" (Section 29 of Local Government Law). 
In Botswana councils have a long history of working with the Village Development 
Committees (VDCs) which are important village structures that facilitate the interactions 
between the councils and the constituents on developmental issues concerning both parties 
(see section 3.4.1 on the role of VDCs on multi-year development planning at local 
government level). In addition to that, local government planning at council level is facilitated 
by District Development Committees DDCs) which play a critical role in the multi-year 
development planning and the prioritisation of projects that have been identified by the 
councillors and their respective constituents (VDCs). DDCs draw a priority list of projects to 
be evaluated by the ministry of local government at the beginning of every National 
Development Plan/DDP season. The same procedure is observed during the annual 
compilation of projects that are implemented through the Drought Relief Labour Intensive 
Public Works Programme (DRLIPWP) (see sections 1.2.1 and 3.4.1 about the DDCs and 
planning in Botswana). 
Councils in Botswana, unlike in countries such as South Africa, do not have executive 
committees or cabinets. They operate through committees which have been delegated 
authority to make decisions, (albeit the exception when making bye-laws) I do not quite 
follow your meaning here. Section 24(1) of the Local Government Law obliges all councils to 
establish Finance and Education committees. Over and above that, individual councils have 
the discretion to establish committees that they consider relevant for the smooth operation of 
the council. Most of them have committees for staff, health, works, licensing and social and 
community development (S&CD). 
On the political and administrative fronts, it is important to state that although councillors are 
elected to represent their wards26 at the full council meetings, their remuneration, like those of 
the council administrative staff, is determined by the national government. The heads or 
political leaders of urban councils and district councils are called Mayors while their 
26 Each councillor is expected to represent at least 3000 residents, irrespective of the size of the land area which 
may be characterised by great distances between settlements within the same ward. 
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counterparts at district councils are referred to as Council Chairmen27 . These elected 
incumbents are expected to serve their respective councils for a period not exceeding a year, 
with the exception of the Central District Councils (CDC) which carry out Council Chairmen 
elections at two year intervals (SPCLGB, 2001 :38). Mayors and Council Chairmen are not 
directly elected by their constituents, but drawn or elected from within the elected local 
political office bearers. Given a short notice of only12 months for them to influence and drive 
the developments of their respective councils, it is difficult to objectively gauge their 
performance in office. 
The administrative heads of councils at city, town and district councils are called City Clerks, 
Town Clerks and Council Secretaries respectively. Larger district councils are divided into 
sub-districts headed by Assistant Council Secretaries, as well as administrative centres. 
Administrative centres and sub-districts do not have a legal standing. This arrangement was 
created in order to bring services provided by the local authorities closer to the people, in line 
with the ideal notion of fiscal decentralisation. For example, Central District Council has six 
sub-districts while other district councils have Administrative Authorities (in addition to the 
sub-districts) for the same purpose (SPCLGS, 2001:127, 129-130). 
Local government in Botswana is single-tiered. It is comprised of district and urban councils. 
There are nine district, five town, one township and two city councils. Councils vary 
considerably in terms of their population across Botswana vis-a-vis land area, natural resource 
distributions, economic growth and development, as well as level of urbanisation and 
potential for urbanisation, owing to the centralised nature of Botswana's public sector 
infrastructural investments. In the 2001 population census it was established that the largest28 , 
Central District Council had a population of 510 532, while Ghanzi District Council, the 
second largest in terms of land area was the least populated, inhabited by only 32 481 people. 
On the other hand, South-East District Council29 had the smallest land area of 1492 square 
kilometres whilst populated by 60 623 people, as a result of the urbanisation phenomenon that 
has characterised Botswana's development trajectories since the diamond boom of the early 
1970s (Refer to Appendix I: Map of Botswana for boundaries of district and urban councils). 
27 This applies to their deputies who are elected at the same time as the mayors and council chairmen. 
28 Central District Council is the largest in terms of the population and land area (142 669 square kilometres) 
29 Part of the South East District Council falls within the Greater Gaborone Metropolitan Municipality (See 
Appendix 3, Map of the Greater Gaborone Metropolitan). 
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(See section 3.3.1 on a brief synopsis about the impact of urbanisation on Botswana's 
population distributions, income differentials and development patterns). 
3.3.1 Urbanisation in Botswana 
According to Botswana National Settlement Policy Government Paper No. 2 of 1998, a 
settlement attains the status of an urban area when it has a threshold population of 5000 
human inhabitants, with at least 75% of its economically-active population in the employ of 
non-agricultural activities (Botswana National Settlement Policy, 1998:7). Botswana's 
economic growth and development has been characterised by rapid urbanisation between 
1971. and 2001. Urbanisation increased from less than 1 0% in 1971 to 18% in 1981. Between 
1981 and 1991 the urbanisation phenomenon more than doubled, shooting from 18% up to 
45%. By 2001 at least 54% of Botswana's population was urbanised (Gwebu, 2003:2). 
Botswana's urbanisation phenomenon is attributed to several inter-related factors. Firstly, an 
increase in the number of places designated urban such as Palapye and Tlokweng as well as 
the reclassification of a large number of villages into urban villages in 1991 increaseed the 
share of Botswana's urbanised population (Gwebu, 2003:2) (Refer to Appendix 1). 
Secondly, rapid rural migration to urban villages, towns and cities, in response to both public 
and private sector investment, changed the landscapes of Botswana's population distributions 
in favour of those areas with appealing socio-economic opportunities that served as pull-
factors for the majority of Botswana's citizenry. Thirdly, the designation of certain areas as 
district and sub-district headquarters, in an effort to decentralise the activities of local 
authorities, meant the improvement of physical infrastructures, utilities and 
telecommunications, as well as the decentralisation of human resources to operationalise these 
centres. These developments served as private sector 'crowding-in' factors. Employment was 
thus created (Gwebu, 2003:3-4). 
Fourthly, the strategic location of certain settlements relative to the major centres of industrial, 
commercial and administrative functions, such as those within the periphery of Gaborone, 
benefited immensely in economic terms. For example, the populations of Mogoditshane, 
Gabane and Molepolole in the Kweneng District Council (KDC) grew rapidly from 14 200 to 
36 300, from 2 480 to 10 600 and from 36 900 to 53 900 respectively (See Appendixes 1 and 
3). This effectively means the population of Gabane surpassed that of Tsabong which stood at 
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6 300 as at the end of 2001. Yet, Tsabong is the capital centre of Kgalagadi District Council 
(Gwebu, 2003:4). 
In vtew of rapid rural-urban migrations that illustrated the inter-regional socio-economic 
inequalities, the Government of Botswana developed a Natimi.al Settlement Policy in 1998 in 
order to "provide a comprehensive set of guidelines for national physical planning and to 
provide a framework for guiding the distribution of investment in a way that reflects the 
settlements' population size, economic potential, level of infrastructure and settlements' role 
as service centres". Botswana has since been divided into four planning regions. These are: (a) 
Eastern Region; (b) South Eastern Region; (c) Western Region; and Northern Region. 
However, for the purpose of this discussion, only the Western and South Eastern Regions are 
explored briefly. 
According to the National Settlement Policy (1998:5), the South Eastern Region is made up of 
the rural districts of South East, K weneng, Southern and Kgatleng, as well as the urban 
districts of Gaborone, Lobatse and Jwaneng. At least 50% of Botswana's urbanites are 
residents of the South Eastern region. They are mainly located in Gaborone, Lobatse, 
Jwaneng, Tlokweng, Mogoditshane, Mochudi, Ramotswa and Molepolole (refer to appendix 1 
for these districts and settlements). Camp bell in Edge and Lekorwe (1998 :261) postulates that 
the re-classification of a settlement as urban is done on basis of the capability of the area to 
provide infrastructural and environmental services similar to those offered in a modern city to 
its population. This means that the aforementioned settlements have the attributes of a modern 
town, yet are located in the so-called "rural" Kweneng district (refer to appendix 3). This 
region is exemplified by the largest concentration of Botswana's population, better 
infrastructures and services, as well as being the largest base of Botswana's manufacturing 
and industrial strength. These economic attributes translate into employment creation, 
increased incomes and densely populated areas, hence economies of scale and scope in the 
provision of local public goods and services come into play. 
In contrast to the South Eastern Region, the Western Region, comprising of the rural districts 
of Kgalagadi and Ghanzi districts, as well as the urban district of Ghanzi, has the lowest level 
of urbanisation in Botswana. It is a mere less than two percent (see appendix 1 for both 
Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts). The National Settlement Policy (1998:6) captures the 
features of the Western Region eloquently as follows, "The Western Region is characterised 
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by low and sparsely-distributed population, lack of surface water and prevalence of saline 
water and semi-desert conditions". In economic terms the provision of local public goods in 
the Western Region, which encompasses the Kgalagadi district, is relatively high per capita 
while the local taxing power should logically be relatively lower because of lower incomes 
and sparsely populated settlements. 
In view of rapid rural-urban migrations that illustrated the inter-regional socio-economic 
inequalities, the Government of Botswana developed a National Settlement Policy in 1998 in 
order to "provide a comprehensive set of guidelines for national physical planning and to 
provide a framework for guiding the distribution of investment in a way that reflects the 
settlements' population size, economic potential, level of infrastructure and settlements' role 
as service centres". Botswana has since been divided into four planning regions. These are: (a) 
Eastern Region; (b) South Eastern Region; (c) Western Region; and Northern Region. 
However, for the purpose of this discussion, only the Western and South Eastern Regions are 
explored briefly. 
According to the National Settlement Policy (1998:5), the South Eastern Region is made up of 
the rural districts of South East, K weneng, Southern and Kgatleng, as well as the urban 
districts of Gaborone, Lobatse and Jwaneng. At least 50% of Botswana's urbanites are 
residents of the South Eastern region. They are mainly located in Gaborone, Lobatse, 
Jwaneng, Tlokweng, Mogoditshane, Mochudi, Ramotswa and Molepolole (refer to appendix 1 
for these districts and settlements). Campbell in Edge and Lekorwe (1998:261) postulates that 
the re-classification of a settlement as urban is done on basis of the capability of the area to 
provide infrastructural and environmental services similar to those offered in a modem city to 
its population. This means that the aforementioned settlements have the attributes of a modern 
town, yet are located in the so-called "rural" Kweneng district (refer to appendix 3). This 
region is exemplified by the largest concentration of Botswana's population, better 
infrastructures and services, as well as being the largest base of Botswana's manufacturing 
and industrial strength. These economic attributes translate into employment creation, 
increased incomes and densely populated areas, hence economies of scale and scope in the 
provision of local public goods and services come into play. 
In contrast to the South Eastern Region, the Western Region, comprising of the rural districts 
of Kgalagadi and Ghanzi districts, as well as the urban district of Ghanzi, has the lowest level 
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of urbanisation in Botswana. It is a mere less than two percent (see appendix 1 for both 
Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts). The National Settlement Policy (1998:6) captures the 
features of the Western Region eloquently as follows, "The Western Region is characterised 
by low and sparsely-distributed population, lack of surface water and prevalence of saline 
water and semi-desert conditions". In economic terms the provision of local public goods in 
the Western Region, which encompasses the Kgalagadi district, is relatively high per capita 
while the local taxing power should logically be relatively lower because of lower incomes 
and sparsely populated settlements. 
It is important to note that this precis on Botswana's population is meant to put into context 
the development of local governments in Botswana, with reference to their demographics, 
resources capacity, and geographical locations, in view of their differences in population 
distributions vis-a-vis land areas as discussed in section 3.3. This contextual discussion on 
urbanisation in Botswana seeks to highlight the fact that population distributions have shifted 
tremendously since the establishment and demarcation of district and urban councils in 
Botswana, yet the boundaries of districts have never been reviewed to allow for this 
development as well as the accompanying features, such as increased incomes. Urbanisation 
in Botswana has a potential for increased decentralisation in the provision of local public 
services, because such principles as the service-costs correspondence can be applied 
successfully in richer districts, while subsidies, funded through intergovernmental transfers. 
can be applied objectively in order to achieve equity and allocative efficiency without 
promoting incidences of free riding. This view draws its validity from the notion of critical 
mass, which is an important determinant of the degree of fiscal decentralisation that should be 
adopted in each municipal government (for an applied discussion of this principle see section 
4.2.1). 
3.4 Overview of fiscal decentralisation in Botswana 
Fiscal decentralisation has a long history in Botswana, dating back to independence when the 
government of Botswana decided that local authorities were to be an important tier of 
government through which local issues would be better addressed locally, without recourse to 
the national government. However, the government acknowledged that local authorities did 
not have adequate financial and human resources capacity. Therefore the degree of 
decentralisation was to be equated with the level of their capacity as it evolved from weak to 
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strong over time. Briefly, this discussion highlights the institutional arrangements between 
both tiers of government, the allocation of expenditure assignments and revenue raising 
powers, as well as the transfer system in place for both recurrent and development 
expenditures at local government level. 
3.4.1 Institutional arrangements 
The Ministry of Local Government30 (MLG), as the main link between local authorities and 
the central government, has the explicit role of providing development support and policy 
guidance to the former. MLG also bargains on behalf of all local authorities at the central 
government for funding. As the "parent" ministry, MLG is allocated financial resources in the 
annual financial budget like any other ministry. However, the ministry is responsible for 
distributing the pool to various local authorities, according to their priorities, within the 
budgetary constraints and in accordance with the priorities of the National Development Plans 
(NDPs) and District Development Plans (DDPs). The extent of the central government's 
involvement in the affairs of local municipal governments through various national ministries· 
is evidenced by the following: 
• MLG controls and supervises most decisions considered critical to the relevance of 
local governments, such as local personnel, budgeting, training, developing new 
revenue sources and, in the development of managerial systems and procedures31 
(Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:94) (see section 4. 4.5.2); 
• MLG is directly involved in the recruitment, training and development of the council's 
staff through the Department of Unified Local Government Service Management 
(DGLSM) (See section 3.4.2). This is done at no cost to the local authorities, in the 
process disburdening councils of budgetary pressures. However, local authorities have 
the responsibility to hire and remunerate the industrial-class employees (labours and 
semi-skilled personnel). Although Olowu and Wunsch (2004:93) credited the effective 
intergovernmental relations system between the MLG and local authorities for the 
successful implementation of this arrangement, the duo hastened to acknowledge that 
the system suppresses own initiatives and the development of local democracy that 
3° Fonnerly the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing 
31 
"No bye-law made by the council shall be of any force and effect unless it is approved by the Minister and 
published in the Gazette" Local Government (District Councils) Act Chapter 40:01 section 30 
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thrives when there is adequate local autonomy, in accordance with the decentralisation 
theorem; 
• local governments are constrained to set fees for the services they provide to their 
constituents, either by the MLG or other government departments that individually 
control the levels of fees to be charged on behalf of councils32. This has created a 
tendency for council staff to assume that the national government will always be on 
standby to close financial gaps at district level (Peters-Berries,l994:43-45) (see 
section 4.5.3); 
• the MFDP had the overall authority to determine which capital projects are undertaken 
in a given district/urban council, regardless of the priorities of the latter, although 
these projects had financial implications in the council's recurrent budgets. According 
to Briscoe (1995); Chanaux-Repond and Kanengoni (1995) in Olowu and Wunsch 
(2004:95), local politicians felt constrained to respond to the needs of their 
constituents, because problems were only addressed when considered important by a 
national ministry, which would then transfer funds to the council, or else the issues 
would not be addressed (see section 3.4.4). 
This thesis suggests that the institutional framework between the national and local 
governments is in such a mode that coordination between the activities of both tiers of 
governments is difficult to maintain because there are various role players (ministries) 
involved in various activities of the municipal governments. The Ministry of Local 
Government may be calling for the implementation of cost-recovery measures to be imposed 
on the electorates, in order to reduce intergovernmental fiscal transfers to the districts, while 
the Ministry of Health (MoH), which sets primary health-care fees, may be driven by the 
contrary notion of equal access to public health. Hence, MoH may maintain lower standard 
rates that may not reflect the population per capita income of each municipal government. 
This would normally arise because of different views of what constitutes equity. MLG may 
understand equity from a fiscal decentralisation perspective, while MoH may consider equity 
as access to public health for all, irrespective of their economic status, at no cost at all or at 
nationally-determined standard rates. 
32 Price setting (local charges) made by the local authorities for implementing on their populations is 
predetermined nationally by the Ministry of Health. The charge is uniform country-wide. 
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Fiscal decentralisation reforms require that the allocation of functions be clearly defined in 
order to ensure that conflicts between tiers of governments or between local governments and 
national ministries are kept to the minimum, in order to ensure that local authorities maintain 
their political autonomy from the centre. This would ensure local political ownership of 
locally-determined spending decisions that would be considered as the preferences of the local 
populations. It is therefore important to highlight briefly the intergovernmental relations 
framework between both tiers of governments and establish whether it provides for 
interdependent and inter-related relations between governments, or maintains a 
"grandmotherly" relationship in favour of the national government. 
Inter-Governmental Relations: The relationship between local governments and the central 
government is governed by several acts, as stated in section 3.2. These Acts outline the 
statutory responsibilities of the councils and those of the national government ministries in the 
affairs of local authorities. In doing so they draw the limitations thereof, placed on 
municipalities and their expectations concerning the national government, on various sectors 
of local economies. In addition, both tiers of government cement their relations through such 
forums as the National District Development Conferences (NDDCs) which are instrumental in 
developing the National Development Plans (NDPs). Such forums are intended to ensure that 
NDPs reflect the priorities and views of local authorities. 
However, the promotion of good relations between the centre and the peripheral governments 
is in principle the responsibility of the Botswana Association of Local Authorities (BALA )33 . 
This body was established in 1983 "with the overriding objective of contributing towards a 
strong, democratic and development-conscious local government in Botswana" (SPCLGSB, 
2001 :63). BALA is supposed to achieve this by promoting and strengthening local 
democracy; providing advice and guidance to local authorities; arranging training for 
councillors; officers and monitoring standards; providing opportunities for discussing issues 
of common interest; formulating common policies on issues affecting local government; 
engaging in dialogue with the central government; and linking municipalities with others 
outside the borders of Botswana (SPCLGSB, 2001 :63). 
33 Comprised of Mayors, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Council Chairpersons. 
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However, the role of the MLG cannot be ruled out in this regard because it is, in principle, the 
chief role player on all issues concerning local governments. As the ministry responsible for 
coordinating all the activities of other ministries at local government, it has an overriding 
influence on the effectiveness of BALA because MLG is a major source of revenues for the 
former. As a result, lack of resources has hampered the achievement of some of these 
objectives for which BALA was created, except for a few, thanks to financial supports from 
donor agencies as well as the national government. The effectiveness of BALA is, 
notwithstanding this, compromised by the unwillingness of the national government to 
respond and implement its resolutions (SPCLGS, 2001 :64). BALA is not recognised by any 
statute or the constitution. 
This scenario is described by Green (1889:374) in Foster, Jackman and Perlman (1980:21) as 
"grandmotherly government", where the intergovernmental relation system is characterised by 
over-legislation at the expense of local authorities. Green (1889:374) in Foster, Jackman and 
Perlman ( 1980:21) remarked that "The outcry against state interference but to centralisation, 
to the constant aggression of the central executive upon local authorities" is not healthy for 
local self-determination of local authorities. This erodes their authority in their areas of 
jurisdictions, in the process undermining the objectives of fiscal decentralisation which is to 
ensure that local political leaders are answerable to their constituents and that their spending 
decisions mirror the changing tastes of their electorates. The ability of local governments to 
meet the preferences of their constituencies, which are not constant, depends on their capacity 
to adopt short, medium and long-term development planning in an environment where their 
spending decisions will be determined by them. They should as well be able to have a high 
level of revenue certainty and security, especially on services funded through 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers. 
Multi-Year Development Planning at Local Government level: According to NDP9 
(2003:389) "A fundamental premise of planning in Botswana is that it should, to the extent 
possible, be based on a "bottom-up" planning system, through consultation, whereby the 
people have the opportunity to express their needs and prioritise them. These needs, in turn. 
constitute the basis for local-level planning and eventually national planning". Grassroots 
consultation is fundamentally critical to multi-year planning at local level. The Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) /Ward Development Committees (WDCs) are the lowest 
level consultation institutions, at village level, to facilitate bottom-up planning and coordinate 
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development.. The former were established in 1968 through a Presidential directive and the 
latter replicated in urban areas. They are thus, called WDCs in urban areas. 
These institutions are created to ensure that there is intensive and extensive consultation 
between ordinary members of society, government officials and politicians in the formulation 
and implementation of the DDPs and NDPs through the Kgotla34. Resolutions agreed upon 
here are taken to the District Development Committees which are comprised of all 
government departments at local level, Tribal Administration, Chief Executives of Councils, 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private sector and others (NDP9, 2003:389-391 ). 
During NDP8 (1997-2003), the government committed itself to genuine decentralisation of 
DDPs, consistent with the development needs of the localities, within their financial and 
implementation capacities and guided by the overall objectives of the NDPs, resources 
permitting. For the first time the Urban Development Plan (UDP) 1, DDP535 and NDP8 were 
simultaneously produced after extensive consultative processes between the councils, national 
government, private sector and the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). (NDP8, 
2003:465). 
Notwithstanding this, there is a concern that long-term development planning is far from 
being bottom-up in Botswana. According to local government officials, the determination of 
projects to be undertaken at district level are not decided upon by local authorities but by the 
national government. During an interview with a senior municipal official it emerged that 
National Development Plans are compiled first and then a schedule of projects that have been 
decided at national level is circulated to all district councils. Councils are expected to decide 
on their projects of interest and submit them to the Ministry of Finance and Development for 
evaluation and reprioritisation. Once this exercise is complete, district councils, through the 
District Development Committees, compile their District Development Plans. An analysis of 
the content ofDDPs indeed reflects a schedule of development projects as contained in NDPs. 
This means that the DDPs address the development needs of the municipal governments 
through the eyes of the national government or from a national perspective, rather than from a 
local perspective. 
34 Kgotla is a public forum for discussing issues of societal interest at community, regional or national level. 
35 Urban councils used to produce physical plans as opposed to development plans. 
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This thesis, therefore, suggests that multi-year development planning in Botswana is 
reminiscent of what Blo-Hansen (1999:237) refers to as policy making environment 
dominated by "expenditure guardians" whose interest lies in protecting the macro-economic 
stability at all costs, in the process sidelining other equality-important role players (See 
section 4.5). In such an environment, local elections may well be decided by national issues, 
because local governments may be greatly constrained by national government36. From a 
fiscal decentralisation perspective this means local preferences would be decided from the 
centre. This is what is referred to as centralist approach to decentralisation. The environment 
within which multi-year policy making process is taking place creates a scenario of centrally-
dominated, local-development planning, because all development projects are funded from the 
centre through non-matching grants (refer to 2.5.3.1 for the disadvantages of non-matching, 
conditional grants and section 4.4 for an analysis of Botswana's intergovernmental transfer 
system). 
It should be noted, in concluding this section, that some of the developments grants are 
administered by the funding national ministries. Perhaps that is the reason why planning at 
local government level is centralist in approach. Accordingly, local authorities account to the 
government ministries, not the people that elected them to power. This is against the basic 
. thrust of fiscal decentralisation which is about achieving economic efficiency. International 
experience suggests that governments are likely to be more efficient at spending their 
financial resources ift they were involved in generating them. 
3.4.2 Expenditure responsibilities 
According to the Local Government (District Council) Act, Chapter 40:01; 28 and the 
Township Act CAP 40:02; 29: "It shall be the duty of a council to perform the functions it is 
required to perform and otherwise exercise its powers so as to secure and promote the health, 
order and good government of the area for which it has been established". Through these 
acts, at least nine districts councils, four town councils and two city councils have been 
established, with varied responsibilities in accordance with the conditions of these acts. Over 
36 This observation was made by Newton in Layfield (1976:6) and referred to by Foster, Jackman and Perlman 
(1980: 16), when they made the observation that in the United Kingdom national issues dominated local 
government politics to the extend of marginalising local issues. In the process the results of local elections were 
being decided on national issues. 
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and above their statutory responsibilities, local authorities may, through bye laws, extend their 
responsibilities with approval ofthe Minister of Local Government. 
In an assertively-written text, after a comparative study of local governments in South Africa, 
Botswana and Swaziland, Oluwu (2004) concluded that, unlike most local governments in 
Africa, municipalities in Botswana have a wide range of expenditure responsibilities and they 
have in most cases exhibited a high level of competence to perform them. Perhaps Oluwu 
(2004) came to this conclusion as a result of the following wide and complex responsibilities 
that the Local Government Acts confers on councils37 : 
• primary education; 
• basic health care and sanitation; 
• maintenance of public roads other than those maintained by the national 
government; 
• water supplies, mostly in rural areas where Water Utilities Corporation38 
(WUC) is not mandated such a responsibility; 
• general administration (for example, the establishment, maintenance and 
control of markets, recreation grounds, parks and other places, cemeteries and burial grounds); 
• abattoirs; 
• regulating and licensing of, among others, brewing, distribution and sale 
of traditional beer. 
Through vanous statutes and regulations the expenditure responsibilities of councils have 
been increased since 1985 to include: self-helping housing, matimela (stray cattle); remote-
area development; fire extinction and prevention; physical planning; trade licensing and 
labour-intensive public works. 
In addition to the expenditure responsibilities assigned to district councils, town and city 
councils, they have additional responsibilities, such as the protection of common properties 
and providing public electricity supplies. They also have to build, maintain and let houses 
and must acquire and develop land for sale as serviced lots39 . As Peters-Berries (1994:8) 
rightly said, the current laws and bye-laws assign the councils broad responsibilities, 
including some of the most cost-intensive undertakings such as: the provision of health care, 
37 The first few are the main functions, whilst the rest are permissive responsibilities. 
38 Water Utilities Corporation has been statutorily assigned. All the responsibilities pertaining to the supply of 
water to urban centres and other areas are designated by the Minister of Minerals, Energy and Water Affairs. 
39 Townships Act CAP 40:02; regulation 28 
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primary education and drought relief projects. However, according to Sharma (1998:79) and 
Wunsch (2004), the capacity of the local authorities has been found wanting in delivering 
their statutory mandates. The limited capacity of councils to deliver their statutory mandates 
satisfactorily is denoted largely by the sustained provision of certain services on a joint basis 
with national ministries. 
Notable among their statutory responsibilities, delivered on a joint basis (provisions?) with the 
ministries responsible for such sectors, are: 
• Primary Education. Whereas the national Ministry of Education (MoE) is 
responsible for the provision of teachers, the deployment of teachers and their 
supervision and development of the curriculum, local authorities have been mandated 
to build schools and teachers' housing, provide supplies and other related facilities 
(NDP8, 1997:341); 
• Primary Health Care. The responsibility to run the basic health-care service has been 
vested with the councils along the same lines as the arrangement with primary 
education. Whilst, the Ministry of Health (MoH) sets the standards, supervises and 
trains the nurses and doctors (including other health personnel), they are employed and 
salaried by the MLG. The national government assists councils quite significantly with 
health facilities and other critical equipments to ensure that the basic health care runs 
smoothly (ibid); 
• Public Road Construction and Maintenance. The construction and maintenance of 
primary and secondary roads have been designated to the roads department within the 
Ministry of Works and Transport (MWT) whilst the MLG, through the councils, are 
responsible for tertiary and access roads. According to NDP9 Part II (2003 :44 ), district 
councils were responsible for construction and maintenance of tertiary and access 
roads, 9 866 kilometres long (earth: 6 996 km, tracks: 2 770 km) while urban councils 
were responsible for 1 440km. MWT is responsible for 8 775km of roads. Yet, MLG 
estimates that during the entire NDP9 (2003-2009) both district and urban councils 
would be allocated a capital budget of PI 066 499 000, while MWT estimates that at 
least P2 332 187 000, as capital expenditure, would be incurred through the 
construction and rehabilitation of secondary and primary roads. Both district and urban 
councils have outsourced most of the roads programme to the private sector since the 
beginning ofNDP8. This has since relieved their overstretched technical capacity; 
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• Water and Waste Water. The water sector, as well as the policy development related 
to it, falls within the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs (MMR W A). 
The Department of Water Affairs (DWA) plans, constructs, and operates water supply 
systems in 17 major villages (headquarters of districts), whilst the operation and 
maintenance of water schemes in medium and small rural villages are the 
responsibility of the district councils under the MLG. The operation of water supply 
systems by DWA certainly deprives local authorities of potential revenue sources that 
would boost their internally-generated revenues. In an effort to perform their water 
supply responsibility effectively, all district councils established separate Water 
Departments (NDP 8, 1997:279-282). 
• Drought Relief Labour Intensive Public Works Programme40 (DRLIPW). 
Botswana is prone to long periods of harsh droughts that threaten the food security of 
rural communities and drastically curtail the potential income that could be generated 
through subsistence farming. The government has historically taken upon itself to 
provide relief measures to the rural citizens through the DRLIPW. MLG's projects 
were accordingly decentralised to the district councils. District councils submit 
proposals of projects to the MLG to be considered for viability and sustainability. 
Priority is given to infrastructure that is considered basic and necessary for the 
developments of rural areas, including the construction of teachers' quarters, health 
posts, accommodation for public servants and water supplies within localities. 
However, it appears that projects undertaken through the DRLIPW are becoming more 
complex and require high level of technical skills to undertake. As a result, of this, it 
was observed during the NDP8 (1997-2003) that the capacities of districts became 
overstretched because the management of projects became too complex, while project 
supervision was weak. As a result, projects took longer to complete than planned. To 
augment inadequate technical skills within district councils to undertake such varied 
and cost intensive projects, it became necessary to engage external volunteers to assist 
with the technical aspects (refer to section 4.4.2). 
Although the provision of local public goods and services on joint basis has worked well in 
the past, there is a pressing need to devolve some of the activities to be fully performed by 
40 This programme is implemented nationally and executed by districts, funded through specific or conditional 
transfers from the centre. 
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local authorities so as to avoid inconsistencies within the same jurisdictional areas. For 
example, councils contend that they are not performing to the optimum in the supply of water, 
because they do not have the authority to identify, site or drill boreholes, as the authority rests 
with DW A. In addition, DWA on one hand offers its customers in large villages the option to 
dig trenches and get connected to the water system by the department at a cost of P470 or, 
alternatively, the department may provide full connection at P640. Councils, on the other 
hand, expect applicants to dig trenches and purchase their own material. Councils in return 
charge P200 for labour involved in the connection. This, according to the councils, was as a 
result of inadequate financial resources (SPCLGSB, 2001: 19). 
This situation is not helpful to genuine decentralization. Firstly, the department of water 
affairs enjoys economies of scale in the supply of water in urban villages (because of high 
population densities) within the jurisdictions of councils while the latter supply water to 
scattered homesteads at a high cumulative cost because homesteads are sparsely distributed in 
small villages. This may negatively affect the durability and sustainability of supplying water 
in a cost-effective manner in rural villages due to high capital costs (incurred by councils) that 
cannot be recovered from rural residents in the short-to-medium term. Residents of smaller 
villages may perceive the supply of non-durable water to them by the councils as a sign of 
failure by councils to deliver their assigned mandate. This may be interpreted as failure of the 
decentralisation reforms to improve the provision of durable goods and services at reasonable 
cost (or in an efficient and effective manner) because rural residents do not get value for their 
money from the councils. 
Secondly, the concept of fiscal decentralisation values competition (or the Tiebout Model) as 
a way of inducing competition between service providers (in this case municipal 
governments) in order to ensure efficient delivery of services. This is only possible when 
residents have a choice of services to choose from. The supply of water in rural villages has 
limited if any choices for residents to choose from. Residents in rural villages have no choice 
but to travel long-distances in order to purchase materials required to connect them to the 
council water supply system while their counterparts in urban villages enjoy the supply of 
durable water by either getting full connection at a correspondingly high cost or by digging 
trenches in order for the department of water to connect them. This inconsistencies only 
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entrenches the view that decentralisation is not a solution for poor service delivery but an 
impediment for better services deliveries by the national government departments41 . 
On a different but related note, Mosha (2004:25) observed that the Gaborone City Council 
had constructed two new clinics that were not in operation because of lack of nurses and 
doctors that are not employed by the council but the MLG. This is an illustration of the 
control that the government (through MLG) has on municipal governments. If local 
authorities had the authority to determine what projects to undertake within the capacity of 
their financial resources, Gaborone city council would not have constructed clinics without 
taking into consideration the human resources required to run them. The city council would 
rather have undertaken an alternative project that it would be able to operate with the 
resources at disposal. Because, the city council constructed the facilities with an expectation 
(and most probably legitimate expectation because projects are approved and fully funded by 
the government through MLG) that MLG would provide human resources, it may as well had 
made a pledge to its constituents that clinics would be operational at an earlier time than is the 
case now. This is centralisation at local level. 
This thesis, while appreciating that there is inadequate capacity at local government level to 
run their affairs without interference from the national government, suggests that the current 
arrangement of joint provision creates a setback for fiscal decentralisation reforms, because it 
blurs the accountability lines between local political representatives and their electorates. 
Consequently, councils merely pass on the blame to the national government for services that 
they are mandated to provide, instead of taking positive steps towards solving inadequacies. 
Notwithstanding this, it is important, ab initio, that before getting into the details of the 
revenue sources assigned to local authorities, the significance of local government as a source 
of employment and a contributor to the Gross Domestic Product of the economy should be 
highlighted. This is one element in the measuring of the extent of decentralisation, because it 
indicates the implications of locally based financial expenditure decisions in the overall 
economy. 
41 The Second Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure (2001 :20) raised a concern that limited 
choices for rural residents in the supply of water by the councils are "unfortunate and grossly inequitable". 
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TABLE 2 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PAID EMPLOYEES BY SECTOR AND ECONOMY ACTIVITY 
September 1999-September 2004 
Sector/Economic Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept Sept 
Activity 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Private & 15300 160100 166900 169519 174483 178854 
Parastatal 
Central 
Government 84900 84500 82200 86958 87700 94753 
Local 
Government 19100 20700 22100 23247 23200 22780 
Grand 
Total 257100 265200 271200 279724 285382 296387 
Source: Central Statistics Office (An extract from the Annual Economic Report (2005:33)) 
Based on the information in tables 2 (above) and 3 (below) it is clear that the level of local 
governments' expenditures did not keep pace with the growth of the overall government 
expenditures within the 1999/00-2003/04 financial years. Local government consumption 
remained constant within the five-year period, whilst its contribution to employment initially 
grew marginally from 7.42% to 8.31% before retreating back to 7.68% in 2004. It is still to be 
established whether this implies centralisation or decentralisation of the overall public sector 
financial expenditure decision-making. It is nevertheless worth noting that the number of local 
governments' employees decreased relative to that of the national government, parastatals and 
private sector. Government's consumption increased faster than that of local governments 
(Table 3). If indeed this information implies centralisation, then the government's efforts to 
inculcate economic efficiency through decentralised public expenditures are not bearing fruits. 
TABLE3 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE AT CURRENT PRICES 
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
P Million 
Government final 7,524.5 8,741.8 10,552.7 12,167.5 13,692.4 
Consumption 
(a) Central 6,709.7 7,839.2 9,507.8 11,013.9 12,422.4 
(b) Local 814.9 902.7 1,044.8 1,153.6 1,270.0 
Percentage of Total 
Government final 30.2 30.5 33.1 33.1 34.3 
Consumption 
(a) Central 26.9 27.4 29.8 30.0 31.1 
(b) Local 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.2 
Source: Central Statistics Office (An extract from the Annual Economic Report (2005:30)) 
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3.4.3 Revenue Assignments 
Councils in Botswana have been assigned less buoyant revenue sources. According to the 
Local Government Law (section 40 of Chapter 40:01; and section 96 of Chapter 40:02) 
councils revenue sources include: 
(a) such tax as the council is authorised by law to collect from the inhabitants of the area 
in respect of which the council has been established; 
(b) such rates as the council is authorised by law to impose; 
(c) rentals from property owned or administered by the council; 
(d) all moneys derived from licenses or permits issued by the council and all taxes, dues 
and fees imposed under lawful authority by the council; 
(e) interest on investment; 
(f) such royalties as may by law be payable to or receivable by the council; 
(g) donations, contributions and endowments; 
(h) reimbursements; 
(i) such grants as the government may make to the council; 
U) any other moneys which may by law be paid to or received by the council. 
It may appear as if local authorities have relatively extensive authority to generate their own 
revenues through a wide panoply of sources. This is the implication that the Local 
Government Law generates. To the contrary, according to Peters-Berries (1994: 12), local 
authorities are disempowered to impose taxes of their own on profitable businesses to avoid 
distortion of competition, such as in the public transport industry. The law further restricts the 
power of councils to tax certain individuals through granting exemptions in property taxation. 
The beneficiaries of this arrangement, among others, are: public enterprises such as the 
Botswana Railways, Botswana Power Corporation and the WUC (in their use of industrial 
land), religious groups who own buildings, private and public schools, as well as the 
economically disadvantaged members of society (Peters-Berries, 1994: 12). There is therefore, 
a clear indication of a deliberate policy to restrict the financial autonomy of councils in 
Botswana. The trend has been developing over time since the 1970s as a result of the rapid 
growth rate of national government revenues from the sale of rough diamonds. According to 
the NDP7 (1991 :472), local government tax was revoked because it was expensive to collect 
and lacked an element of equity. This assertion was made during the time of Botswana's 
diamond boom. 
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Since being stripped of the right to raise local government tax, municipal governments have 
very limited own revenue that they have some sort of control over. As the main sources of 
local governments' revenues have been reduced too, they have technically created a third type 
of revenues for themselves - albeit at the expense of their electorates. '!'hese are through own 
revenues, intergovernmental grants (referred to as Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) or Deficit 
Grants). The main revenue sources for district councils are trade licence fees, matimela 
charges, water levy, fees for sanitation and abattoir and investment income from General Fund 
balances. 
Urban councils, on the other hand, mainly have access to the following own revenue sources 
(SPCLGSB, 2001 :52): property rates; site and service levies and licence fees. 
According to the NDP7 (1991 :453) there was a rapid expenditure resurgence during the 
NDP6 period, so much so that the difference between councils' own revenues and the deficits 
grants from the central government was P36 million, before swelling to P 140m in the 1990/91 
financial year. It is on record that expenditure growth indeed averaged at least 13 percent per 
annum between the financial years 1985/86-1990/92 in real price terms. During the same 
period, urban councils were expected to finance 85 percent of their expenditure 
responsibilities from own sources. Much to the disappointment of the national government, 
urban councils only managed to finance 40 percent of their expenditure responsibilities for the 
financial year 1989/90 as against the 81 percent that they had funded in the financial year 
1985/86 (NDP7, 1991 :455). 
This trend continued unabated during the NDP8 (1997-2003) and NDP9 (2003-2009) 
intervals. There is therefore, a positive gap (because expenditure needs have been rising 
rapidly while the revenue raising capacity remained stagnant) between the expenditure needs 
and the revenue-raising capacity of the local authorities. This applies to both urban and district 
councils. The expenditure needs' growth exceeded the own revenues' growth rate. During 
NDP8, RSG constituted 64 percent and 92 percent of the urban and district councils, whilst 
during NDP9, 70 percent and 95 percent of urban and district councils were sourced by the 
central government through intergovernmental financial transfers (NDP8, 1997:467; NDP9, 
2003:392). 
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According to Sharma, in Sing and Reddy (2003:234), limited revenue sources are further 
subsided/depleted by the ineffective administration at local government which manifests itself 
in the form of high default rates and arrears in service levies, arrears in the collection of loans 
extended to the public via the self-help housing areas (SHHA) programme (loans) and 
inadequate collection of property rates in urban councils (see sections 3.5.1 and 4.3.1.1). 
It is important to mention the fact that the General Fund was not created by the government as 
a local revenue source. According to section 41 ( 1) of the Local Government (District 
Council) Act and section 97 (1) of the Townships Act "Every council shall establish and 
maintain a general fund and all moneys received by the council by way of revenue shall be 
paid into this fund, all expenses incurred by the council in the execution of the powers and 
duties conferred upon it by or under provisions of this Act shall be defrayed out of such fund". 
Due to deferred expenditures, as a result of inadequate capacity to undertake budgeted-for 
projects and council activities, as well as inflexible financial rules imposed by MLG, such 
revenues accrue in the general fund (in the process-generating income) lost me here!. Such 
interests as may accrue to the general fund is seen by local authorities as a lucrative source of 
income for their councils (refer to case studies, sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2; and 3.5.3). In fact it 
accounts for more than 60% of own incomes for most district councils. 
This thesis therefore suggests that the growing gap between expenditure needs and revenue 
capacity at municipal level is not incidental but as a consequence of the expenditure reforms 
undertaken that were not complemented by reforms of revenue- generating powers. 
Furthermore, inadequate measures were taken to build local institutional capacity to maximise 
their (municipalities') revenue collections from existing revenue sources. 
3.4.4 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
Whereas Craythorne (2003 :218) agues that the power of the government to impose taxes 
relates directly to its fiscal powers, the reality is that in unitary states local governments derive 
their power to raise and spend own revenues directly from the central government. The 
practice therefore, has been that the bulk of the sub-central governments' revenues emanate 
from the national government. Botswana is certainly an illustrative example of a centrally-
organised revenue generation system. Figure 2 (below) fairly represents Botswana's fiscal 
transfer system. Figure 2 indicates how/that all major revenue sources, including cyclical 
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taxes (for example income tax and taxes on natural resources) are the preserve of the national 
government. Hence, there are no revenues generated within the jurisdictions of municipal 
governments to be shared between spheres of government, like in a hybrid tax system as is the 
case in South Africa and France. Revenue generation is centralised and distributed by the 
national government, through the established transfer mechanisms as discussed below. 
*Figure 2 Taxation Systems I: The Centralised Systems of Grant Allocation 
(This model is adapted from Burns, D. Hambleton, R. & Hoggett, P, 1994: 132) 
Income 
Major Taxes 
• Mineral revenues 
• Personal Incomes 
• Corporate Profit 
• Customs and Excise 
• VAT 
• Licences 
National 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Expenditure 
Major National Government 
Programme 
Education 
c::::> Social Security 
Defence 
Health 
Internal Security 
*The contents (income and expenditure) of figure 2 are based on the Botswana budget speeches of2004/05 and 2005/06 
Centralised taxation in Botswana is an offspring of the widely-held notion in the developing 
world that decentralised taxes may be a recipe for inter-regional or inter-ethnic conflicts. 
Whilst this may be true for many developing countries, it must be mentioned that a centralised 
taxation system is not a sufficient condition for equitable distribution of national-generated 
resources, but a necessary condition. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the architects of the 
intergovernmental transfer carefully to craft the system in such a way that it achieves equity 
without compromising the provision of local public services on the basis of economic 
efficiency. 
The justifications advanced for a centralised taxation system in Botswana are on the basis of 
the fact that only two administrative districts42 have diamond mines and only one is endowed 
with substantial natural resources that are up to international tourism standards, as well as for 
the equitable distribution of such revenue sources as the petroleum fuel taxes and hotel taxes. 
42 As at 2007 several (two copper and one nickel) mines were opened in addition to the existing three big 
diamonds mines. One diamond mine was on the verge of being opened in 2007. It is expected that more mines in 
2008 and 2009 will be opened in Botswana in non-traditional diamond areas. 
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Hence, the government of " ... Botswana chose a deliberate policy that allows central 
government to collect revenue from these sources and to redistribute them to the various 
districts according to their planned development needs" (SPCLGSB, 2001 :47). This has left 
local authorities with insignificant autonomy and close to no own initiative as so pithily 
phrased below: 
"Financial dependence on the central government breeds an unhealthy reliance upon Central 
Government, forcing local authorities to look to the Central Government for advice and 
direction on even the smallest matters. It reverses the desirable direction of accountability, 
making local authorities less responsible to the needs of their constituents" (NDP8, 
1997:233). 
In concluding this section, it is important to state that intergovernmental transfers are/come in 
two forms. Capital transfers to local authorities are non-matching and conditional. That is, 
local authorities are not expected to contribute anything but must implement approved 
projects within their areas of jurisdictions. Government also transfers RSGs to the local 
authorities to carry out their day to day activities as assigned by the acts establishing them. 
Such transfers are not stable over time. They appear to reflect the annual national budget 
outlook rather than a transparent revenue transfer system that is predictable in the medium to 
long term. As indicated in section 1.3 the oscillatory nature of intergovernmental transfers are 
such that rapid increases in one year are followed by sharp declines in the following financial 
year. This is not conducive to local long-term financial planning. Thus, local authorities may 
be too demotivated to be innovative in budgeting for their districts because there is no revenue 
certainty or security over an extended period of time (refer to sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2; 3.5.3 and 
4.4). These decentralisation shortcomings are illustrated in the case studies below. 
3.5 Case Studies: Fiscal decentralisation for equitable distribution and innovative financial 
management or wasteful spending? 
As alluded to in the literature review, fiscal decentralisation as an on-going process can be 
used as a vehicle to achieve certain objectives successfully, if appropriately designed and 
implemented (refer to sections 2.3.1 & 2.3.2). Nevertheless, the opposite is true ifthe strategy 
adopted is misguided and it can, at worst, force the economy on its knees, fuel tribal/ethnic 
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rivalry and cause corruption of the elite through inter-regionally skewed developments that 
are precipitated by inconsistent intergovernmental transfer mechanisms, shrouded in secrecy. 
Now, that it is clear that local authorities rely on national government for funding their 
statutory assignments in terms of fiscal and institutional support, it is important, first and 
foremost, to study carefully the expenditure trends within the district and urban councils on 
local public goods and services that have the following features: (a) significant externalities or 
merit goods such as primary education and primary health care; (b) equity-inclined or social-
welfare goods and services such as Social and Community Development (S&CD) and Remote 
Area Development Programme (RADP) (pure goods); as well as (c) mixed and private goods 
and/or services such as domestic water and sewerage connections, sanitation services and 
municipal staff housing rentals. 
These expenditure assignments have been chosen in order to assess the extent of each case 
study of local governments' expenditures on the (a) redistribution of nationally-generated 
revenues in order to achieve allocative efficiecy through the provision of social services; (b) 
goods and services with externality effects43 in order to establish the extent and impact of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local government financial management; and (c) on 
mixed and private goods and/or services in order to ascertain the degree of cost-recovery 
measures applied with the aim of maximising allocative efficiecy and inter-municipal equity, 
depending on the average population per capita income (or the chargeability of services 44) of 
each local government case study. It is the aim of this thesis to establish whether the 
allocation of expenditure assignments took into consideration an element of technicity or 
technical and managerial expertise of each local government that is required to provide such 
services as determined by the acts establishing them, especially those services with high 
potential to generate more revenues for local authorities. 
On the basis of information collected on the expenditure assignments, as mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, the discussion would also establish the revenue-raising capacity of each 
council, based on actual revenues collected on selected revenue items that account for the 
major component of internally-generated moneys. Reference would be made to the 
productivity of expenditures on selected mixed and/or private goods and services. An analysis 
43 See footnote in section 2.4.3 (Page 60) 
44 According to Prud'Homme (1995:210) the chargeability of services indicates the ease with which services can 
be financed through public charges rather than with taxes. 
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of property taxation as a significant source of town/city councils' own revenues would be 
made in order to establish its coverage and collection ratios among others. Finally, this thesis 
will study trends in intergovernmental fiscal transfers over an extended period of five years, 
from the 2001/02 to 2005/06 financial years, in order to establish whether they address both 
the vertical and horizontal inequalities between local authorities and the national government 
as well between local authorities themselves respectively. 
Based on available information, the discussion should be able to answer the hypothesis. It is 
the objective of this thesis to establish whether the current allocation of expenditure and 
revenue assignments, intergovernmental transfer mechanism and institutional framework 
facilitate the achievement of allocative efficacy, restrained local public expenditures, 
increased revenue generation, improved political accountability as well as better equity in 
each category of municipal governments covered in the case studies below. 
3.5.1 Gaborone City Council45 
Gaborone is the capital city of Botswana. All national ministries, most parastatals and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) are headquartered here. It is the 
financial, telecommunication, rail, manufacturing and air-travel/transport hub of the country. 
As at 2001, it was home to at least 186 007 people, accounting for 11 percent of the country's 
populace (See Tables 4 and 5). For this reason, it has become the major location of formal 
employment in Botswana. The city's rapid population growth rate since 1966 to 200 I from 6 
000 to 186 007 largely reflect the country's development trajectories that (a) promoted 
centralised public and private investments, (b) considerably improved social and 
infrastructural services (for example in Education, Health and Housing) and (c) increased 
incomes attributed to the growth of the diversified formal sector employment within the city. 
Table 4: Gaborone's Population trends 
Year Population Batswana Non-Batswana 
1991 133, 346 121,487 11,981 
2001 186,007 163,382 22,625 
45 Gaborone lays on State land (75.7%) and Freehold land (24.3%). The administering ofland allocation has been 
assigned the Department of Lands on behalf of the Minister of Lands and Housing. (GUDP2, 2003-2009:51 ). 
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Source: Central Statistics Office (Adapted from the Gaborone Urban Development Plan 2, 
2003:6) 
Table 5: Population Growth Trends in Urban Primary Centres (2001) 
Primary Centres 2001 Annual Growth Rate% (2001-) 
Gaborone 186,007 3.37 
Francistown 83,023 2.44 
Lobatse 29,689 1.32 
Selibe-Phikwe 49,849 2.28 
Total 348,568 2.28 
Source: Central Statistics Office 2001 (Adapted from the Gaborone Urban Development Plan 
2, 2003:7) 
Compared to other primary46 and urban centres, Gaborone has enjoyed more rapid population 
growth rates. According to Campbell in Edge and Lekorwe (1998:262) half of Botswana's 
population was within the 200 kilometre (km) radius of Gaborone in 1981. By 1991, the 
distance had reduced to 100 km. This rapid change within 10 years was mainly due to the 
migration effect (refer to section 3.3.1). In fact, by 1991 Gaborone had reached primacy 
status47 in accordance with the Pareto Law. Gaborone was 104.6 percent larger than the 
second biggest centre (See Table 5). At least 53.3 percent of the urban population were 
residents of Gaborone. This development was (is) influenced by geographic location 48 of the 
city, by other district councils bordering the city, as well as the centralised economic structure 
of the country. The population expansion has had many implications for the GCC to deal 
with. The provision of serviced land and housing, as well as other necessary infrastructural 
developments required in a modern city, such as the provision of centralised sewerage and 
drainage systems, overextended the limited financial resources of GCC. In order to establish 
whether the current fiscal decentralisation system is sympathetic to improved management of 
financial resources and increased revenue generation in GCC, this discussion systematically 
analyses the expenditure, revenues and intergovernmental financial trends of the capital city 
council over a period of five years. 
46 The National Settlement Policy-White Paper No. 2 of 1998 provides for a stratified classification of centres 
into primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary centres are considered to possess high development potential, to be 
economically diversified and populated by more than 20 000 people. 
47 
"A city attains the status of primacy when its population is at least twice that of the next largest town". 
(Stewart, 1947) quoted by Campbell in Edge and Lekorwe (1998:263). 
48 This will be discussed later, more specifically in chapter 5 
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Expenditure trends: On average, urban councils are estimated to have accounted for 24% of 
total councils' recurrent budgets over the 2001/02-2005/06 periods, with modest fluctuations 
annually. However, GCC enjoyed a lion's share of the total urban expenditures, accounting 
for almost 40% of the urban councils' budgets. Between 2000/01 and 2001/02 there was an 
almost 14% increase in expenditures, followed by an annual increa~e of 23.15%, 3.86%, 
6.69% and finally a reduction of 1.31% in the subsequent financial year. It is also clear from 
table 6 that there were deficits in every single year between 2001/02-2003/04 (in 
chronological order) as follows: 1.95%, 8.93% and 10.95% . Moreover, during the same 
period, GCC budget deficit increased consistently (See tables 7, 8 and 9). This is despite 
balanced estimated expenditures and incomes in each financial year within the period under 
revtew. 
The preliminary findings indicate a rapid rise in expenditures during the 2001/02 and 2002/03 
financial years, followed by a sharp fall in the subsequent years until the council budget 
finally shrunk by just over a percent in the 2005/06 financial year. Below is an analysis of five 
expenditure items, in order to establish the reasons for simultaneous deceleration of budget 
expansions and increased budget deficits growth in the period under review. These are: 
education, primary health care, Social and Community Development (S&CD), Self Help 
Housing Agency (SHHA) and water and sewerage. These sectors have been chosen for a 
number of reasons which, to a large extent, could be considered laboratories of allocative 
efficiency in the expenditures of nationally-raised financial resources at municipal level, more 
so in that they exhibit an element of redistribution. Local government, as the government 
closest to the people, is better placed to identify the deserving beneficiaries of equity-inclined 
services that should be targeted enough to avoid free rider elements and welfarism. It is even 
more pressing to refer to these expenditure items, because they constitute, on average, almost 
32 percent, or over 113, of the GCC budget (See table 9 below). 
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behalf of the SHHA residents until efforts were made by the city council to reduce the costs it 
incurred in water supplies. A water upgrading project in all SHHA areas, with the exception 
of the Old Naledi53 , was completed in 2000 by the WUC. The project was necessitated by the 
pressing need to ensure that the residents of Gaborone connected water supplies into their 
yards in order to phase out public stand pipes that had become a burden to the council. The 
project generally was successful given that just over 75 percent of yards were connected to the 
WUC water system. Unfortunately the low-income areas were sidelined from the GCC's 
development strategy as they were not connected to the sewerage system. They have been left 
to face the rigours of the old system of pit latrines and septic tanks that is proving unfriendly 
to the environment (GUDP2, 2003-2009). 
After an examination of the GCC's expenditure trends, based on available information, it 
emergeg that a significant portion of the city's financial resources are devoted to primary 
health care (see table 9). The figures from financial resources, assigned to the health-care 
expenditure item, have been rising since 2001/02 to 2005/06, mainly because the sector has 
significant externality effects. The roll-out of the anti-retroviral therapy, among others, to 
residents within the city's planning area (see appendix 3) that are statutorily outside the 
GCC's jurisdiction, has had an impact on the rising health care expenditures. The city also 
provides public and private education services to the Kgatleng, Kweneng and South East 
districts (see appendix 1 for these districts). It should be noted that the city plays an important 
(if indirect) role in both public and private education, because a significant amount of property 
tax is lost through exemptions extended to all private and public education service providers. 
In addition to that, there is an extensive involvement of the central government through 
government ministries and departments, as well as parastatals, in local government-assigned 
responsibilities. For example, the department of housing is responsible for the monitoring of 
the SHHA programme. Allocation of land and land servicing also fall within the purview of 
central government's departments. This finding is corroborated by Maundeni (2004:20). 
Perhaps this better explains the decline in the number of allocations of SHHA plots and loans 
within the city (refer to table 9). However, on a more positive side, increased resources 
allocated to the upgrading and development of sewerage and sanitation services is a positive 
step towards decentralised service provision. The success of sewerage and sanitation services 
53 Old-Naledi is a unique low-income area that does not conform to the Urban Development Plan 
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Table 6: Trends in Recurrent Expenditure Estimates for the Years: 2001/02-2005106 (Gaborone 
City Council) 
EXPENDITURE 
ITEM 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/0549 2005/0650 
City Clerk 13,144,310 17,351,770 18,988,805 22,170,660 20,340,220 
Treasury 9,487,520 10,753,300 13,050,543 11,982,890 10,461,440 
Education 8,936,940 10,864,870 12,795,060 12,957,910 11,154,990 
Clinics 20,497,790 19,260,630 23,332,498 35,608,450 36,348,240 
Environmental 
.Health 11,592,460 12,703,320 12,257,655 20,431,100 22,580,510 
Engineering 20,714,770 25,835,800 24,677,247 24,519,710 24,123,970 
Architecture 
&Building 4,799,900 4,924,800 3,759,013 7,123,050 6,213,250 
Social 
&Community 
Development 5,713,570 7,643,910 3,842,224 5,062,120 5,084,000 
HBC 623,720 659,640 
fire service 3,663,640 3,807,140 4,279,204 4,800,940 6,694,690 
SHHA 5,910,050 4,438,660 4,683,288 6,029,970 4,526,430 
Transport 11,665,360 11,940,300 12,879,102 9,087,230 9,280,470 
Water/Sewerage 7,068,710 8,680,830 6,470,590 9,202,790 9,945 200 
SUB-TOT. 121,400,760 138 864,970 141 ,015,229 168,976,820 166,753,410 
SURPLUS -2,417,980 -13,617,840 -17,356,233 0 0 
Grand Total 123,818,7 40 152,482,810 158,371 ,462 168,976,820 166,753,410 
Sources: Ministry of Local Government, City and Town Councils Recurrent Budgets 
(2001102-2005/06) 
Table 7: Estimated Growth Rates of Gaborone City Council Recurrent Budgets (in %) 
District 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 Average 
Gaborone +13.86 +23.15 +3.86 +6.69 -1.31 +9.25 
Table 8: Estimated Growth Rate of Deficits of Gaborone City Council Recurrent 
Budgets (in %) 
Dist111.0L 11 ... 001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 l~rage 
Gaborone 1.95 8.93 10.95 0 0 4.36 
First of all, education on average constituted over seven per cent of the council's budget. By 
2002 there were 40 primary schools in GCC. 12 and 28 primary schools were privately and 
publicly owned respectively. According to the Gaborone Urban Development Plan 2 (2003-
49 Financial year 2004/05 represent approved estimated expenditures where as 2005/06 is a representation of 
estimated expenditures 
5° Financial year 2005/06 represents estimated expenditures 
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2009:98) 60.7 per cent of public schools were overstretched exceeding the stipulated 40 pupils 
maximum per class. Empirical evidence from a report compiled by Botswana Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO) (200 1: 10) indicates that many pupils from the 
surrounding peri-urban centres of Kweneng and South East Districts51 receive their primary 
school education within the GCC area. This constitutes a spill-over effect on the council's 
budget. However, because there was no quantified number of pupils from within GCC and the 
surrounding peri-urban centres, it remained difficult to calculate the cost of spill-over effects 
on the GCC. A qualitative conclusion would nevertheless be reached later after studying the 
education expenditure within the K weneng District Council, one of the main beneficiaries of 
GCC's expenditure spill-over effects. 
Table 9: Estimated Sectoral expenditures (expressed in%) 
. t th I b d t (GCC) agams e annua u 1ge s 
Sector 2001102 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 Average 
Education 7.21 7.12 8.07 7.66 6.68 7.34 
Clinics 16.55 12.63 14.73 21.07 21.78 13.13 
S&CD 4.61 5.01 2.42 2.99 3.04 3.61 
SHHA 4.77 2.91 2.95 3.56 2.71 2.42 
Water & 5.70 5.69 4.08 5.44 5.96 5.37 
Sewerage 
Total 38.84 33.36 32.25 40.72 40.17 31.87 
Secondly, primary health care, much the same as primary education, is a merit good. With at 
least 14 clinics under the GCC as at 2002, over 13 per cent of the council's budget is 
dedicated to this expenditure item, yet congestion of patients has become a concern to the 
local authorities. The referral of patients by clinics from the surrounding districts has been 
found to be worsening the situation. 52 This also constitutes spill-over effects which should be 
internalised through national transfers (GUDP, 2003-2009, 18; Botswana Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO) 2001: 1 0). 
Thirdly, Botswana has a wide array of social services such as the Destitution policy, Orphan 
Care Program (OCP), Community Home Based Care System (CHBCS), which are taken care 
51 More especially pupils from Mogoditshane and Tlokweng (See appendix 3) 
52 Gaborone, as the capital, took a lead, as the first district to roll out the Anti-Retroviral (ARV) therapy to those 
infected with the Human Immuno Deficiency Virus (HIV), in the event attracting people from outside its 
statutory boundaries. 
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of by the councils through the Social and Community Development (S&CD). According to 
the GUDP2 (2003-2009: 130) there are increasing incidents of destitution in the city, strongly 
linked to the HIV -AIDS pandemic. The increase of orphans, and the CHBCS who are 
provided with, among others; bedding, clothing, toiletry, special diet and counselling, kept the 
council on average spending close to four percent over five years. This indicates the extent to 
which the city is involved in the redistribution of resources in order to enhance allocative 
efficiency as the government closest to the people. 
Fourthly, Self Help Housing Agency (SHHA) is an initiative of the Government of Botswana, 
meant to relieve the low-income groups who do not have access to the housing loans provided 
by the market. In 1999 the loan stood at P20 000 per beneficiary. The loan is used to purchase 
building materials. The beneficiaries are expected to repay the council within 15 years. This is 
a revenue-generating initiative for the local authorities and as such GCC is expected to utilise 
the initiative as some form of a revenue-generating source of money that can be re-lent to the 
low-income residents of Gaborone. However, the success of the initiative does not only rely 
on the willingness of the beneficiaries to repay loans, but the extent to which GCC is allocated 
serviced land for the programme by the Ministry of Lands and Housing, as well as the 
availability of funds to survey the plots by the Department of Surveys and Mapping. Serviced 
plots are provided by the Department of Local Government and Development before they are 
finally allocated to the beneficiaries (GUDP2, 2003-2009:51 ). It should be noted, however, 
that GCC is only involved in the administration of SHHA. The formulation, implementation 
and monitoring of SHAA policy and programme, remain the preserve of the national 
government (Maundeni, 2004:20). 
A major setback so far has been shortage of serviced land in the Gaborone planning area. As 
at 2002, the allocation of plots was last done in 1997, with the number of applications soaring. 
According to the GUDP2 (2003-2009:20) the waiting list of applications stood at 20 772 at 
the beginning of 2002. Intriguingly, the rate at which SHHA plots were developed after 
allocations was below 50 percent in four areas, indicating the financial inability of the 
residents to build appropriate structures in accordance with the Development Control Code of 
1995. 
Fifthly, GCC, like other urban centres, is supplied water by the Water Utilities Corporation 
(WUC). However, the council had been paying the water bills run up by public stand pipes on 
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can only be gauged against the revenue income that they bring to the city council's coffers. As 
such this is addressed below in the analysis of the city's revenue sources. 
Revenue Sources: Gaborone City Council (GCC) has relatively wide sources of own 
revenues compared to rural districts. Nevertheless, given the stature of Gaborone City as a 
capital, in a highly-centralised development system, it is fair to state that the city is, by 
international standards, far from being declared a financially-independent entity. 
Table 10 
s Ima e evenue Ef tdR S ources ex presse m percen a d' t es (GCC) 
Financial years 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 Average 
Own Revenues 34.24 32.43 27.90 30.86 37.00 32.51 
Revenue Support Grants 65.75 67.57 72.10 69.14 63.00 67.51 
On average, it is estimated that a third of the city's municipal government revenues was 
generated through own sources. To refocus the study, only five own revenue sources are 
scrutinised. These are, sewerage fees and sewerage connection fees; property rates and rates 
interest; Building Materials Loans (BML); interest on deposits and parking levies. These 
revenue sources have a complementary relationship with the city's rapid increasing 
population, industrial and infrastructural developments, as well as increasing incomes for the 
residents through employment creation. These revenue sources are therefore expected to have 
responded positively to rapid socio-economic and population increases. 
On average these revenue sources constitute just over 86 percent of the council's own 
revenues during the financial years of 2001102-2005/06. Property taxes are the highest source 
of the city's internally-generated revenues. Property rates and rates interest, on average, 
boosted the municipality's own revenues by well over 70 per cent. However, property rates 
did not grow consistently during the period under review. There were some fluctuations 
between the different financial years which are attributed to high default rates among the 
city's residents. The same applies to the service levy, which is inconsistent between each of 
the three financial years (refer to table 11 ). Uncertainty about the potential income in 
monetary form from property taxation is attributed to high property tax default levels. GCC 
consistently underestimated the possible amount of income to be generated through property 
taxes between 2001/02-2003/04 as at follows, 16.45%,29.83% and 4.70% respectively. 
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In an interview with the city's senior rates officer, it emerged that inconsistencies in the actual 
collection of property taxes within the city emanate from several factors. Some of the factors 
are beyond the control of the city council. In accordance with the Local Government (District 
Councils) Amendment Act No 18 of 2004, second schedule, all municipal governments are 
required to submit their proposed property rates to the Minister responsible for local 
governments for approval before they are gazetted (see Appendix 4). According to the senior 
council official, the council has had to wait for over eight months or even longer for the rates 
to be gazetted, pending minister's approval. Senior government officials at MLG indicated 
that indeed there were delays in the gazetting of rates bye-laws, although they always 
submitted their recommendations to the minister on time. It emerged that the approval of 
property taxes is a political issue that is closely guarded by the government. According to the 
officials, the minister of local government carries out extensive consultations within the 
government, through Cabinet Memorandums, before the rates are revised. Whilst awaiting 
publication of revised rates, the council is often delayed and prevented from collecting rates 
on time. 
These assertions, made by both GCC and MLG, officials corroborate the opinion held by one 
of the senior government official at the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 
(MFDP) who concurs with the view that the government of Botswana is very cautious of the 
fiscal decentralisation reforms because of the potential political implications they may have 
on the outcomes of national elections. This is even true for GCC which has been under the 
control of the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) since 1984. 
According to the officer who was once in the MLG as an economic planner, there have been 
good proposals to devolve more revenue-generating powers to local authorities in order to 
enhance the principle of correspondence in local governments' service provision. This is so 
that the cost of such services is borne by beneficiaries, in view of their quality and quantity. 
Such reforms, according to the officer, would have given local authorities more discretionary 
powers to set property rates at the level equivalent to the quality of services, such as internal 
tarred roads and street lights, that enhance the value and safety of properties. Perhaps the 
government should only set a rates cap to ensure that such rates are within the level that the 
residents of Gaborone can afford to pay. 
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Underestimation of internally-generated revenues is a common phenomenon in GCC. Despite 
the city council's significant employment of capital in the provision of sewerage and 
sanitation services that ensured that at least 75% of homesteads were connected to the system, 
the council underestimated revenues generated through the sewerage-connection fees and 
sewerage fees by 316.36%, 1123% and 179.47% between the 2001/02-2003/04 financial years 
respectively. There are, however, good signs that the city will soon reap the benefits of 
improved sewerage services across the city, in all spectrum of society. The city is expected to 
derive significant income once the fees are fully applicable to different categories of the 
private sector (see appendix 5). These include all sectors: the business community, as well as 
the private residents ofthe city. 
There is nevertheless a concern that the city council underestimated the potential revenues that 
it was going to recover from the residents of Gaborone. During the financial years 2002/03 
and 2003/04 the total amount of revenues recoverable from the building material loans 
extended to the residents through the SHHA programme, was underestimated by 45% and 
20% respectively. This occurred at a time (31 February 2002) when the combined service levy 
and Building Material Loan (BML) arrears owed to the municipality stood at close to P3 000 
000 (GUDP2, 2003:20/21). The under collection of revenues on BML is mainly attributed to 
lack of political will on the part of the city councillors, as well as lack of effective 
enforcement capacity. 
According to Mosha (2004:22-23), nearly half of the SHHA plot holders are in arrears with 
their service levy, while the collection of BML is frustrated by the councillors who are more 
concerned about their political popularity among their constituents. The interference of the 
city's political leaders in blocking and delaying legal measures that the SHHA staff intend 
taking against the defaulters, is blamed on the staff to prosecute defaulters (Mosha, 2004:23). 
The behaviour of the political representatives is nevertheless comprehensible, given that 
SHHA is a national programme funded through specific grants from the centre. The success or 
failure of the programme cannot be entirely blamed on the councillors. This is a manifestation 
of non-matching transfer system in practice. 
The General Fund constitutes a significant portion of the city's income (see table 11). 
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Table 11 
Trends in Estimated Revenue Sources of the Gaborone City Council (in Millions Pula) 
REVENUE ITEM 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05* 2005/06* 
Advertising Signs 385,400 622,240 838,541 703,560 90,000 
Building Material loans 222,180 340,850 282,007 1,663,300 1,898,170 
Clinic fees 153,640 367,720 179,347 360,000 360,000 
Day Care Centre 40,950 41,520 39,685 40,000 40,000 
Fines-Bye Laws 10,670 10,390 4,420 10,000 11,650 
Community centre fees 59,690 98,250 58427 90,000 90,000 
School Hire 4,730 9,230 6,989 9,000 9,000 
Home Economics 10 60 0 100 200 
Beer Hall Rental 
Abattoir Fees 717,280 1,014,560 224,270 715,000 546,690 
Cemetery fees 5,930 5,700 6,257 74,000 8,140 
Dog licences 490 260 258 300 300 
Interest on Deposit 2,671,980 1,495,730 7,271,921 3,634,250 7,000,000 
Market Rent 146,350 138,840 74,244 246,310 246,310 
Miscellaneous 46,260 58,440 437,778 50,000 250,000 
Plans Perusal fees 161,200 243,880 213,021 200,000 200,000 
Pound Fees 610 1,910 3,861 2,000 4,000 
Rates Clearance Cert. 980 3,160 1,489 3,000 3,000 
Rates 30,274,890 36,854,150 30,881,521 36,000,000 40,763,520 
Rates Interest 1,608,430 1,795,440 2,503,080 1,737,360 1,737,360 
Roads Reinstatement 4,440 15,570 21,125 20,000 20,000 
Sale of Sundry Assets 20,660 54,300 28,240 50,000 50,000 
Shrub sales 79,970 68,180 38,705 65,000 65,000 
Sale Tax on Beer 289,230 958,590 958,590 0 0 
Sanitation Services 185,900 378,280 125,375 380,000 380,000 
School Work Sales 0 0 
Sewerage Connection 
fees 87,800 1,012,060 871,551 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Sewerage Fees 26,700 272,520 539,775 500,000 600,000 
Service Levy 902,000 1,117,670 928,887 995,300 1,000,000 
Rentals-Staff Houses 1,475,380 1,949,790 1,995,315 2,890,60 2,990,060 
School Fees 258,800 285,800 0 540,600 554000 
Parking Levy 0 85,000 85,000 
Trade Licenses 118,450 128,321 123,400 129,640 
Plant Hire 16,111 25,000 25,000 
Deficit I ,,,..,7,980 13,617,840 17,356,233 0 0 
Revenue Support 
Grant 81,423,170 103,039,730 114,193,371 116,830,880 106,596,370 
GRAND TOTAL 123,818,740 152,482,810 158,371 ,462 168,976,820 166,753,410 
*Estimates 
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Table 12 
Trends in Estimated Incomes and Expenditure (in %1 for the GCC 
Financial Years 2001/02- 2002/03- 2003/04- 2004/05- Average 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Own Income* + 16.62 -10.64 +18.03 +15.36 +9.84 
RSG +26.54 +10.82 +2.30 -6.05 +8.40 
Expenditure +23.15 +3.86 +6.69 -1.31 +8.09 
trends 
* includes deficits 
This fund is made up of revenues that accrue as a result of failure by the councils to utilise 
budgeted for revenues on given expenditure items by the end of the financial year (see section 
3.4.2). However, this revenue source is more of an external source of income because it is 
controlled by MLG. Local authorities are authorised to spend only 10% of the fund. Any 
amount in excess of 10% can only be spent with the authority of the minister of local 
government. Interest on investment from the general fund was underestimated during the 
financial years 2001/02 by 29.08% and overestimated by 29.44% in the 2002/03. In 2003/04 
such interest accruing from the moneys in the general fund was tremendously underestimated 
by 243%. This situation is neither effective for decentralised expenditure nor for informed 
planning by municipal government. Perhaps this better explains persistent budget deficits 
experienced by the city council, despite projected balanced financial budgets every year. 
Better planning is a harbinger of innovative financial management. The more limited the 
discretionary powers assigned local authorities in expending their financial resources. the 
lower the level of fiscal decentralisation and, consequently, the lower the level of local own 
initiatives in striving for innovation in management local government finances. 
Finally, it is worth noting that despite its relatively buoyant economy, characterised by the 
mushrooming of industrial and office developments, as well as the erection of the largest retail 
centres that the country has ever experienced, GCC is not by any measure different from other 
urban councils in generating own revenues. The city experienced rapid budget expansions 
during the period under review that were not complemented by increased streams of own 
revenues. At least 67% of the city's revenues are from the intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
or Revenue Support Grants (RSGs). RSGs grew rapidly during the five year period under 
review (see table 11). This means that the city's dependence on national government to 
finance its activities increased significantly against the government's cost-recovery policy 
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which requires that a significant portion of services in urban centres (especially cities and 
towns) be provided on full-cost-recovery basis. The cost-recovery policy clearly differentiates 
settlements on the basis of, among others, population, levels of income (employment level) 
and geographic location (socio-economic status). These variables are used to differentiate 
settlements according to their impact on the feasibility and extent of fiscal decentralisation in 
any given municipality. They may as well be used as good indicators for determining the 
expenditure needs (or costs variances between settlements) and measuring the fiscal capacity 
of municipal governments. Once this information is available, the national government would 
be in a better position to determine the vertical and horizontal distribution of RSGs in an 
equitable fashion such that all local authorities can implement their fiscal rules-driven 
budgeting and planning innovatively. 
In concluding this section, it is important to point out that several indicators suggest that the 
national government, through its agencies, is extensively involved in the affairs of GCC. In 
addition to that, there is a discernible lack of political will to maximise the collection of 
limited own revenues in GCC, because there are no incentives present to do so - neither in the 
intergovernmental transfer mechanism, nor in the local political system. This is due to the 
extensive use of non-matching specific grants on local projects such as SHHA, the failure of 
which cannot be blamed on local authorities, but on the revenue source, the national 
government, because GCC considers itself merely the administrator of the scheme. Finally. 
lack of a transparent and unpredictable intergovernmental transfer system (which is the 
essence of fiscal decentralisation) is a serious draw-back for long-term planning at local 
government, because it creates a platform for ad hoc decision making by municipal financial 
management. 
3.5.2 Kweneng District Council 
According to the 2001 Population and Housing Census, the total population of K weneng 
District Council (KDC) was 229 755 in 2001. This means KDC represents 13.7% of the 
country's total population. Though the population density in KDC was 6.0 people per square 
kilometre in 2001, most of the population is concentrated in the eastern region of the district 
bordering the capital city, Gaborone. That is to say, the south eastern and eastern part of the 
district is peri-urban. Unlike Gaborone, and other urban areas, land tenure in KDC is under 
the jurisdiction of the local authorities, namely the Kweneng Land Board. At least 93.6% of 
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the land is communal whilst the remaining 6.4% is state land (Kweneng District Development 
Plan 6, 2003:7-8). 
According to Kweneng District Development Plan (KDDP) 6 (2003-2009:8) more than 60% 
of the district's population is absorbed into formal employment. This is largely attributed to 
the fact that the east and south-eastern parts of the district are integrated into the Greater 
Gaborone Metropolitan area. Residents of Metsimotlhabe, Tlokweng (in South East District 
Council) and Molepolole, the capital of KDC commute to Gaborone on a daily basis where 
they are employed (see appendix I and 3). In fact, residents of Tlokweng, Mogoditshane and 
Gabane pay an equivalent of a standard local rate to commute to Gaborone. Thus, residents of 
these settlements enjoy the same local public charge accorded the constituents of GCC. 
On a related but different note, it is important to underline the fact that the public sector of 
government is the largest employer within KDC. Put differently, the Government of Botswana 
(GoB) is probably the largest investor in the district. There are nevertheless, a number of facts 
worth noting that make this district unique from others. They are briefly highlighted as 
follows: 
• the south eastern and eastern part of the KDC falls within the most attractive region in 
the country, forming the integral portion of the Gaborone satellite communities. 
During the 1991-2001 period Mogoditshane54 (a proposed sub-district of KDC) 
recorded the highest population growth rate, compared to other peri-urban centres 
because of its close proximity to the city; 
• there is an overspill of businesses into the KDC from the capital city because land is 
relatively cheap and accessible. Tribal land is free in Botswana. The encroachment of 
Gaborone into the KDC has literally left no spatial separation between the two districts 
except a statutory boundary; 
• Molepolole (the KDC headquarters) also enjoyed rapid population and urbanisation 
growth to an extent that it became its position as the most populous village in 
Botswana for a decade (Mogae, 2001:13); and 
Mogoditshane like Gabane, Tlokweng have benefited immensely from the rapid economic boom of Gaborone 
which was more visible between the early 1980s and 1999. These settlements have pull factors that attracted 
many migration-driven people who are employed in the capital city. Such pull-factors include cheap 
accommodation and cheap or free land. Tribal land in Botswana is free. This created a conurbation characterised 
by "the merger and accretion ofGaborone, Tlokweng, Mogoditshane and Gabane" (Gwebu, 2003:8) (refer to 
Appendix 3). 
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• finally, on a different note, the western and north-western parts of the district remains 
rural, less developed, sparsely populated and home to the economically disadvantaged 
groups of the society more especially, the Basarwa (San) and Bakgalagadi who largely 
rely on small-scale pastoral farming and cultivating arable land (subsistence farming). 
From a fiscal decentralisation perspective and in particular the Bahl-Linn thesis, KDC 
represent two contrasting situations that cannot be treated likewise should the benefits of 
decentralisation be expected to filter from the governance system (political) to the ordinary 
citizens. Put differently, the manifestation of fiscal decentralisation is politically and 
economically beneficial only, as far as the Bahl-Linn thesis applies, indiscriminately. The 
beneficiaries of infrastructural developments and customised service deliveries should in 
principle be charged at the level equivalent to the services accorded them as far as possible as 
an incentive for them to hold to account the custodians of the local public purse. KDC as an 
urban area in the eastern part cannot be equated with the rural western area lest at the expense 
of inter-regional equity within the same local government jurisdiction because the cost of 
accessing the same good provided in both developed (as well as densely populated area) and 
rural (and sparsely populated areas is not the same) areas is not equivalent (this is discussed in 
section 4.2.1 ). 
An in-depth analysis of the trends in statutory expenditures and revenue incomes of the 
district is analysed to assess whether it can be said conclusively that the Bahl-Linn thesis 
applies indiscriminately or otherwise. 
Expenditure Trends55: It is estimated that KDC financial budgets consistently represented 
over 13% of the district councils' expenditure budgets within the five year 2001/02-2005/06 
financial years. The budget expansions of the KDC appear to have tracked the budget 
developments of the overall recurrent district councils' expenditures. Indications are that 
KDC's recurrent expenditures grew rapidly before eventually subsiding between 2001/02 and 
2005/06 financial years as follows: +41.44%, +6.56%, +24.43% and -7.75% (refer to table 
13). During the same period, the district experienced successive budget surpluses despite 
indications of balanced estimated expenditures and incomes in each financial year. Budget 
55 Information is based on the district councils' recurrent budget documents during the financial years under 
study. 
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surpluses were quite high representing 19.61%, 11.08% and 17.76% ofthe district's budgets 
during the financial years 2001/02-2003/04 respectively (See Table 13 and Appendix 6). 
KDC is made up of a combination of peri-urban settlements and rural areas. This implies that 
there are different expenditure patterns within the district. Logically, residents of the more 
urbanised eastern region would not require the same quality of public goods accorded those in 
the western region because the former have high purchasing power. Although it is difficult to 
discern the district's spending patterns in each region, due to lack of information, the 
discussion focuses its analysis on the expenditure trends in education, health, Social and 
Community Development (S&CD), SHHA and water/sewerages expenditure items. These 
expenditure items represent two opposing poles of socio-economic situations. On the one 
hand, the district's increased allocation of funds for sewerage and drainage systems, as well as 
for SHHA, may well be a sign of a high level of modernity associated with urbanisation. 
Urban areas enjoy a critical mass status, therefore infrastructural developments that are 
characteristically chargeable (mixed and private goods), or have elements of quod pro quo, 
may be reflective of the ability to pay for such services by the residents (or income levels). 
On the other hand, budgetary allocations of the district on RADP and S&CD programmes 
may be a sign of high dependency ratio of the residents on pure public goods that are 
principally driven by the desire to provide social welfare goods and services to those who are 
not in the economic mainstream. This section of society is mainly made up of the elderly and 
residents of resource-poor regions (low income and high unemployment levels). It is 
nevertheless worth noting that all these expenditure items combined constitute over 50% of 
KDC's budgets over the five year period. Clinics, education, S&CD, SHHA and water and 
sewerage system account for 15.31%, 14.41%, 10.67%,0.25% and 10.80% respectively ofthe 
district's budgets over a period spanning 5 years. 
Preliminary indications are that SHHA constitutes the smallest percentages of the eo unci I' s 
expenditure; yet data in Table14 reveals that the programme attracted more attention by 
registering the highest expenditure growth at an average of 60.48% within three years of its 
inception in KDC. Although SHHA was initiated by GoB in order to make housing affordable 
to low-income earners in accordance with the National Policy on Housing in Botswana, 
Government Paper No. 2 of 2000, its relatively high uptake in KDC suggests that indeed a 
good portion of the population of the district is employed in the formal sector. Residents of 
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KDC (more especially those residing in the south-eastern part) enjoy a diversity of suppliers 
of building materials at competitive rates because of their close proximity to the major 
primary centres, as well as the strategic location of such urban villages as Mogoditshane and 
Gabane in relation to Gaborone. It is therefore not incidental that the council devoted a 
significant portion of their financial resources on SHHA in order to provide its constituents 
with basic shelter that is highly-subsidised by the government. 
Table 13: Trends in Estimated Recurrent Expenditures for the Years: 2001102-2005106 
(Kweneng District Council) 
EXPENDITURE 
ITEM 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05* 2005/06* 
Secretariat 13,212,280 14,851,385 17,137,848 27,669,600 24,908,540 
Treasury 4,914,340 5,335,088 5,198,601 7,700,290 7,727,230 
Education 12,375,360 22,717,932 21,809,980 22,845,510 21,610,316 
Clinics 17,247,190 19,730,140 15,664,457 28,615,860 25,856,020 
Environmental 
Health 1,094,290 4,467,775 5,003,079 7,701,420 6,440,410 
Engineering 7,299,630 8,890,326 13,659,421 13,933,210 13,142,360 
Architecture 
&Building 4,542,660 4,537,820 4,837,159 6,130,310 5,749,370 
S&CD 10,163,160 18,533,807 11,432,030 17,971,430 16,667,620 
RADP 1,669,660 3,764,128 4,208,200 4,301,210 3,782,810 
RAC 1,524,260 1,651,550 3,070,483 2,534,520 1,644,290 
SHHA 0 244,010 163,090 606,990 624,770 
Transport 8,909,530 15,130,280 18,907,891 17,600,360 15,965,530 
Water/Sewarage 10,793,160 12,736,221 20,196,570 18,201,600 18,060,040 
SUB-TOT. 93,745,520 132,590 462 141 288,807 
SURPLUS 18,390,350 14,691,156 25,099,712 
GRAND TOTAL 112,135,870 147,281,618 166,388,519 175,812,310 162,179,350 
*Estimates 
Table 14: Expenditure Growths (%) between 2001102-2005/06 Kweneng District 
Council 
Expenditure T2QOl!02- 2002/03- ..:.vvJ/04- *2004/05- Ave 
Item ')()()') /03 112003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Education +83.57 -3.99 +4.74 -5.40 +19.73 
Clinics + 14.39 -20.60 +82.68 -9.64 +16.70 
S&CD +82.36 -38.31 +57.20 -7.25 +23.50 
SHHA -33.16 +272.18 2.92 +60.48 
Water & +18.00 +58.57 -9.87 -0.77 + 16.48 
Sewerage 
*Estimates 
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Second to it, is S&CD, which does not only indicate sustained growth, but constitutes a 
significant percentage of the council's budget. The budgetary allocations of the district for 
S&CD grew at an average of 23.50% over a period of 5 years (see table 14). Social and 
Community Development (S&CD) is a programme that has been deliberately created to 
effectively address the problems faced by vulnerable members of society. The programme 
directly targets destitutes, female-headed families and the elderly, amongst others. S&CD was 
effectively designed to improve the well-being of members of society by cushioning them 
against both structural and seasonal poverty. In the context of this discussion, increased 
allocations of financial resources towards S&CD by KDC imply that there are increasing 
incidents of destitution within the district. However, the question is whether the programme 
targets the appropriate section of the communities or, fairly, is being abused, because 
increased spending should be reciprocated by the empowerment of the vulnerable members of 
society. The discussion suggests (with limited information at the disposal) that increased 
spending on the programme correlated positively with an element of entitlement and/or free 
welfarism amongst communities within the district. That is, there is an unfair enrichment of 
KDC residents in the eastern belt of the district. Comparative studies on patterns of S&CD 
expenditures in KDC and KgDC should nevertheless shed some light on the level of 
redistribution of each municipal government. 
It is important to acknowledge that all the expenditure items under study were allocated more 
financial resources in KDC, relative to the budgets as compared to GCC, with the exception 
of primary health care and primary education. Perhaps this could be due to the externality 
effect of GCC's increased expenditures on primary education and primary health care. On the 
whole it is important to underline the fact that KDC plays a much more prominent role in the 
redistribution of resources than GCC, as illustrated by consistently high financial resource 
allocations to social welfare services than the former. 
Revenue Sources: Data on hand indicate that KDC's financial independence from the 
national government is disproportionably weak. The municipality, on average, generated only 
8.80% of own revenues during the five year period. Whereas own revenues exhibited signs of 
positive annual growth, such positive growth was, however, insignificant compared to the 
expansionary nature of the expenditures over the same period (see table 15). It is emerging 
that, on average, own revenues grew faster than the expenditures, albeit at a slower pace than 
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would have been expected from a district that IS associated with Botswana's rapid 
urbanisation and development. 
Literature on fiscal decentralisation suggests that rapid urbanisation and high resource 
allocation on mixed and private goods should have positive correlation with internally 
generated revenues at municipal government level. Whilst on average, own revenues grew at 
21.55% annually; there is every reason to doubt that the deployment of resources on local 
public goods and services has had a positive impact on the revenue-generating capacity of the 
district in the five year period under review. It cannot be overemphasised that the reliance of 
the district on interest on investment as a major source of own revenues is not a good outlook 
for successful decentralisation. Data in table 16 indicate that at least 53.54% of KDC's own 
revenues are generated from interests accruing to the General Fund. An increasing 
accumulation of revenues in the General Fund should not be seen as a positive development 
on local government finances but a regression on the development of infrastructural 
development and a major contribution to under-development. The General fund represents 
unutilised revenues as a result of (a) high vacancy rates with KDC that translates into 
underperformance of the local authority on assigned functional responsibilities; and (b) 
unused budgeted financial resources as a result of inadequate capacity at municipal level, 
which implies under-delivery of programmes that are supposed to improve the general welfare 
and socio-economic wellbeing of the constituents. Therefore, inflated expectations by the 
council to rely on interest accrued on invested surplus funds is but a draw-back on local 
financial autonomy, because the withdrawal of such funds from the bank is rigidly controlled 
by the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) (See section 3.4.2). Perhaps this better explains 
the reason why a local government finance expert in Botswana (Mosha, 2004: 19) classifies 
the General Fund as an external source of local government income. 
Another significant revenue source for KDC, which is tied to the spending decisions of the 
council, is water connection fees as well as fees for domestic water consumption. Both 
sources of income account for 13.05% of the internally-generated revenues of the district. 
Data in table 16 indicate that there was an uneven, and in some instance inverse, relationship 
between water fee connection and water fee domestic between the 2001102 to 2005/06 
financial years. For example in the 2004/05 financial year, the council generated P865 000 
through increased connection of private water users. This was the highest revenues generated 
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within the period under review (see table 16). Logically, increased connections of private 
water users imply reduced use of free water from the public stand pipes. The latter is at the 
expense of the council. However, there was a drastic decline of revenues collected during 
2004/05 in spite of increased use of privately-connected water. 
According to senior council management, the unpredictable movements between financial 
years on the amount of incomes generated through the imposition of public charges, is a 
reflection of the inadequate capacity of the council to collect revenues due to them from the 
public users of the service. This means that the council is failing to exploit a sustainable and 
predictable revenue source that does not only increase with the level of development and 
urbanisation, but also with increased population growth. As for KDC, the more households 
connected the better. This would be at a lower cost to the council, because of the orderly 
organisation and shorter distances between homesteads (this can be measured through the 
number of people per square kilometre of population density which is increasing per square 
kilometre). Due to the council's incapacity and, probably, lack of incentive to maximise the 
collection of this revenue source, the amount of revenues as illustrated in table 1 7 is very 
unstable and therefore cannot be relied on for making realistic projections of potential 
revenues. 
As already indicated in section 3.3 .1, the reclassification of rural villages into urban villages 
came with a package of infrastructural developments and services. The decentralisation of 
human resources is also augmented by the provision of housing at the expense of the council. 
Staff housing rental as such accounted for 12.93% of the internally-generated revenues of 
KDC. However, this revenue source was also not reflective of the investment that the council 
made in constructing decent accommodation for its employees. As indicated in table 16, the 
amount of revenues in Pula, collected from the occupants, was fluctuating despite the fact that 
such houses were not vacant at any time during the 2001/02-2005/06. For example, the 
council managed to source P1 440 370 during 2001/02 from the occupants, while in the 
following year the amount declined to P963 168. It emerged during the interview that the 
council also charged its staff rental below the market-related prices for the accommodation 
provided. This is contrary to the cost-recovery policy of government. This is nevertheless 
debatable, because the policy only states that both tiers of governments can only recover a 
small portion of the cost that they incurred in providing goods and services in both urban and 
rural villages. 
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Finally, the Building Material Loan (BML) is a revolving revenue source that should largely 
mirror the financial resources allocated the SHHA programme. At least an average of 6.58% 
of the council own revenues emanated from this source. At least the BML appeared to be 
positively responding to the council's increased spending on SHHA. Other than these revenue 
sources, it is important to highlight briefly other spending tied to revenue source that could be 
tapped into to broaden the revenue base of KDC. Matimela fund, whilst a significant revenue 
source, is very unpredictable, because it is difficult to forecast the number of cattle that would 
go astray for collection by the council (see table 17). However, there is every reason that the 
council could develop an effective model to predict and generate a trend of cattle that go 
astray in order to maximise the collection of such cattle. Trends in revenues collected from the 
provision of sanitation services indicate that this source of income is also unpredictable. This 
is not healthy for local government financial planning. 
In concluding, a discussion on the performance of own revenues within the district, it is 
important to bring to the fore that understanding the intricacies of each revenue source is quite 
a complex study to undertake. Yet, studying the longitudinal trends on the performance of 
internally-generated revenues can be better understood when the same is done on the 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, because both revenue sources influence the performance of 
the other. The relationship between the two revenue sources can be inverse if the transfer 
mechanism is not properly designed, yet the opposite is true when the transfer mechanism 
complements increased own-revenue generation, while restraining local spending through an 
effective local political accountability system. 
Table 15 
T d . E . ren s ID stimate dl dE ncomes an d' xpen Iture ID o) for the KDC 
Financial Years 2001/02- 2002/03- *2003/04- *2004/05- Average 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Own Income +9.83 +15.29 +36.13 +24.96 +21.55 
RSG +33.30 + 12.79 +3.32 -11.06 +9.58 
Expenditure +44.43 +6.56 +24.43 -7.75 +8.09 
trends 
*Estzmates 
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It is important to state that this study will be incomplete and irrelevant if the most significant 
aspect of KDC's recurrent revenue source is sidelined from the discussion. KDC almost 
entirely relies on the RSGs from the national government for its day-to-day operations. Fiscal 
transfers from the national government contribute over 91% of the KDC annual recurrent 
budget on average. Until the 2005/06 budget, RSGs were consistently accounting for over 
90% of the municipal's annual budgets. The fiscal transfers, during the period under review 
grew much faster than expenditure growths at 9.58% against 8.09% (see table 15). That the 
RSGs dominate the financial outlook of the KDC is without doubt. 
Table 16 
Trends in Estimated Revenue Sources of the Kweneng District Council (in Millions 
Pula) 
I REVENUE ITEM 11 2001/02 I 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Advertising Signs 20 3,586 4,880 38,500 
Building Material loans 296,093 423,945 1,760,400 1,818,380 
Clinic fees 67,480 59,375 61,929 78,250 398,430 
Day Care Centre 900 310 1,080 1,870 1,080 
Fines-Bye Laws 14,680 4,420 7,480 25,000 
Game Licences 13,000 14,300 14,300 
Hiring Classrooms 85 155 500 500 
Home Economics 550 1,847 24 2,750 100 
Insurance Commission 1,996 29,786 41,850 46,040 
Interest on investment 5,324,150 5,849,139 7,786,319 6,918,560 9,156,700 
Matimela Fund 304,600 5,451 137,230 901,700 916,950 
Prospecting Royalties 73,880 9,900 9,900 
Miscellaneous 450 189,602 50,391 8,510 9,360 
Plan Perusal Fees 169,770 273,285 345,573 257,680 178,930 
Sale of sundry items 75,430 57,183 48,663 76,500 110,819 
Sanitation Fee 163,500 177,004 121,187 406,130 478,090 
School Work sales 2,000 2,390 2,390 
Staff House Rental 1,440,370 963,168 1,092,956 3,280,910 2,099,100 
Stock Sales 
Commission 3,470 1,168 407 1,820 2,099,100 
Trade licences 92,980 10,754 69,282 122,400 180,330 
Water fee-cattle 11,940 79,820 5,500 28,000 45,120 
Water fee-Connection 324,590 303,035 150,210 865,000 680,900 
Water fee-Domestic 875,600 1,036,597 1,477,486 738,990 2,491,900 
School fee 40,150 44,500 41,374 39,000 31,200 
SUBTOTAL I 9,359,430 10,279,898 11,852,049 16,138,540 20,167,850 
Revenue Support Grants 102,776,440 137,001,720 154,536,470 159,673,770 142,011 ,500 
GRAND TOTAL 112,135,870 147,281,618 166,388,519 175,812,310 162,179,350 
Inform at ton Based on the Dtstnct Counctls' Recurrent Budgets for the fin anew! years under revtew (200 /102-
2005/06) 
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A number of observations with regard to the RSGs are made in this discussion. Firstly, RSGs 
exceeded the overall actual expenditures of the district in all three financial years, 2002/02-
2003/04. Secondly, financial resources required for funding the recurrent activities of the 
council were overstated in all three the years, 2001/02-2003/04. Thirdly, own revenues were 
overestimated on two occasions, during the 2002/03 and 2003/04, while this revenue category 
was underestimated significantly in the 2001102 financial year. Fourthly, KDC inflated the 
RSGs required, in order to provide local public goods and services at over 40% in the 
2003/04. Finally, as a result of a combination of all the aforementioned factors, KDC 
experienced budget surpluses for all three the financial years of 2001/02 to 2003/04. Budget 
surpluses exceeded actual expenditures by 9.97% to 16.65% (see appendix 6). 
Table 17 
Estimated Revenue Patterns (in %) for the KDC 
I Revenue Item 12001/02- 2002/03- *2003/04- *2004/05- Aver 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2002/03 
Matimela -98.21 +2417.51 +557.07 +1.69 +719.51 
Water fee & domestic + 11.61 +21.50 -1.45 +97.80 +32.36 
connection fee 
Building material NIA +43.17 +315.24 +3.29 + 120.56 
Sanitation +8.25 -31.53 +235.12 +17.71 +229.55 
*Estimates 
According to senior officials at KDC, budget surpluses in the district were due to lack of 
capacity to implement the entire planned-for council activities within one financial year. Lack 
of a transparent revenue transfer system also hampered them from anticipating the amount of 
revenues that they were likely to receive from the national government at the beginning of the 
financial year. For example, the official interviewed indicated that the financial transfers 
allocated the council in 2004/05 were very limited, as indicated in table 15. Yet, in the 
2005/06 financial year GoB transferred a significant amount of moneys to the district. As at 
the end of the 2006/07 financial year, a significant amount of revenues was unutilised because 
the council was overwhelmed by the volume of fiscal transfers allocated to them within one 
financial year. 
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In view of the facts, briefly discussed above, this thesis suggests that the volume of the 
Revenue Support Grants is determined on the basis of the position of the national financial 
budget. That is, the transfer system is generally ad hoc and incremental. It also emerges in the 
discussion that annual RSGs exceeded the actual expenditures, it therefore the conclusion of 
this discussion that KDC does not have an incentive to increase its revenue-raising effort, 
because all the council's budgetary requirements are covered by the RSGs. It is therefore not 
strange that the local official stated that the collection of garbage in the entire district is at the 
absolute cost of the district. Hence the discussion concludes that Botswana's fiscal 
decentralisation system is the root cause for unrestrained increase of local public spending, 
dulled revenue-generating efforts, lack of own initiative and innovation on financial 
management, as well as decreased participation of local community organisations. There are 
no incentives for them to participate in local development issues, as local authorities take care 
of all issues through nationally-generated revenues (high incidents of free-rider and grants 
economies at local government level (see section 1.3 for the definition of a grant economy). 
3.5.3 Kgalagadi District Council 
Kgalagadi District Council (KgDC) covers 10.5% of Botswana's total area. As opposed to 
Central District Council it has only one sub-district. The headquarters of the district, Tsabong 
is located 360km from the nearest town and 530km from the capital Gaborone. The economy 
primarily relies on the sale of cattle to the Botswana Meat Commission in Lobatse, which is 
500km away from the district headquarters (see appendix 1). Fuel wood is a major source of 
energy. 
Population density of KgDC has remained more or less the same between 1991 and 2001 with 
at least less than one person per square kilometre. There are mainly two types of settlements, 
linear in the south and scattered in the northern part. Most villages showed decline of 
population, except a few major villages as a result of the migration effect to major primary 
centres in search of employment opportunities. Whereas the national government has invested 
on infrastructural developments, the district generally remains undeveloped compared to the 
preceding two case studies. This has had many implications on the performance of the district 
in delivering the services to the ordinary people who are generally economically 
disadvantaged as compared to those of GCC and KDC. These challenges include: 
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• sending vehicles to Gaborone more frequently for repairs because of the sand that 
blows all year long; 
• lack of skilled manpower undermines policy implementation capacity. Skilled 
individuals find the district remote and therefore, unattractive; 
• inadequate or lack of disposable income undermines cost recovery and savmg 
initiatives, such as unsatisfactory levels of private water connections; 
• programmes such as SHHA do not bring desired outcomes, because the beneficiaries 
have to travel more than 500 km to purchase materials. This is quite costly; 
• low population translates into small market 
Expenditure trends: The district's expenditures are briefly analysed by means of illustrative 
tables. The scope and depth of analysis is similar to the two previous case studies, except that 
the information has been summarised. Kgalagadi District Council's expenditures during the 
period under study averaged 5.85% of the district councils' recurrent budgets. The annual 
financial recurrent expenditures were quite inconsistent, with variances of over 100% between 
annual financial years. Recurrent expenditures grew by 0.64%, shrunk by -25%, before rising 
by 113.36% and finally slowed down by -7.8% between the financial years, 2001/02-2002/03; 
2002/03-2003/04; 2003/04-2004/05; and 2004/05-2005/06 respectively. On average, the 
KgDC's recurrent expenditures soared by 80.43% between the periods 2001102 and 2005/06. 
The council dedicated an average of 47.34% of its financial resources on education, health, 
S&CD, SHHA and water and sewerage functions during the five year period under review. 
These major statutory functions were given more priority over other functions. The allocation 
of a larger portion (by the Kgalagadi district council) to the above-mentioned goods and 
services almost mirrored that of KDC. However, it is striking to find that the council spends 
slightly lower than the Kweneng district council on these major functions that in most cases 
reflect the redistributive role ofthe council on nationally raised revenues (See table 18 below). 
The entire range of sectoral functions under study enjoyed positive growth over a five year 
period. The council gave more attention to the provision of potable water to the communities 
in comparison to other expenditure assignments. This could be due mainly to the fact that 
potable water is a scarce commodity within the district and more expensive to extract from 
underground sources(See table 19 below). It cannot be overemphasised that due to low 
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density and the types of settlements found within the district, it is not uncommon that, on 
average, distances between far-flung homesteads are quite great. Therefore, it is economically 
logical to suggest that the council plough in more financial resources into connectind their 
constituents to private? water supply. 
Table 18: Estimated Sectoral expenditures (expressed in%) 
against the annual bud_g_ets jK_g_DC) 
Sector 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 Average 
Education 7.05 12.34 9.05 11.12 9.41 9.79 
Clinics 16.69 13.20 14.87 15.88 17.18 15.56 
S&CD 13.98 9.19 16.65 12.41 12.83 13.01 
SHHA - 0.09 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.23 
Water & 10.04 9.89 6.14 8.70 8.93 8.74 
Sewerage 
Total 47.76 44.71 47.08 48.47 48.70 47.34 
As opposed to increased uptake of SHHA programme in KDC, the residents of KgDC council 
were sluggish in receipt of the programme for several reasons. Firstly, it is economically 
costly for them to construct their houses through the loan, because they have to travel long-
distances to purchase building materials which are not readily available within the district. It 
is important to state the fact that the loan amount of SHHA is uniform across the country. As 
such it does not take into account the different costs across the regions or districts for 
providing the same local public goods and services. This discussion therefore suggests that the 
construction of SHHA residential houses is more costly in KgDC than in KDC and GCC. 
Secondly, it has already been indicated that poverty is more pronounced in KgDC than in the 
other two case studies. Due to low per capita income within the district, it is likely that the 
majority of the residents, who are not in the formal sector, are not eligible for the loan. It is 
therefore justifiable that SHHA, on average, accounted for only 0.23% of the annual 
budgetary allocations of the council (table 18). From a fiscal decentralisation perspective 
SHHA, which is a nationally-funded programme, does not address the horizontal imbalances 
between the resource-well-endowed districts and those that are resource-poor, in the cause for 
equity, but plays an important role in widening the gap between the rich and poor through a 
one-size-fits-all programme in favour of rich. 
126 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The assertion of the thesis is on the basis of the fact that all the citizens of Botswana who 
benefit from this programme, across all districts, get the same loan amount (which is P20 
000), at the same interest rate and the same period of grace to repay it, yet residents from 
poorer districts have to incur a lot more expenses to purchase building materials from distant 
primary centres because of the centralised nature of development and pubic investments in 
Botswana. 
Data in tables 18 and 19 indicate that KgDC gives more or less the same attention to other 
expenditure items, with the exception of SHHA and primary health care and/or clinics. The 
district ploughed more financial resources into clinics than KDC. Data in table 19 indicate 
that the average increase on primary health care spending is over 22%. Expenditure on clinics 
seconded that on water and sewerage provision 
Revenue Sources: The major sources of own revenues at KgDC are: interest on investment; 
water fees and domestic connections; staff housing and matimela. More than an average of 
82% of internal revenues was generated from these sources within the 2001/02-2003/04 
period. The lowest contribution from these sources was in 2003/04 mainly because of a sharp 
fall in the interest on investment revenues. The impact of the fall on interest on investment 
was quite significant, so much so that it pushed down the own revenues from a total of P6 822 
300 to P2 379 045. Overall the contribution of the four major sources of internally raised 
revenues fell from over 89% to just over 69% of the total amount of internally generated 
funds (See Table 20). 
Table 19 
E xpen Iture G row th {0A) b tw 2001/02 2005/06 K I d" n· s 0 e een - ~ga aga I 1stnct c ouncd 
Expenditure 2001/02- 2002/03- *2003/04- *2004/05- Average 
Item 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Education +76.18 -45.53 162.05 -22.01 +10.67 
Clinics -20.38 -16.42 + 127.84 -0.26 +22.70 
S&CD -33.84 +34.50 +59.09 -4.71 +13.76 
SHHA - -62.16 +106.17 -11.14 + 10.96 
Water & -0.84 -53.89 202.27 -5.36 +35.55 
Sewerage 
*Estimates 
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The reliance of the district on interest on investment as a major source of income cannot be 
overemphasised. Such reliance is nevertheless not healthy for the district, because the council 
does not have control over this revenue source. A sharp decline of income has a major shock 
effect on the own revenues of the council, as illustrated by tables 20 and 21. Between the 
2002/03 and 2003/04 financial years, internally generated revenues declined by over 65%. 
The council overall expenditure decreased on all expenditure items during the same financial 
year, with the exception of S&CD (see table 19 and 21). Coincidently, RSGs from the centre 
also decreased significantly by more than 18%. It is however, interesting to find out that water 
and sewerage connection fees contribute significantly to KDC's own revenues (see table 20). 
RSGs from the national government constitute the largest component of the KgDC's income. 
During the 2001/02, 2002/03 and 2003/04 financial years RSGs accounted for 92.10%, 
90.09% and 95.48% of the KgDC budgets respectively. Own revenues were quite 
insignificant, to an extent that RSGs were in excess of the entire financial budgets of the 
district during 2002/03 and 2003/04 (see appendix 6). RSGs were in excess ofthe 
Table 20: Major sources of Internal Revenues (expressed in%) 
Revenue Item 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Interest on Investment 64.61 63.32 0.40 
Water fees & domestic 14.62 15.15 44.41 
connection fees 
Matimela 1.32 0.94 2.71 
Staff Housing 9.29 9.97 22.36 
Total 89.84 89.38 69.88 
Based on District Councils estimated recurrent budgets (2001102-2005106) 
T bl 21 T d ' E f t d I a e : reo SID s 1ma e ncomes an dE d•t xpen 1 ure m 0 or t e 
Financial Years 2001/02- 2002/03- *2003/04- *2004/05- Average 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Own Income +42.26 -65.13 +326.78 +17.53 +80.36 
RSG +10.33 -18.86 +73.18 -10.78 +13.47 
Expenditure 0.64 -25.76 +113.36 -7.82 +80.42 
trends 
* Estzmates 
Based on District Councils estimated recurrent budgets (2001102-2005/06) 
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overall resources required to cover the budgeted for expenditures in KgDC. This scenario is 
counter-productive to the notion of fiscal decentralisation. The incentives for the council to 
strive for increased own income and restrained expenditures were nil because the district did 
not have to generate its own revenues in order to provide services to its residents because 
RSGs were more than enough to finance all the council's activities. Excess financial transfers 
from the centre are a recipe for wasteful spending at local government level. 
The financial outlook of KgDC generally depicts that of KDC's in many ways. The heavy 
reliance of the former on RSGs to advance their recurrent expenditures, high percentage of 
expenditures on social safety nets and social services as well as maintained financial surpluses 
at the end of financial years (in the General Fund) are some of the notable similarities between 
the two district councils (See Tables 20 & 21 below). Notwithstanding these similarities, it is 
important to note that the similarities are striking in many respects. Based on preliminary data, 
as discussed in both case studies, it appears that there is generally more of an element of 
welfarism in KDC than in KgDC, because of both districts having strikingly different socio-
economic dissimilarities. The former has a relatively high per capita income and relatively 
low expenditure needs based on its strategic geographical location, population, infrastructure, 
urbanisation, modernisation and level of employment, which translates into high income 
levels (see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). 
6 Summary and deductions 
The analysis of data in this chapter indicates that: 
• the institutional framework of Botswana's intergovernmental system exhibits an 
element of over-regulated public sector that constrains/inhibits own-initiative at local 
government level. This the government maintains by its extensive involvement in the 
affairs of local authorities. The joint provision of statutory services that has not 
subsided over 3 decades; centralised recruitment, training and development; centrally 
determined fees and charges56; centrally determined and conditionally determined 
capital projects suggest that there is physical localisation rather than decentralisation. 
56The national parliament amended the Local government (District Councils) Cap 40:01 and Township Cap 
40:02 to enable the setting of service and user fees by resolutions of each local authority in 2004. The fruits of 
this development are still to be realised. 
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Lack of institutional capacity in all the three municipal governments' case studies is a 
creation of an over-regulated local public sector; 
• Botswana's approach to decentralisation is centralised. Rapid expenditure growth at 
both district and urban councils is not complemented by local capacity building. The 
fact that GCC remains incapable of exploiting property tax and service levies to the 
maximum after three decades since being assigned this revenue source, leaves more 
question marks than answers about the capacity and political credibility of local 
authorities to perform their statutory responsibilities without closer supervision and 
monitoring from the centre. However, this situation is created by the government's 
approach to fiscal decentralisation; 
• the extent to which property taxation can be increased is highly dependent on the 
ability of the Ministry of Lands and Housing (MLH) to service and allocate residential 
plots to the residents. GCC's hands are tied when it gets to influencing trends in 
property tax growth as its critical revenue source. This indicates that local authorities 
are constrained by central agencies concerning the extent to which they can influence 
their statutorily-assigned revenue sources. This is not healthy for decentralised local 
government, since failure by the centre to perform their assigned mandates translates 
into under-collection oflocal governments' marginal revenues; 
• there are high horizontal inequalities between municipal governments, as well as 
relatively significant income inequalities between regions within municipalities. As is 
the case in the Kweneng district council where the western underdeveloped region is 
not compensated through specially-designed horizontal transfers because of its low 
income and high expenditure needs emanating from smaller populations and 
settlements, as well as insignificant economic activities; 
• the vertical fiscal transfer system is on an ad hoc basis. The oscillatory nature of fiscal 
transfers from the centre is such that local authorities cannot objectively prognosticate 
the expected Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) on an annual basis or within the six year 
development planning period. Lack of transparency on the determination of RSGs 
creates uncertainty and lack of security on the part of local authorities. This adversely 
affects their short-term, medium and long-term planning such that they cannot employ 
innovative measures to transform their limited resources into significant policy outputs 
and long-lasting positive outcomes; 
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• there are no indications of fiscal transfers meant to equalise spill-over effects that such 
districts as the Kweneng (KDC) and South East (SEDC) enjoy at the expense of 
Gaborone on education and health-related expenditure items; 
• intergovernmental fiscal transfers are one-size-fits-all. There IS no formula to 
determine a transparent criterion in allocating nationally-generat~d financial resources. 
This is counter-productive to own initiative and innovation at local government 
financial-planning level. The transfers do not take into account the horizontal 
inequalities between local authorities, and as such appear to benefit richer municipal 
governments at the expense of the relatively poor ones; 
• KDC and KgDC do not have locally determined revenue sources. Their reliance on 
interests earned on invested revenues in the General Fund exposes them to budgetary 
shocks should the financial transfers from the centre decline significantly; 
• inter-regional migration in Botswana is driven by the phenomenon of urbanisation that 
is an outcome of centralised public and private sectors' investment in the South-
Eastern region, at the expense of regions within the periphery such as the Western 
region that have not attracted migrants. Hence, inter-regional migrations do not in any 
way reflect the Tiebout effect at work, because these migrations are not affected by 
attractive local public goods and services but by the national government's 
development strategy that is concentrated in only two regions; and 
• finally, excess fiscal transfers from the centre have dulled incentives for local 
participation of communities because they are not provoked to participate in the 
development of their areas or hold to account their political representatives, because 
they do not bear the costs of services provided them by the councils, these being 
wholly covered by the national governments through RSGs. The financial transfer 
system appears to be having a fly-paper effect on local governments' increased 
spending and depressed generation of own revenues. 
In concluding this chapter, this thesis suggests that the approach of Botswana's 
decentralisation system is flawed in many respects because it fails to address the socio-
economic inequalities between municipal governments, through transfers that would have a 
net additionality effect on municipal spending. This is only possible if there are hard budget 
constraints on municipal budgeting. Such a scenario exists in an environment where the 
government has made efforts to establish the municipal governments' expenditure needs and 
131 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
revenue-raising capacity. Currently, the government has not established these at standardised 
levels. This undermines efforts towards a municipal government system that has attributes of 
organisations run on sound financial management principles, where prudence in managing 
public finances is complemented by strong business acumen (that is the application of 
innovative measures aimed at achieving more with limited resources). 
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Chapter 4 
4. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AT LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LEVEL: FINDINGS, INSIGHTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
National Development Plans in Botswana are generally a reflection of the government's 
intents. The betterment of local governments' financial management has been and continues 
to be a priority (theoretically) to the Government of Botswana (GoB). Several policy 
documents of the Government of Botswana (GoB) attest to the view that good financial 
management at local government is a prerequisite for sustainable provision of services to the 
people of Botswana. The Minister of Finance and Development Planning is on record 
(captured) in the National budget speech of the financial year 2004/05 as saying that, during 
the aforementioned financial year "Government will ensure that the problems of financial 
management at the local authorities are addressed and the Local Authorities are fully 
accountable for the public funds" (Budget Speech, 2004:16). 
The achievement of such a goal is not an easy task because it is multidimensional, entailing 
factors that are not necessarily financial in nature but have implications on the level of 
financial management on local authorities. They may include, amongst others, lack of human 
resources capacity arising out of inadequate technical skills for the management of accounts 
(or poor institutional capacity); lack of political accountability; poorly-designed 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanisms; lack of political incentives to maximise the 
collection of allocated local revenue sources and inadequate local expenditure controls. The 
budget speech correctly highlighted some of the overarching issues on local government 
financial management such as backlog of un-audited accounts and absence of management 
accounts (Budget Speech, 2004:16). Furthermore, the minister in the subsequent budget 
speech expressed the policy direction of government on broadening local government revenue 
base through the amendment of both the Local Government (District Councils) and Township 
Act in order to facilitate the introduction of cost-recovery measures (Botswana Budget 
Speech, 2005: 19). Hence, GoB committed itself to achieving the following objectives during 
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the NDP8 (1998-2003) and NDP9 (2003-2009), with specific reference to the decentralisation 
policy (devolution of spending and revenue-generating powers to local governments )57 : 
• decentralise budgeting process; 
• stimulate local government own revenues generation; 
• ensure equitable distribution of nationally-generated funds; 
• improve capacity of local authorities to implement effectively and efficiently their 
development planning; 
• restrain local public sector spending; 
• engender the role of local communities through Community-Based Organisations 
(CBOs), more especially in local development planning; 
• strengthen the capacity of local public-sector personnel, for the betterment of their 
capacity to deliver durable services on a sustainable bases; 
• improve regional development planning through shared use of resources between 
local authorities by creating strong rural-urban linkages; and 
• promote democracy and (good) governance at municipal government level. 
New measures were to be implemented to give effect to these objectives. Indeed, NDP8 is 
profoundly associated with major local government studies aimed at public sector reforms in 
order to allow for decentralisation of spending decisions to local authorities. Some of the 
notable outputs of such studies include the decentralisation policy of 1993; the government 
task force on local government of 1993; the preparation of Formula-Determined Revenue 
Support Grants58 (FDRSGs); the preparation of Model Bye-laws59 ; the preparation of Cost 
Manual60; the Report on the Second Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure 
in Botswana, 2001 (and the subsequent response to the findings of the SPCLGSB by GoB 
through the Second Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure in Botswana, 
Government Paper No. 1 of 2003); as well as the establishment of Local Authorities Public 
57 See NDP9 (2003:391); Budget Speech (2004/05); Budget Speech (2005/06). 
58 The Formula--Determined Revenue Support Grants were to be pre-determined on the basis of the size of the 
population under the jurisdiction of a particular local authority, remoteness of the administrative area, as well as 
the geographical size of the local authority (NDP9, 2003:392). 
59 Model Bye-laws were developed to review the laws, regulations and rules that are considered to be hampering 
the councils' attempts to collect revenues and independently set local fees for the local public goods and services 
(NDP9, 2003:392). 
60 MLG prepared the costing manuals listing services provided by local governments and how such services may 
be costed. This was intended mainly to ease the absolute dependence of municipal governments on the central 
government to determine the service costs for the services the former provided their constituents (NDP9, 
2003:393). 
134 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Accounts Committee (LAPAC). Cost recovery policy, encompassing the entire public sector, 
was promulgated as well, in order to give effect to the implementation of the Privatisation 
Policy of Botswana, Government No. 1 of 200061 • These reforms were introduced in order to 
give the decentralisation reforms momentum and steam to address the aforementioned 
shortcomings of local government financial management and achieve the objectives as 
outlined above in bullet form. 
In order to have better insights and understanding of Botswana's fiscal decentralisation 
strategy, the discussion now embarks on a much broader approach for describing the 
dynamics, inter-relationships and interconnectedness of the factors responsible for the 
successes and shortcomings of the system. A four-framework approach forms the basis upon 
which an insightful discussion would eventually establish whether the existing strategy 
facilitates the achievement of the objectives that the government has set, creates a conducive 
environment for financial probity and own initiatives at municipal level and, finally, whether 
the strategy enhances good financial planning (decentralised spending) at local government 
level. The four-framework approach is constituted by expenditure responsibilities, revenue 
assignments, fiscal transfer mechanisms and institutional framework guiding the preceding 
three issues above. 
In-depth analysis of Botswana's decentralisation strategy will be done on the basis of the 
fiscal decentralisation theory developed in chapter 2; findings from preliminary case studies 
on Botswana's local government system in chapter 3; relevant information from other 
municipal governments that corroborate or contradict the findings in chapter 3 and, finally, 
such information would be assessed in order to come to scientifically irrefutable conclusions. 
4.2 Expenditure and revenue assignments 
The two classical principles of assigning local authorities functional responsibilities and 
revenue raising authority, as indicated in section 2.5.1, still hold in the analysis of local 
government finance. These are 'finance should follow functions' or what Bahl, in Bell and 
Bowman (2002:40), refers to as "expenditure first" rule and the 'beneficial principle'. The 
61 It is interesting to note that Oates, in Bennett ( 1990: 159), likens the decentralisation of spending decisions to 
local authorities with shifting the provision of service-delivery responsibility to the private sector or to the 
privatisation phenomenon. Oates argues that "they are both functional 'divestiture' strategies aimed at controlling 
increase in public sector spending". 
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latter is premised on the correspondence theory. According to Schroeder in Bahl and Smoke 
(2003 :23-45) it is important that whenever a review and restructuring exercise of local 
government functional responsibilities and revenue raising authority is undertaken, at least 
four critical questions should be given attention. First and foremost, it is essential to ascertain 
whether all municipalities should be accorded equal treatment or not. Secondly, the 
restructuring exercise should determine the level of autonomy that local authorities should be 
given. Thirdly, the assignment of functional and revenue-raising powers should define the 
extent to which local authorities should be instruments of redistribution. Finally, such powers 
and functions assigned to local authorities should be clearly divided between districts and sub-
districts in the constitution or acts establishing local governments. 
The discussion therefore embarks on an assessment and analysis of the functional 
responsibilities and revenue-raising powers assigned to local authorities in Botswana with 
reference to the four analytical frameworks, as briefly discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
The aim of this assessment is to establish whether the assignment of functional and revenue-
raising responsibilities to different categories of municipalities in Botswana (a) enhances 
allocative efficiency in the provision of local public goods (beneficial principle) and (b) 
appreciates the regional socio-economic inequalities between local authorities. It should be 
stated at the outset that such analyses are based on limited information on per capita income-
taxable income within municipalities in Botswana, as well as assumed costs of providing 
services in different categories of local governments. 
4.2.1 Expenditure needs per municipal government 
International literature and experience indicate that regional disparities are one of the major 
characteristics differentiating local authorities in various countries. This applies to both 
developed and undeveloped countries. The United States of America offers an illustrative 
example of economically-segregated regions. However, inter-regional or inter-municipal 
inequalities are more pronounced in developing countries. According to Prud Homme 
(1995:202) economic development that characterised economic growth in many of the 
developing countries over the past few decades, did not eliminate economic disparities. 
Therefore, in order for decentralisation reforms to achieve allocative efficiency in a given 
country, they must take into consideration regional economic inequalities. 
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According to Prud Homme (1995:209), different municipalities should be treated differently 
during the implementation of the fiscal decentralisation reforms, depending on several 
features defining them. Such features include the geographical size, population size and levels 
of economic development. The critical mass notion advocates for more decentralisation of 
local government units that have the potential to benefit more from the reforms on the basis of 
the three key factors, population, activities and income. As such, large cities are preferably 
better candidates for decentralised units, as opposed to smaller jurisdictions, although they 
may all be enjoying the same legal status (Prud Homme, 1995:209). Therefore, this thesis 
holds the view that there is positive correlation between critical mass notion (sufficiently large 
income, population and economic activities) and extent to which functional responsibilities 
and revenue-raising powers could be decentralised. 
For the purpose of establishing whether there are different expenditure needs (defined as 
expenditure needs per capita) and different financial capacities (defined as potential taxable 
income per capita) between municipal governments in Botswana, this study encompasses an 
analysis of limited data on population distribution, income and economic activities in the three 
case-studied municipalities. The discussion also relies on secondary information on other 
municipalities, other than the case study ones, in order to draw broader conclusions on 
whether the assignments of functional and revenue-raising powers achieve allocative 
efficiency and increased revenue-raising at municipal government level. 
First and foremost, it is important to state that councils in Botswana are differentiated by the 
Acts establishing them. The Township Act and the Local Government (District) Act establish 
urban councils and district councils respectively. This means that all district councils enjoy 
the same legal status. The same applies to city, town and township councils. However, data in 
sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 indicate that the Kgalagadi District (KgDC) and Kweneng District 
Councils (KDC) have both been assigned the same functional responsibilities. In addition, 
their total budgetary allocations on five selected expenditure items were more or less the 
same, with a few exceptions. KDC spent at least an average of 14.41% on primary education 
while KgDC expended 9. 79% on the same. Furthermore, both councils each allocated almost 
(more or less) equal shares of their budgets to five expenditure items accounting for at least 
50% of their entire budgets (see table 21 ). The implication created by the expenditure patterns 
and budgetary allocations of both councils on selected expenditure items is that both 
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authorities have equal per capita local expenditure needs. That is, the monetary cost of 
providing the same local public goods and services is equal in both municipalities. 
However, available data on population distributions, relative to the land area (population 
density), indicate that KDC has a higher population density of six peopl~ per square kilometre 
while KgDC has a population density of fewer than one person per square kilometre. 
Furthermore, at least 60% of the KDC constituents are absorbed into the formal employment 
sector against less than 20% in KgDC. Part of KDC is within the Gaborone metropolitan area, 
while KgDC is located over 530km away from Gaborone. Whilst KgDC remains a rural area 
after the 40 years since Botswana attained independence and is experiencing an outward 
migration effect, KDC falls within a region that has over 50% of Botswana's urbanites. This 
means KDC did not attract migrants by default, but by design, since the district is home to a 
significant industrial base of Botswana's manufacturing industries or, alternatively, a 
significant host of the population spill-overs of Gaborone (See sections 3.3.1; 3.5.2; 3.5.3 for 
details). 
From an economic point of view, the expenditure needs of providing similar local public 
goods and services in KDC should be significantly lower than those in KgDC, because the 
former enjoys economies of scale emanating from high population density and high-income 
levels relative to the latter. Two local public goods provided by both councils illustrate this. 
(a) SHHA: According to Kgalagadi District Development Plan (2003:41), almost all the 
building materials for the construction of SHHA projects are bought outside the district 
because of its remoteness. Gaborone is the preferred source of materials yet, it is located more 
than 500km away from KgDC. Beneficiaries end up spending more on transportation costs 
than on building materials required for their structures. This impacts negatively on the rollout 
of the programme, because it fails to achieve the reasons for which it was established. That is, 
providing subsidised housing loans to low income earners who do not qualify for market-
priced loans. Notwithstanding this, the total amount of a loan allocated to residents of KgDC 
is equivalent to that of KDC and, for that matter, any other district or urban council, including 
GCC. Conditions for repaying the loans are also the same (see section 3.2.1 for conditions of 
the SHHA programme). 
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It is therefore logical that the uptake of the programme grew much faster, at an average of 
60.48%, in KDC against 10.96% in KgDC (See table 22). This creates the wrong perception 
that KDC is more successful in rolling out the programme, without taking into consideration 
the socio-economic differences between the two districts in terms of the level of economic 
activities and development. KgDC can effectively be defined as having high per capita 
expenditure needs and a low taxable income per capita while KDC can effectively be defined 
as having relatively low expenditure needs per capita and high income per capita compared 
to the former. These differences should be reflected by varying budgetary allocations on each 
expenditure item over an extended period of time (finance-follows-functions principle), but 
that is not the case. Budget allocations are made as if the two district councils have the same 
level of expenditure needs per capita. 
(b) Water Supply: The ability of the council to supply potable water to the communities does 
not solely depend on the capacity of personnel in its employ, but the financial capacity to 
sustain the durability of this service over time. KgDC has made efforts to apply cost-saving 
measures through the introduction of privately connected water supplies. The major problem 
in rolling out the private water connections to the communities, stems from the fact that there 
are hardly any populated settlements in the district which mostly has sparsely-distributed 
homesteads. The cost of providing private water connections in KgDC is high per capita, 
compared to that of KDC (more especially in the south-eastern part) where the district is 
densely populated. 
This thesis therefore suggests that the assignment of functional responsibilities in Botswana is 
not differentiated in accordance with the characteristics of each district (more especially with 
reference to the critical mass principle) in order to achieve allocative efficiency. Rather, a 
uniform approach to the assignment of expenditure responsibilities has contributed to the 
entrenchment of pre-independence regional disparities. It is also important to bring to 
attention the fact that almost the entire budgets of both districts are covered by the national 
government through RSGs (See sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3). It is therefore justifiable to 
argue that the decentralisation or devolution of expenditure responsibilities to local authorities 
in Botswana is not properly designed to achieve regional equity, but to maintain the status quo 
and, worse, to actually exacerbates inter-municipal inequalities. 
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Expenditure needs-critical mass diagram 
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The expenditure-needs (or needs-critical) diagram above, modelled on the critical path notion 
illustrates that the higher the population the lower the costs of providing local public services. 
This study assumes that the cost of providing local public goods and services in K weneng 
District Council (KDC), whose population and economic credentials are represented by B in 
the expenditure needs-critical mass diagram, would cost the district e while the same services 
may cost KgDC ei at population A. This model applies satisfactorily to Botswana's situation 
because an increase in regional populations in the country is associated with urbanisation and 
other economic pull factors that improve the standards of living for residents through highly-
centralised public and private investments (See section 3.3.1). Mosha, in Edge and Lekorwe 
(1998:290), validates this view of their analysis of the impact of urbanisation in Botswana. 
According to Mosha in Edge and Lekorwe (1998:290) 73% of the Financial Assistance 
Policy62 (F AP) funds went to projects located in the urban areas, creating at least 20 000 jobs, 
while the 71% of the Accelerated Land Servicing Programme (ALSP) also went to the same. 
On the basis of the expenditure needs-critical mass notion, the thesis suggests that 
municipalities are not clearly differentiated in order to establish their expenditure needs, each 
according to economic status, land area vis-a-vis population and geographic location. Hence, a 
blanket approach to the allocation of resources on nationally-funded programmes (functional 
responsibilities) at municipal level at the expense of the marginalised districts. 
62 F AP was a government empowerment programme that allocated financial grants to the citizens in order to start 
up their businesses. The programme justifiably benefited urban areas because investors were interested in large, 
ready markets for their produce. 
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4.2.2 Financial capacity 
The revenue-raising authority, assigned to local authorities, in essence reflects the extent of 
control they have in their own affairs. Put differently, the more revenues local authorities 
generate, the more control they have on how it is utilised for local services or their assigned 
functional responsibilities. The main reason behind significant own revenues for municipal 
governments is to ensure that they provide services that mirror the preferences of their 
constituents in such a way that the costs of local services fall on the service beneficiaries. This 
arrangement is credited for successfully depressing incidents of free riders and enhancing 
political accountability. Residents are then provoked to gauge the quality of services they 
receive against the charges that they pay in return to their respective local governments. 
Generally, the revenue-raising authority of local authorities tends to be unchanging over time. 
However, due to the technological revolution and innovations, as well as the changing 
economic conditions, it has become important to review the revenue-raising authority of sub-
national governments from time to time (Tanzi, 2001 :8). This is meant to ensure, among 
others, that there is production efficiency in the provision of local public services. This line of 
reasoning coincides with the view held by Prud'Homme (1995 :21 0) that different sectors 
should be treated differently on the basis of the externality, chargeability and technicity 
factors. Goods prone to externality effects are not good candidates for decentralisation, yet 
those that can be financed by charges and provided with the lowest available managerial and 
technical capacity at local government level are best candidates to be decentralised. Services 
which easily lend themselves to charges can play a significant role in enhancing the revenue-
raising powers of local authorities or enhance fiscal decentralisation. 
The assignments of revenue raising powers in Botswana are more or less the same for all 
district councils and urban councils (see section 3.4.3). The difference between urban and 
district councils' revenue sources lies in the fact that only the former have access to property 
taxes and sewerage connection fees. However, despite the same revenue sources allocated all 
district and urban councils, the extent to which each unit can benefit from the decentralisation 
is varied and should be reflected by varied fiscal capacity between urban councils themselves 
and among district councils. This argument is premised on the critical-mass notion that holds 
that the higher the population within the local government unit, the higher the income 
generated due to frequency of economic activities taking place. Hence a more densely-
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populated local authority reaps most benefits of the decentralisation reforms. This view would 
generally apply to Botswana's situation, due to major demographic changes associated with 
urbanisation and economic development in the south-eastern region, encompassing both GCC 
andKDC. 
Fiscal capacity-critical mass diagram 
Population (total expenditure/economic activities) 
The fiscal capacity-critical mass diagram above illustrates how the higher the population, the 
higher the local internally-generated revenues63 . This model as well applies satisfactorily to 
Botswana's situation, because, despite the fact that the revenue generating powers of urban 
councils are the same as provided for by the statutes establishing them, their financial capacity 
is hypothetically different. In fact, the Botswana National Settlement Policy (1998: clearly 
demarcated primary centres into three categories such as Primary Centre I; Primary Centre II 
and Primary Centre III64 . Primary Centre I should have at least 100 000 people. Table 5 in 
section 3.5.1 indicates that only Gaborone city (among other urban councils) qualifies as a 
Primary Centre I. Lobatse Town Council (LTC) in the vicinity of GCC has a population of 29 
689. This means LTC is more than six times smaller than GCC, in terms of the population 
(refer to appendix 1 to see L TC). In essence, L TC is not by any means more developed than 
63 According to Mosha, in Edge and Lekorwe (1998:290), the disposable cash income for urban villages was 
US$265.60, while that of rural villages is US$147.10. The average monthly consumption expenditure was 
US$417.60; US$224.1 0 and US$130.50 for towns, urban villages and rural villages respectively. 
64 Primary Centres II and Ill are expected to have at least 50 000 to 99 999 and 20 000 to 49 000 respectively. 
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GCC. At population A, L TC can only generate i revenues as opposed to GCC that is capable 
of generating ii Pula with a population of B65 . 
There is evidence that GCC is the largest base for Botswana's manufacturing industries 
(Mosha in Edge and Lekorwe, 1998:290). This means the city is in an advantageous position 
to maximise the collection of revenues due to it, such as property taxation and sewerage 
collections and user-fees at relatively lower administrative costs. However, this is not the 
case. (Refer to section 4.3.1.1 for reasons why the GCC fails to maximise its own revenues.) 
In concluding this section, the discussion argues that Botswana's fiscal decentralisation 
strategy is rather more concerned with the allocation of local revenue-generating sources than 
establishing each authority's financial capacity on the basis of the revenue sources already 
allocated them. (See appendix 4 for additional revenue sources allocated local authorities, 
despite their failing to put to good use the already existing revenue sources.) Although this 
conclusion is based on secondary sources, due to lack of adequate available information, 
generally, urban councils generate at least 30% of their own sources, despite vanances 
between their populations and level of economic development. Nevertheless, empirical 
evidence in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 indicates that, despite varying economic statuses. 
population distributions and incomes, Kweneng District Council generates as little own 
revenues as Kgalagadi District Council. 
Revenues generated through user charges are quite unstable from year to year. Such public 
charges for community centre services, sewerage connection fees, sewerage fees, service 
levies and parking levies were not predictable. V ariances between two financial years for 
these chargeable services are so inconsistent that district or national government authorities 
cannot prognosticate the possible revenues that can realistically be generated through them. 
Such is the situation in GCC that it is difficult to reconcile the estimated and actual revenues 
generated at the end of the financial years as highlighted in all the three case studies. This is a 
wide-spread problem across the urban councils such as in Jwaneng Town and Francistown 
City Councils (Office of the Auditor General Report, (Jwaneng Town Council) (2002:63); 
Office of the Auditor General Report, (Francistown City Council) (2000:4). 
65 Gaborone, Francistown and Selibe-Phikwe have population densities of more than I 000 persons per square 
kilometre (Mogae, 200 I: I2). This is a strong point for designing different strategies for intergovernmental 
relations between government and urban areas as well as between government and rural areas 
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4.2.3 Redistribution role of councils 
The Household, Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of 2002/03 states that 23.8% of 
Botswana's labour force were unemployed (Midterm-Review NDP9, 2006:5). Midterm 
Review NDP8 (2000:6) in turn identified lack of income as an immediate cause of poverty. 
Lack of income is associated with lack of wage employment and limited employment 
opportunities. The decline of the labour-intensive agricultural sector and the rapid expansion 
of the capital-intensive mineral sector resulted in limited employment opportunities in the 
economy. Although poverty has steadily declined since independence, HIES indicate that 
30.3% of citizens live below the poverty datum line (Midterm Review (NDP), 2006:6). The 
Government of Botswana, through various intervention programmes such as Remote Areas 
Development Programme (RADP), Social and Community Development (S&CD) and 
community development, among others, has injected a significant amount of resources to 
cushion the impacts of poverty on vulnerable members of society. To this end, the 
government has been generally successful, although there is still room for improvement. 
Rural areas are the most affected by incidents of poverty. In fact, Mosha, in Edge and 
Lekorwe (1998:340), contends that incidences of poverty are increasing in rural areas despite 
reported decline of poverty country-wide. The most affected being the rural districts of 
Ghanzi and Kgalagadi. Hence there is a need for the government to intervene through life-
sustaining and sustainable programmes. GoB through the Mid-Term Review NDP8 (2000:6) 
strove to target policies systematically at individuals and groups of people who needed such 
assistance and so avoid abuse of the programmes. Therefore, local authorities as the 
government closest to the people, and being in a better position to reap the benefits of 
allocative efficiency, play a significant role in the redistribution of nationally generated 
resources. 
The role of district and urban councils in the redistribution of centrally-financed expenditure 
assignments cannot be underestimated in Botswana. Local authorities are key players in the 
provision of (a) merit goods (primary education and primary health services); (b) social safety 
nets (RADP); (c) drought relief services (LIPWP); as well as (d) the community development 
orientated functions (S&CD). The extent to which each locality is involved in the 
redistribution of nationally-raised revenues is dependent on various interrelated factors: (i) the 
level of socio-economic development of each locality; (ii) level of urbanisation and 
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modernity; (iii) the level of poverty within each municipality and (iv) its prime (strategic) or 
remote location from the major primary centres. 
Notwithstanding these, it emerges that GCC on average spent 31.87%, KDC 51.44% while 
KgDC allocated 47.34% of their resources on the redistribution of nationally-financed 
expenditure items. To the extent that Gaborone, as the capital city, the financial and business 
hub of the country, expends at least a third of the budget on these expenditure items, it is 
justifiable. However, it is difficult to deduce from the case studies the reasons justifying the 
allocation of well over 50% of the KDC budgets on these expenditure items. This is contrary 
to the findings of the Study of Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Botswana, that indicate that 
rural areas are inhabited by 62% of the poor or very poor citizens of Botswana, 24% were 
resident in urban villages, while only 14% ofurbanites were poor (Mid-Term Review, NDP8, 
2000:5). 
A larger section of KDC residents certainly fall within the urban villages' bracket that has 
lower poverty incidences as compared to rural villages that characterise KgDC. 
Table 21 Average Sectoral Expenditure Growths (in Percentages) 
District/Urban Council Education Health S&CD SHHA Water & 
Sewerage 
GCC 7.34% 13.13% 3.61% 2.42% 5.37% 
KDC 14.41% 15.31% 10.67% 0.25% 10.80% 
Kg DC 9.79% 15.56% 13.01% 0.23% 8.74% 
Table 22 Average Sectoral Expenditure Growths (in percentages) 
District/Urban Council Education Health S&CD SHHA Water & 
Sewerage 
GCC 26.70% 69.79% 16.24% -15.56% 47.64% 
KDC 19.73% 16.70% 23.50% 60.48% 16.48% 
Kg DC 10.67% 22.70% 13.76% 10.96% 35.55% 
However, reconciling the budgetary allocations per district on S&CD expenditures raises 
more questions than answers. Table 22 indicates that the budgetary allocations for S&CD in 
GCC and KDC are increasing at a faster rate than in KgDC. In fact, the rate at which KDC is 
allocating financial resources to S&CD can be interpreted as indicating that the rate of poverty 
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incidences is increasing faster than that of the other two councils. Yet, 82.6% of the 
population of KDC are residents of the four major settlements (Molepolole, Gabane, 
Mogoditshane and Thamaga) within the urbanised eastern corridor. These areas are 
considered the economic hubs of the district. However, this is not to suggest that there is no 
urban poverty in Botswana, but to suggest that there is a logical expectation that rural districts 
on the outskirts should be seen to be allocating a larger share of their budgets to equity-
inclined services than urbanised settlements whose residents have more employment 
opportunities. 
This thesis, suggests that in order for councils to equitably allocate nationally-generated 
resources, expenditure needs should be established first. Secondly, the demarcation of sub-
districts can be an important factor in ensuring that the programmes are targeted enough to 
avoid abuse of resources, yet achieving equity in their distributions (see section 4.2.4). 
Lotz in Ahmad (1997:202) defines expenditure needs as "expenditure a given authority would 
have to incur to supply all its services at the costs equal to the national average -not better 
and not poorer, but average". Establishing expenditure needs would justify high expenditures 
on certain services in district A and lower expenditures in district B without necessarily 
compromising the national average costs on those services. The local government system in 
Botswana does not have a standard measure of each district's expenditure needs on statutory 
functions assigned. This has given the councils leeway to expend their resources in an 
unsustainable fashion. 
According to the Report on the Second Presidential Commission on Local Government 
Structure in Botswana (200 1 :28-29), the social aspect of RADP was more successful than the 
community development aspect because it involved the much easier issuing of handouts. 
Councils are said to have failed to avail themselves of technical support. 
Councils are said to have failed to avail themselves of technical support required for 
community development projects, thus leading to their failure, because they were preoccupied 
with issuing the handouts (to their constituents) that are not facilitative to the sustainable 
developmental objectives of the programme. The issuing of handouts by the councils is 
reminiscent of what Bennett (1990:4-5) terms the "principle of entitlement". Increased 
handouts have indeed fuelled the expectations of the local communities to such an extent that 
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community development projects are just not given the same priority by their local political 
leaders. The widespread view that it is a moral responsibility for the state to provide handouts 
through local authorities has not only contributed to an increased free rider problem but 
caused a Samaritan's dilemma. The expectations tend to have been raised beyond the national 
average individual's households poverty levels. 
Although there is no adequate information to calculate the exact percentage of resources that 
should be allocated each district, limited data is suggestive of the relative abuse of the social 
safety nets in councils without regard for the overriding element of allocative efficiency as a 
justification to assist those in need through decentralised expenditure. This is as a result of the 
following interrelated factors: 
• the central government (MLG) has not been able to establish expenditure needs per 
locality and the financial capacity and/or taxable resources per locality; and 
• welfare benefits are under-provided in economically disadvantaged rural district 
councils, in contrast to the peri-urban district councils that, by virtue of being 
classified district councils, enjoy as much equitable revenues from the national 
government whilst their level of income is quite high as a result of diverse economic 
opportunities, hence higher disposal incomes. This means that there are high incidents 
of free-rider elements and welfarism in strategically located, peri-urban-domlnated 
districts, as compared to the remotely-located district councils. 
4.2.4 Demarcating and defining the roles of sub-districts 
Deciding on the size of municipal governments is a dilemma that requires a trade-off between 
economies of scale and production efficiency enjoyed by larger councils and the Pareto-
efficient output or allocative efficiency that tie expenditure decisions to resource costs in 
smaller sub-national governments (See section 2.3.1). Considering the facts that the major 
reasons for undertaking fiscal decentralisation reforms in Botswana are to achieve allocative 
efficiency, decentralised budgeting and service deliveries, political accountability and 
equitable distribution of nationally generated resources, it is justifiable that this thesis 
analyses the demarcation of sub-districts from this perspective. 
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The Report of the Second Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure in 
Botswana (200 1 : 125) discovered that the degree of delegated authority varied among councils 
in each sub-district. Their mandates were not clarified either. In most cases, decisions of sub-
districts were found to be tied to those of the district headquarters. Furthermore, there are no 
guidelines that define the level of authority for sub-districts (SPCLGSB, 2001: 126). Within 
the districts are large traditional villages which have achieved the status of urban villages. The 
report of the commission found that the juxtaposed arrangement of development funds for 
urban villages, in relationship to the rest of the settlements within districts, created an 
imbalance in the distribution of the funds. The political (numerical) advantage the former 
enjoyed at the council chamber favoured them whenever projects allocations were made 
(SPCLGSB, 2001 :126-7). 
The concentration of development expenditure in districts' and sub-districts' headquarters 
contributed to the failure of the districts to bring services closer to the people, because people 
from rural areas have to travel long distances in order to access council services in urban 
villages. This invariably results in congestion of constituents at the service points (SPCLGSB, 
2001: 129-30). This discussion therefore suggests that allocative efficiency has not been 
achieved, because there appears to be centralised choices within the districts that lead to 
uniformity of service provision, without taking into account the existing variations in 
preferences between urban and rural settlements within the districts. Given the disparities in 
the levels of development between settlements within districts, there appears to be loss of 
Pareto efficiency in the provision of local public services, because preferences of residents 
from different settlements vary markedly. Perhaps this is the reason why it has been difficult 
for the government to establish reasonable estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity 
of municipalities, as well as finding it difficult to ensure that social safety nets specifically 
target those in need. 
The argument for properly delineated sub-districts is not only to achieve allocative efficiency, 
but to strive for, amongst others, tax innovation as well as public charges innovation. These 
innovative measures are only possible when differences within the political jurisdiction vary 
little. Given the vastness of districts in Botswana that have internal socio-economic 
differences, thread-bare in many respects, sub-districts may be used as innovative hubs for tax 
and cost recovery innovations at local government level. The prospects of generating property 
taxation are much better in Mogoditshane and Molepolole than they are in Metsimotlhabe (see 
148 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
appendix 3 for these settlements). The designation of Mogoditshane as a sub-district or 
administrative centre would empower it to become a service point for smaller settlements 
within its vicinity. This would ensure that technical efficiency and economies of scale are 
achieved at the same time. It is important to indicate that the demarcation of councils does not 
only apply to district councils but may be a useful tool, in urban centres that are characterised 
by abject poverty in the midst of affluence, to address horizontal inequalities within the 
councils and to find innovative ways of generating revenues so that councils operate at 
minimum cost (technical efficiency). This view is based on the notion that 'what get measured 
gets managed.' This is discussed in section 4.3.2. 
In concluding this section, this thesis suggests that the current arrangement of districts and 
sub-districts is not sympathetic to the achievement of allocative efficiency and Pareto 
efficiency, because district-wide choices, that result in the uniformity of services, create loss 
of consumers' surplus66. As such, the main reason for which sub-districts have been created, 
that is to bring services closer to the people according to their peculiar needs arising out of 
their unique preferences, is not achieved. Hence the demarcation of sub-districts tended to be 
counterproductive to the notion of local political decentralisation to the margins. 
4.3 Local government own revenues 
Revenue-raising authority assigned to municipalities is fundamentally a critical measure of the 
powers allocated to them. They should be run their own-affairs to the extent they are able to 
self finance their statutory expenditure functions except for bridging finances from the centre. 
Reference is thus made to the fact that low-mobility taxes and area specific benefit-motivated 
user-charges should finance, as much as possible, a significant amount of functions assigned 
local authorities so as to reinforce municipals' sovereignty and political significance for their 
voters-cum-taxpayers (see section 2.4.2). 
Bahl, Smoke and Solomon (2003 :72) state that a good revenue system should strike a balance 
between budgetary needs (based on expenditure assignments); the cost of producing local 
public services and, finally, "the combined amount of local taxes, charges and 
intergovernmental transfers". Finding equilibrium between budgetary needs and all revenue 
66 According to Bailey ( 1999:20) loss of consumer surplus is caused by mismatch between consumer preferences 
and variations within a locality. 
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sources at the disposal of the municipality, requires a flexible tax system that tracks the 
expenditure patterns and that equivocally reflects the socio-economic status ofthe municipal's 
residents. Thus, their ability to finance the expenditure functions of the government closest to 
them, would ensure an equitable tax system (horizontally and vertically) that ensures that the 
beneficiaries of the municipal expenditures (financed by taxes) directly bear the costs 
associated with services they enjoy (principle of correspondence). In this regard, Bahl, Smoke 
and Solomon in Bahl and Smoke (2003:72) generated the following norms of good taxation: 
(a) tax assigned should generate revenues adequate to cover budgetary needs; 
(b) local tax revenues should be responsive to the effect that they grow or decrease in 
proportion to the expenditure needs' growth or reduction; 
(c) the tax should be equitable horizontally (should be reflective of inter-municipal 
inequalities) and vertically (tax should match the basic municipal budgetary needs); 
(d) there has to be an element of correspondence "between those who bear the burden of 
the tax and those who enjoy the benefits of expenditure financed by the tax"; 
(e) the tax assigned should be administratively feasibly; and 
(f) Local taxes should be structured in manners that gives local governments some degree 
offiscal autonomy. 
According to Bennett (1990:20) there has been an intriguing trend recently in developed 
countries that has stimulated tax innovations that are "redirecting attention towards a cost-
benefit relationship". These are called tax benefits. In this regard two principles of taxation 
have so far characterised local government taxation. These are (a) the ability to pay taxation; 
and (b) taxation according to benefits. The former has a redistributive intent while the later 
has quasi-charging intent (Bennett, 1990:20). In view of these fiscal decentralisation 
innovations in local government taxation this discussion briefly analyses Botswana's taxation 
system. 
4.3 .1 Local government taxes 
It is important first and foremost to acknowledge that local governments in Botswana do not 
have access to any sort of taxes, except for urban councils which have been assigned property 
taxes. This gives them an upper hand (because they have marginal revenue source that is not 
available to district councils) on internally generated revenues. The implication is that the 
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all the countries to strengthen it as the most common revenue source. This is for the reason 
that property taxes are considered to have a strong element of a good revenue system. 
Property tax is considered a relatively stable revenue source compared to other potential taxes 
because: 
• it is income inelastic (that is, it changes slower than income) (Bell, 1999:2); 
• "real estate markets reflect long-term assert values, which tend to respond more slowly 
to annual changes in the level of economic activity than economic flows like business 
turnover or wages" (Bell, 1999:2); 
• moderate property tax base fluctuations, as a result of periodic assessment practices (as 
opposed to annual assessments), capture changes in real estate values completely 
(Bell, 1999:2); 
• it is easy to administer locally (Bird, 2004: 1 ); 
• it does not raise the problem of competition or harmonisation between sub-national 
and national governments (Bird, 2004:1). 
The Local Government Township Act, Section 7, empowers the urban councils in Botswana 
to levy rates and fees on land and properties by bye-laws. They may, according to this Act, 
"provide for the fixing and levying of different rates upon different classes of land". In order 
to come to a scientific conclusion, the discussion made an empirical analysis of the urban 
property taxation system in Botswana (GCC as a case study) by adopting a six-major function 
property analytical tax system, developed by Kelly (2000) for evaluating Kenya's property 
system as follows: 
(a) Tax base identification67 : All residential and commercial plots68 in GCC are 
subjected to property rates, with the exception of the old SHHA plots (refer to section 
3.5.1) which are charged service levies. The rates cover both land and buildings. 
(b) Tax ratio69: Tax rate is uniform across the city, determined by the municipal 
government by way of a bye-law which is approved by the Minister responsible for 
Local Government. 
67 It is defined by Government Policy as to what is and what is not taxed. 
68 Except those listed in chapter 3: churches, parastatals, government properties and others 
69 Tax ratio measures the tax amount per value of the property, taxing encompassing the area--rating system for 
example. 
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(c) Coverage ratio: According to Kelly (2000:41) coverage ratio is "the amount of 
taxable property captured in the fiscal cadastre divided by the total taxable property in 
a jurisdiction". Officials in the GCC are adamant that the coverage ratio of the 
property tax is around 70% within the City Council. The remaining 30% is not valued 
and captured in the valuation roll, for the reason that the city does not have the 
capacity to value commercial properties (such as the Game City Mall70 that has not 
been valued since 2001) and in some instances residential land is valued at the 
exclusion of residential properties for the same reason. 
(d) Valuation ratio: the frequency of land and property valuation indicates the valuation 
ratio of the property tax policy system. It is a standard practice to value land and 
properties every five years. However, this is not always the case. As at the middle of 
2006, valuation was last conducted in 1997 and approved in 1999. This means it has 
been nine years since valuation was last conducted within the fast-paced, growing city 
of Gaborone. In fact, the valuation of land and properties is done by the Department of 
Lands, within the Ministry of Lands and Housing, on behalf of GCC, because the 
latter does not have the capacity to perform this function. 
(e) Collection ratio: tax revenues collected against the total tax liability within a financial 
year represent the collection ratio. Government officials at the GCC estimated that the 
collection ratio stood at around 60% within their area of jurisdiction. As it has already 
been indicated in section 3.4.3, urban councils in Botswana experience a high rate of 
tax defaults from their residents, in the process pushing down the collection ratio of 
their municipal governments. 
The administration of property taxation reqmres that there is at least adequate local 
information, as well as moderate administration costs, such as a cadastre that would be used to 
predict potential revenues payable to local authorities with fair accuracy over an extended 
period of time (Arora and Norregaard, 1997:8). From the analysis carried out above on the 
revenue productivity and efficiency of property taxation in Gaborone City council (GCC), 
several issues emerge. Tax productivity in GCC is constrained by inadequate administrative 
capacity within the council to capture necessary data on the extent, value and ownership of 
land and taxable properties. In addition to that, the so-called dilemma of indifference and 
incompetence appears to have negatively affected GCC's tax productivity because the 
70 Game City is the largest commercial mall in Botswana. 
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frequency of valuation within the city is quite infrequent. Valuation is done by the Ministry of 
lands and Housing, which has the competence to undertake the work, yet is less inclined to 
put more effort in order to ensure that the city's tax revenues reflects the value of taxable 
properties. The city council's hands are tied by its own incapacity to rescue the situation for 
the betterment of its revenue stream. 
As a result of this inability to take advantage of the potential stable revenue stream property 
taxation offers, the city fails to achieve its purported objective of ensuring that it has 
considerable control over its marginal revenue and, in turn, tax innovation. The benefit-costs 
notions of property taxation have therefore not been achieved, chiefly as a result of 
government tax policy choice and administrative action (see sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 for a 
brief analysis). 
High default rates, over an extended period of time, that go unpunished, coupled to low 
coverage ratios and low collection ratios, seriously reduce the significance of property 
taxation, within GCC, as an important local political issue tying the tax ratio to benefits 
received by the electorate in the form of services. The latter would include secondary tarred 
roads, streets lights and other community services. These services enhance the value of land 
and properties within given locations. As such the political significance of property taxes has 
failed to provoke local communities to gauge the level and rate of developments carried out 
by the council vis-a-vis the rates charged them via property taxes. In other words, property 
taxes in GCC have not lived up to the expectations of encouraging feedback to local officials 
from the service recipients as a political control mechanisms at local level; the quintessence of 
fiscal decentralisation theory (see sections 3.5.1 on GCC own revenues). 
4.3.2 Government's tax policy choices 
According to Kelly (2000:38) the revenue productivity of property tax cannot be de-linked 
from the government policy choices on the tax-base definition and tax ratio. As a matter of 
fact, a bye-law on tax rates in the GCC, like in other urban councils in Botswana, is approved 
by the Minister responsible for local governments after extensive consultation with the 
national Cabinet. This often causes delays before the rates are finally approved and published 
in the Gazette (see section 3.5.1). According to the officials at the Gaborone city council, the 
property rates bye-laws are normally not approved until six months into the new financial 
154 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
year. Having to wait for MLG to gazette new tax rates, more often than not, delays the 
council's collection of its revenues on time. 
From a fiscal decentralisation perspective, property taxation is optimally assessed on the basis 
of, among others, its revenue productivity, neutrality, simplicity and equity (Bell, 1999:2-4). 
However, for the purpose of analysing the government's tax policy on property taxation from 
a fiscal decentralisation perspective, the discussion briefly assesses only the neutrality and 
equity aspects of property taxes in the Gaborone City Council (GCC). 
Bell (1999:3) states that properly-designed taxes should be difficult to avoid. This ensures that 
they do not have an impact on (private economic decisions) explain concept?. Because 
property taxes are assessed against immovable, real properties, there is little that owners can 
do to avoid them, hence property taxes tend not to distort (private economic decisions)?. For 
these reasons, property taxes are generally seen to be neutral when compared to many other 
taxes. However, the tax-based definition of property taxes in Botswana fails to take advantage 
of the neutrality of property rates because it excludes potentially buoyant sources of this tax. 
The exclusion of the national government buildings, and more especially public enterprises, 
denies GCC revenues due on properties within its jurisdiction. This thesis therefore suggests 
that the tax base definition is not broad enough to take advantage of property developments 
that have taken place in the past 40 years. It limits the revenue-raising powers of the city and 
inhibits the city's endeavours to build its financial capacity by not giving it the leverage to 
control the greater part of the city's development trajectories without having to recourse to the 
national government to finance services that should be funded through internally generated 
revenues. 
Whereas tax ratio is uniform 71 across all types of properties within the city, the determination 
of tax rates by the minister responsible for local authorities, undermines the notion of tax 
legitimacy. Property rates should be seen to be legitimate by the service recipients. Thus, the 
rightful authorities to ensure that tax is legitimate are the councillors. This ensures that local 
authorities own up to the quality (or lack thereof) of the services vis-a-vis the rates level. The 
national government should rather set the rates cap in order to protect local voter-cum tax 
payers from exorbitant property rates. 
71 Uniform tax ratio is credited for its simplicity to administer, as compared to selective tax system. 
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The second dimension of government tax policy choice on property taxation is how the 
element of equity is integrated into the local property taxation system. Bell (1999:4) argues 
that equity in property taxes can be achieved across jurisdictions and across individuals within 
the same jurisdiction. For the purpose of analysing GCC's property taxes, this discussion 
restricts the government's policy choice on the equity of the urban property rates across the 
range of individuals within Gaborone. 
Government's policy with regards to distributing the tax burden across different income 
classes, in part reflects different abilities of residents to pay taxes. "The ability-to-pay 
principle72 of taxation stipulates that the burden of financing .... general community services 
should be distributed across property owners in relation to the value of their property, which is 
proxy for ability to pay" (Bell, 1999:4). A significant portion of property tax is generated 
from high-income groups, who receive income from capital. In this way property tax is 
considered to be progressive and proportional across income classes, because it is by nature 
tax on housing consumption (Bell, 1999:4-5). It is therefore logical to argue that, in order for 
municipalities to be innovative in setting different tax rates across different income groups, 
the physical planning practices should be supportive to ensure that the tax rates are 
progressive and reflect the benefit-charges principle. According to the benefit principle, local 
governments should provide a variety of goods and services to their constituents according to 
the benefits received by the latter. Such benefits would also reflect the cost incurred by the 
council (Bell, 1999:5-6). 
The 1963 Gaborone development plan segregated residencies according to the income levels 
of residents. "Housing development was polarised with high and medium cost on one side and 
low cost on the other". The government reversed this development strategy in 1984 in favour 
of the mixed development (Maundeni, 2004: 15). Whilst this is a welcome development from 
a government's social and philosophical perspective of balanced development that does not 
appear to sideline those who are economically disadvantaged, it has placed many limitations 
on the discretion of GCC to increase the revenue productivity of property taxes and to 
72 According to Mosha (2004:32) around 40 000 people in the capital city live below the National Poverty Datum 
Line. One third or seven per cent of these people are very poor. In order for social safety nets to be targeted 
enough and for these needy people to be exempted from paying property taxes or paying subsidised taxes at an 
administratively lower cost, they should not be juxtaposed with medium and high income groups. 
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indiscriminately enforce property tax that has a redistribution effect for the low-income 
groups at lower administrative costs. 
First of all, property tax is generally expected to be visible. Property owners expect to receive 
a package of goods and services commensurate with the taxes they pay. The goods and 
services received by the residents are assumed to be having a positive impact on the value of 
their properties. The juxtaposition of different income groups within the same location would 
mean that the value of high-income group properties depreciate because of their relative close 
proximity to low income properties. Under this scenario the city council would have difficulty 
charging progressive tax on different properties within the same location, because the high-
income groups would consider themselves to be overtaxed if they are taxed according to the 
market value of their properties that are subjected to the same quality of goods and services 
provided to the low-income groups within the same location. The tax rates, therefore, would 
be seen to be lacking political legitimacy by high-income groups because the determination of 
the tax rates through the valuation process on mixed properties may not be easily subjected to 
the market forces in order for the tax base and tax rate to be understood by tax payers 73 . 
Secondly, the idea of social mix may complicate the city council's endeavour to implement its 
redistributive policies in a targeted fashion when relatively disadvantaged city residents are 
mixed with high-income groups. Relieving under-developed members of the city from paying 
property taxes may very well be an administratively costly exercise when they are within the 
same location as high and medium-income earners. This tax system is said to have failed the 
notion of simplicity and may very well lead to conflict between different income groups who 
receive the same receive bundle of goods and services whilst paying different rates. 
This thesis therefore suggests that the government policy choice on urban property taxation 
should not promote equitable prices of property taxes for different income groups (it lacks an 
element of fairness) because it would probably under-tax the high and medium-income groups 
73 There is already a growing concern from the residents of Botswana's most premier residential area (Ph aka lane 
states) that they do not get value for money from the Gaborone City Council. Phakalane Estates is the preferred 
residential area for Botswana's high-income group yet construction companies have turned it into a dumping 
site. GCC has this far failed to protect the area from illegal dumping because the city council is preoccupied with 
other areas in the city. This is despite the fact that Phakalane generate the highest revenue income through 
property taxes that "reflect" the value of expensive mansions. The Managing Director of Phakalane Estate is 
quoted by the local newspaper saying: "I have tried to talk to the city council but they are turning a deaf ear. 
They do not seem to know that I am the goose that lays them golden eggs". This a practical result of treating 
different areas equally (Sunday Standard, 2007: 1-2). 
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because ofthe difficulty to establish the market value of their properties. Hence, the ability-to-
pay notion does not apply. Furthermore, tax rates lack legitimacy when they do not reflect the 
quality of goods and services that the city councils provide its residents. It is therefore argued 
that the administrative action of the council to maximise its property revenues, is in part 
constrained by the government's policy choice as discussed below (see section 4.3.3). 
4.3.3 Administrative action 
The three remaining variables of tax policy (coverage ratio, valuation ratio and collection 
ratio) indicate the administrative capacity and capability of the local governments to: (a) 
efficiently identify and capture data on all properties; (b) measure the accuracy of property 
valuation against the market value; and finally (c) enforce compliance through an efficient 
collection of rates. 
Whilst property rates are generally a stable source of revenues for local governments, their 
income elasticity is influenced by base elasticity, collection rate elasticity and the rate 
elasticity. These factors entail the revenue productivity of the property tax system. According 
to Bell (1999:3) base elasticity is a measure of the responsiveness of assessed property value 
to income changes. In essence, the tax base elasticity mirrors the valuation ratio or the 
frequency with which land and properties are valued. The fact that as at the end of 2006, 
valuation was last done in 1997, indicates that the current property rates at GCC do not reflect 
the changes to the economic base of Gaborone city of the past nine years. Hence, current tax 
rates on land and housing do not reflect the current market value of these rateable properties. 
This means urban housing is under taxed in Gaborone. The city council fails to capture all tax 
revenues due to it. 
The rate elasticity on one hand "reflects the extent to which increases in assessed value are 
translated into property tax collections" (Bell, 1999:3). The increasing defaulters on valued 
land and properties indicate that the assessed values of properties and land have not been 
transformed into collectable revenues for the council. This has been highlighted by several 
reports of the Office of the Auditor General. Tax defaults are common across urban councils 
in Botswana other than Gaborone (Annual Report of the Auditor General, 2001 :52; Annual 
Report of the Auditor General, 2000:4). The collection rate elasticity, as defined by Bell 
(1999:3) as changes on property tax collections on account of the collection efficiency 
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measures, the extent to which the collections of tax have increased because of changes in tax 
liabilities. Table 11 in section 3.5.1 indicates that there have not been significant changes to 
the total amount of tax collected between the financial years 2001/02 to 2003/04. This was 
corroborated by a senior local authority official who indicated that the collection ratio stands 
at 60% (see section 4.3.1.1). 
The administrative dimension of property taxation within GCC, indicates that there is lack of 
political will to enforce the taxes as instanced by high defaults rates, as well as lack of 
technical proficiency at GCC to effect a valuation process, that is both transparent and 
insulated from political interference, by professionally-trained people in the employ of the city 
council. 
In concluding this section, the view presented in this thesis is that the current government 
policy on property taxation and administrative action fail to give local authorities the 
discretion to be innovative with taxes in order to improve their productivity. The tax system 
lacks an element of benefit-cost notion, a critical political-accountability mechanism for fiscal 
decentralisation reforms. However, lack of political will to increase the collection ratio of 
property taxes is traceable to the intergovernmental fiscal relation system as discussed m 
section 3.5.1 (see section 4.5.1 for applied illustration of budgets estimations). 
4.4 Public user charges 
There is a growing recognition of user-charges as alternative revenue sources for local 
governments. Public charges evince the principles of benefit and correspondence of 'prices 74 ' 
to services provided through the "willing-to-pay-for-particular-services" model (Bird, 1999) 
that implies such elements as the ability to pay and the willingness to pay for public services 
because consumers are charged explicitly. This, according to Bird (1999), ensures that public 
services are valued at marginal cost to citizens. For the purpose of this discussion it is 
important to note that functions of public charges are (Bailey, 1999: 132) to achieve allocative 
efficiency, raise revenue, cover the costs of service delivery, meet the financial targets (or 
required rate of return on asserts) and the need to target subsidy in the pursuit of equity. 
74 The use of the word charges as opposed to prices is a recognition of the administrative determination of 
payments rather than through the market forces (Bailey, 1999: 125). 
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It is nevertheless essential to acknowledge that the main economic rationale for user charges, 
is to promote economic efficiency with which the governments make use of resources, 
without necessarily promoting over-consumption of public services or under-pricing services 
financed through public finances. The major challenge in public charges is setting the right 
price, because of the public nature of services provided at municipal level which cannot be 
subjected to market forces. However, marginal-cost pricing is preferred in the public sector in 
order for the public services to be provided efficiently. However, there is no consensus on the 
best model in setting the right prices for public services (Bird, 1999). 
Economists who prefer charging for services in relation to costs, propose that prices be set 
equal to the long-run marginal costs, while those who favour charging services in relation to 
benefits are of the view that there is a requirement of accurate information of service costs and 
service take-up. On the basis of lack of consensus on the correct pricing mechanism, Bailey 
(1999: 129) concluded that "public choice theory has failed to integrate charging policy and 
practice into its own analytical framework". However, this does not rule out the significance 
of charging as an effective mechanism to achieve economic efficiency in the production costs 
and quality as well as quantity outputs of services. Such requires an increased input of 
consumers (Bailey, 1999: 136-137). User charges have been used successfully in the United 
States of America, more especially on services that are least discretionary, such as sewerage 
and refuse collection which households and business cannot do without (Bailey, 1999:143). 
Therefore, larger cities have a better chance to succeed in introducing user charges, more 
especially on those services that are tied to real properties. 
The Government of Botswana, through the Cost-Recovery Policy (1996), exhorted the 
municipal governments to introduce cost-recovery measures following the completion of the 
Report on the Second Presidential Commission on Local Government. The government of 
Botswana subsequently responded (vide the Report on the Second Presidential Commission 
Paper No. 1 of 2003 and the Local Government (District Councils) (Amendment) Act No. 18 
of 2004 as well as through the Township (Amendment) Act No. 20 of 2004). The Acts 
categorised the services upon which public charges are applicable into two. Second schedule 
of the amended Acts comprises of local public goods and services that municipal governments 
set user fees by way of bye-laws (which require an approval from the Minister of Local 
Government) while the third schedule lists local public goods and services that gives 
municipal governments the authority to set local public charges through council resolutions 
160 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(without having to consult with the MLG officials) (See Appendix 4). These include among 
others the plan-perusal and building-control services, sanitation services, sewer-connection 
services, sewerage services and water-connection services, as well as staff house rentals. 
According to the Botswana National Settlement Policy (1998:14) it is the government's policy 
thrust to recover all costs associated with the provision of services in all towns and recover 
part of the costs in villages with low average incomes. However, only a small portion of the 
costs have thus far been recovered in villages, including urban villages. As indicated in 
sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 councils have generally not taken advantage of user charges in 
order to achieve economic efficiency and allocative efficiency in the provision of local 
services. The report of the Second Presidential Commission on Local Government Structure 
in Botswana (2001 :49-55) established that local authorities set their public charges below the 
costs incurred by the authorities when providing services. They also poorly manage revenue 
sources such as the collection and custody of stray cattle. During the interview with officials 
at the KDC, it emerged that no user charges had been instituted since the introduction of the 
cost-recovery policy. A policy to this effect had been drafted although it had not been 
presented to the council for approval. By middle 2005, GCC had shown significant resolve to 
take advantage of strong real properties (houses) within the city by introducing user fees on 
services, tied to land and housing properties (See appendix 5). Such user fees include among 
others sewerage fees that residents and businesses cannot do without (the more infrastructure 
developments within the city the higher the revenues for the municipal government through 
user fees tied to land developments (more especially housing properties). 
The success of the implementation of cost recovery would be a major step towards achieving 
allocative efficiency and economic efficiency on local public services. In addition, effective 
user charges that are instituted with clear mechanisms of revenue collections and clear 
punitive measures for defaulters, would build strong political-accountability lines between 
residents and councillors. Until then it would be difficult to experience the positive spin-offs 
of fiscal decentralisation at local-government level through restrained local public sector 
expenditure, increased local revenues (allocative efficiency and economic efficiency) and 
active participation bi residents in local political decision making. It is thus concluded that 
local authorities in Botswana are generally lagging behind in instituting public charges, partly 
because of lack of political will but also because of limited administrative capacity, as 
indicated by the officials interviewed at three municipal governments. 
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4.5 Inter-governmental fiscal transfer mechanism 
Centrally-generated revenues distributed as Revenue Support Grants (RSG) constitute the 
largest amount of municipal revenues (both urban and rural) in Botswana. This is the most 
important aspect to scrutinise when analysing Botswana's fiscal decentralisation system, 
because nationally-determined financial transfers can be detrimental or facilitative to 
innovative financial management at municipal governments, by promoting good or, at worst, 
bad financial governance. The need to deconstruct or reconstruct the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers system is precipitated by the objective which it is intended to achieve. Theoretically, 
the mechanism takes into account the vertical imbalances between the national and local 
governments; horizontal inequality (inter-municipal socio-economic inequality); externalities; 
and finally the rightful sphere of government to administer taxes assigned. Achieving a 
balance between these competing and complementary factors is not too easy a task to achieve 
because "Local government structure is never at an ideal state" (Lotz in Ahmad, 1997: 185). In 
essence, the intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanism should always be in transition in 
order to remain relevant to the (a) local political changes; (b) socio-economic development 
(new needs at municipal level); and (c) changes in spatial distribution ofpopulations. Perhaps 
that is why Webb in 1912, as quoted by Foster, Jackson and Perlman (1980: 173), remarked 
that grants cause "chaos which practically no one understands". 
Botswana deliberately chose a centralised taxing system in order to achieve an equitable 
distribution of nationally-raised revenues to all districts. To achieve such an objective requires 
of the government to have established basic expenditure needs, as well as the revenue-raising 
capacity of each municipality in order to ensure that the financial transfers from the national 
government closely mirrors the 'needs-capacity gap' at local government. This is meant to 
avoid pure grant financing of local governments, which is counter-productive to good 
financial management and accountable governance at municipal level. To make informed 
conclusions on the economic inefficiency or efficiency of Botswana's intergovernmental 
transfer mechanism, the discussion briefly analyses the budget variables at local government 
level below. 
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4.5.1 Budgeting at local governments 
Despite political statements made and governments' written policies and strategies on fiscal 
decentralisation and its intended objectives, a major indication of the 'actual and political 
aims' of the government are quite deducible from the budgeting dynamics at municipal level. 
Reference is thus made to the case studies in sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. 
(i) Estimated Expenditures vis-a-vis Actual Expenditures: There is a clear trend of 
overestimation of expenditure requirements by District Councils to justify 
increased transfers of RSGs from the national government. During the financial 
years 2002/03 and 2003/04 KgDC overestimated its expenditure requirements by 
23.17% and 50.05% respectively. For three consecutive years, KDC as well 
overestimated its expenditure requirements for the same reasons. During the 
financial years 2001/02, 2002/03 and 2003/04 KDC overestimated its budgetary 
needs against the actual expenditures as follows: 15.11%, 10% and 16.32% 
respectively. This practice is not only confined to two District Councils but quite 
widespread. This is highlighted in the Audit Report and Accounts of the South 
East District Council, Office of the Auditor General (2000:4). On the other hand, 
GCC slightly underestimated its budgetary needs for all the three financial years, 
2001102-2003/04 possibly because of unexpected sharp increases in health-related 
expenditures (see appendix 6). 
(ii) Estimated own revenues vis-a-vis actual revenues: in order to attract as much 
RSGs from the national government, District Councils underestimated their 
projected internally generated revenues. For the two financial years (2001/02-
2002/03) KgDC underestimated expected flows of internally generated revenues 
by over 32% and 26% respectively. The same practice is replicated in KDC. (See 
Annexure 6). On the other, GCC in most cases overestimated expected flows of 
own revenues because of a high default rate on property taxes, service levies, as 
well as on BMLs, which were not recovered from the residents within the planned 
financial years. 
163 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(iii) Estimated RSG vis-a-vis Actual RSG: Of all three Districts, KgDC is the only 
one which made overly-optimistic estimations on RSGs from the national 
government, ranging between 17% and over 42% (See Annexure 6). 
These three variables of budgeting provide better insights of analysing Botswana's 
intergovernmental fiscal relations system. First of all, a wide vertical fiscal imbalance 
between the national and municipal governments creates what Pisauro (2001 :5) calls the 
common pool problem. According to Pisauro (2001 :8) this phenomenon arises as a result of 
the "mere presence" of the national government at municipal level through financial transfers 
that have "an insurance element" directly affecting budgetary decision making at grassroots 
governments. This insurance element and, at worst, the "bailout element" exposes the 
intergovernmental fiscal relation system to a "moral hazard" or fiscal indiscipline (Pisauro, 
2001 :8). 
This is quite evident in the three case studies above. The deliberate overestimation of 
budgetary needs, inflated RSGs needs and the persistent underestimation of projected 
internally generated revenues within municipalities, are major syndromes of the common-pool 
problem in Botswana. These syndromes in turn generate the soft-budget constraint in local 
governments budgeting. According to Pisauro (2001 :8) this constraint occurs when local 
authorities do not take into account the "true social marginal cost of taxation but rather choose 
an excessive level of expenditure"75 . 
Increased spending on dependency-syndrome generating components of programmes such as 
RADP (food rations or food give outs) rather than on the community-development 
components, which will help ease local spending once local residents are empowered to 
sustain their lives, indicates that councils prioritise "black-hole spending". That is, councils 
prefer to spend more on goods and services that increase with time rather than slow down 
spending, because the higher the rate of poverty rates, as a result of poverty inducing 
spending, the faster the rate of spending on such expenditure items. The major thrust of 
RADP is to empower local communities to sustain, themselves rather than encourage a 
dependency syndrome. On account of the fact that most local spending is funded from the 
75 Kgatleng District Council decided to buy an expensive BMW X5 for the Council Secretary at the expense of 
other deserving development projects. 
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centre, there are no incentives for local governments to take into account the true social 
marginal cost of taxation. 
The overall consequence of the soft-budget constraint has been incremental budgeting at 
municipal governments, increased spending on entitlement-oriented programmes and the 
purchase of unnecessarily costly motor vehicles. The outcomes of the soft-budget constraint 
are indicated by very optimistic expectations of RSGs from the national government by the 
council from one financial year to another; lack of political-will to enforce the cost-recovery 
policy on such revenue-raising sources as the property taxation in urban areas and other 
internal sources 76as well as the under-utilisation of traditional revenue sources such as 
matimela, for the reason that there is not a standard requirement for marginal revenues at 
municipal level. There is no incentive either on the part of local authorities to optimise own 
revenues, because RSGs in most cases exceed the annual expenditure requirements for district 
councils (See sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2; 3.5.3 and appendix 6). 
The impact of a common pool problem in Botswana is manifested in many ways at municipal 
government level as indicated above. Notably, the fly-paper effect is quite evident. Empirical 
evidence in sections 3.5.1; 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 consistently indicate that aid from the national 
government significantly increases local expenditures, while lowering own revenues (refer to 
tables 10, 15, 16 and 21). Deller and Maher (2005:213) define the fly paper effect as "the 
phenomenon where increases in unconditional aid have a stimulatory effect on recipient 
government expenditures greater than equivalent changes in personal income". Thus, the fly-
paper effect literature compares with the fiscal decentralism view that local governments are 
more likely to restrain their spending when their own revenues constitute a larger share of 
total spending. The opposite is correct when aid from the central government maintains a 
positive trend. Therefore, this thesis holds the view that increased spending at municipal level 
is a reflection of increasing aid from the centre through RSGs. 
One of the major setbacks of RSGs in Botswana, is the absence of a transparent formula that 
informs the vertical transfer mechanism. In the mean-time GoB has extensively applied an ad 
hoc transfer mechanism that largely reflects the availability of centrally-raised revenues on an 
annual basis. This arrangement, while providing the central government with the maximum 
76 See Reports of the Office of the Auditor General (Audits and Accounts of the Jwaneng Town Council, 
2002:66; Audits and Accounts of the Gaborone City Council, 2002:) 
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flexibility to ensure a balanced, and in most cases surplus budgets at the national level, it 
compromises the medium-term economic planning and informed budgeting at municipal 
governments because (a) there is no transparent and predictable formula that can be relied 
upon for long-term planning and budgeting at local government; (b) there is great 
uncertainties at local governments every financial year, and that is why the difference between 
the estimated financial expenditures and actual expenditures differs markedly. The Ministry of 
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) uses this system to reduce the RSGs allocated 
local authorities mid-way through the year to balance projected budget deficits at the national 
level. In the process there is an inevitable disruption of locally-planned activities and 
programmes. This concern was raised more often than during the interviews with local 
governments' officials. 
It is intriguing to note that, despite a concern by local authorities about inadequate finances to 
carry out their statutory mandates, there is a general trend of unspent revenues at the end of 
the financial years, as reflected in the General Fund. Whilst it was not possible to get the latest 
data on the amount revenues in the general fund, the report of the Second Presidential 
Commission on Local Government Structure in Botswana indicated that all councils 
harboured P73 702 243.44 during the 2000/01 financial year. GCC, KgDC and KDC each had 
over P20 000 000, PI 500 000 and P7 200 000 respectively. Officials at the ministry of local 
government stated that this trend has not subsided. Nevertheless, it is important to state that 
unspent revenues at the end of the financial years, are as a result of lack of a transparent 
transfer system, as well as poor institutional capacity at local government which indicates a 
poor fiscal decentralisation strategy that does not take into account the capacity of local 
authorities to allocate expenditure responsibilities, as well as allocating revenues from the 
centre. 
In the overall, the current fiscal transfer system impedes good financial management and 
realistic budgeting at local government level. In fact, as Martin (1982) (adapted from Watson 
and Hassett, 2003:87) agued, the precursors of serious financial problems are overly 
optimistic projections. Botswana's local authorities exhibit syndromes of poor availability of 
information for budgetary decision making. Crucial information for budgetary decision 
making and good financial management is undermined by the non-observance of the core 
management functions such as strategic planning, performance measurement and program 
evaluation that have never been carried out. In fact, none of the councils under study had a 
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strategic fiscal plan. The trio are referred to as the 'manage by fact' due to the 'nearly perfect' 
budgetary decision-making (own citation). 
In concluding this section, it is important to draw attention to the view that the common pool 
problem in Botswana's vertical intergovernmental transfer, manifests itself in several but 
interrelated ways. The soft-budget constraint encourages incremental spending at municipal 
level without giving attention to areas of priority. Municipal governments are tempted to 
attract as much RSGs as possible, in order to allocate more resources to the already existing 
programmes. In addition, elements of innovative financial management, as well as 
decentralised budgeting process are dulled by RSGs that are not transparent and predictable 
over time. Thus the spending decisions and revenue-generating efforts are influenced by aid 
from the centre, hence the fly-paper effect. 
4.5.2 Development budgeting at local government levef7 
Local governments' development/capital spending constitutes a significant portion of 
Botswana's national budgets. Local development spending is I 00% funded through 
conditional grants by the national government. Due to inadequate information, the discussion 
briefly analyses the implementation of the Labour Intensive Public Works Programme 
(LIPWP) at municipal level. LIPWP is generally a voluntary programme deliberately created 
to cushion the effects of drought on affected communities country-wide. This programme has 
significantly been transformed from a relief programme into an accelerated implementation 
mechanism for planned projects as contained in the District Development Plans (DDPs). 
Because drought is declared almost every year in Botswana, the implementation of LIPWP 
has become almost a normal and annual development phenomenon at municipal government 
level. 
The operational costs of LIPWP, including wages and salaries, are funded by the government 
at the centre. Local authorities prepare project memorandums for approval at MLG. Such 
memorandums are expected to contain a significant number of projects from DDPs and any 
77 When this thesis was being finalised, a draft evaluation report or a performance audit report on drought relief 
LIPWP by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) (Botswana) was being finalised. The findings of the report 
mirrored the general view held by this thesis on LIPWP. However, the report could not be used as a reference 
because it was not yet published for public consumption. The report is written by Mr. Zachariah Kwada for 
OAG. 
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other projects as specified by a directive from the Office of the President declaring the 
implementation of LIPWP. The programme is expected to last for a duration not exceeding 12 
months, although this hardly ever happens. 
During a workshop organised by MLG for councils to draft the implementing guidelines of 
LIPWP, several issues emerged. Firstly, a significant number of nonviable projects were 
implemented through the programme, more specifically large community halls in small 
settlements. Such halls are seldom utilised and have turned into white elephants. Yet, there are 
outstanding development projects across the country that have not been implemented as a 
result of 'lack of financial resources'. Secondly, MLG does have criteria to distribute the total 
pool of revenue allocated to it by the Ministry of Finance. During an interview, local officials 
quizzed the method used by MLG to allocate them development funds for the LIPWP. 
Officials from MLG also acknowledged that there is no clearly-established criterion to 
distribute drought relief funds among district councils. It appears that the revenues allocated 
to councils through the LIPWP reflect the historical priorities of the programme rather than 
the current priorities. Thirdly, there is inadequate commitment from the councils to implement 
approved projects within the time and cost, as indicated in the project memorandums, because 
the government is often compelled to release more funds to ensure such projects. 
To illustrate that LIPWP funds were utilised without regards to the notions of efficiency. 
effectiveness and economy a national coordinator of the drought LIPWP stated that during the 
2005/06 financial year, the drought unit in Kasane (Chobe district) procured building 
materials from as far as Gabane in KDC. For unknown reasons council officials went beyond 
Francistown, the nearest primary centre (see appendix 1 for Kasane and Gabane). Because 
councils are not expected to contribute anything to the projects financed through LIPWP, they 
tend to give little, if any, attention. As a result of uneconomic spending of funds released for 
LIPWP projects, MLG incurs high administrative costs in an effort to monitor the activities 
and progress of the programme. Although there was no data to verify this assertion, the 
frequency of trips by MLG officials to district councils. as well as the nature of decisions they 
have to take on specific projects, indicate their level of involvement. For example, MLG have 
had to instruct councils to abandon certain projects because they were no longer viable to 
undertake because they were badly initiated. 
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Time and cost over-runs characterise projects implemented through LIPWP. Following an 
analysis of cost and time overruns in KDC and KgDC it was established that excessive 
spending and poor cost effectiveness were effected in the implementation of projects 
undertaken through LIPWP. The grants, in reality, were based on ex post costs because cost 
overruns were a common phenomenon. 
In concluding this section, the thesis suggests that because of lack of political ownership of 
LIPWP the programmes appear to have most of the disadvantages of conditional grants. These 
include high administrative costs incurred by MLG through the monitoring mechanisms, as 
well as poor cost-effectiveness and excessive spending. This is not justifiable in view of the 
fact that municipal governments have considerable infrastructure backlog owing to limited 
resources to undertake projects proposed by their constituents (as contained in the 
Urban/District/National Development Plans. This is an illustration of centralised-determined 
spending decisions, funded through non-matching conditional grants. Such grants do not have 
an element of political commitment because there are literally no incentives to be cost-
effective, as there is a guarantee that incomplete projects would finally be funded by the 
national government. Local authorities do not account for projects as they often blame the 
national government for under-funding the programme. Hence the discussion concludes that 
inappropriately-designed grants are counterproductive to allocative efficiency, decentralised 
planning and budgeting, as well innovative ways of achieving more public outputs with fewer 
or limited inputs. 
4.6 Institutional framework 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1999:26) (quoted from Pisauro, 
2001 : 11) a good institutional framework for intergovernmental fiscal relations defines the 
powers and responsibilities of each sphere of governments based "on stable principles and/or 
agreed formulae and that they should be clearly stated". Spelling out the powers, functions 
and responsibilities of each sphere of government is not always explicit. It in most cases 
reflects the macroeconomic stance and philosophy of the government that may rope in or side-
line different policy actors in economic decision-making. The policy-making process, role and 
influence that different actors harbour in local policy-making may significantly facilitate fiscal 
decentralisation through the active role and inputs of local politicians on local issues whilst 
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over-interference of central government officials and politicians may seriously undermine the 
purpose for which fiscal decentralisation reforms were initiated. 
In addition, the institutional capacity as well as the manner with which financial transfers are 
determined, impacts on the spending behaviour and efforts of municipal government to 
generate own revenues. Finally, the intergovernmental transfer mechanism and the role 
players involved in determining and allocating grants to municipal governments impact on the 
extent to which fiscal decentralisation achieves its envisaged objectives. 
An extensive discussion of the theory of central-local relations by Blom-Hansen (1999) about 
the interaction of the three types of policy actors serves as aid to understanding of the 
institutional framework and its implications on municipal financial management. According 
to Blo-Hansen (1999:237) the policy actors in central-local relations is constituted by the 
"expenditure advocates", "expenditure guardians" and "topocrats" "whose abilities to pursue 
their self-interests are constrained and facilitated by the structure of the inter-governmental 
policy networks" (Blom-Hansen, 1999:238). Topocrats 78represent the views and interests of 
local government within the policy-making process, while expenditure advocates who in most 
cases form "professional bureaucratic complexes" are interested in increased sector-specific 
expenditures and policy through new public programmes, as well as the expansion of funding 
for existing programmes. On the other hand, expenditure guardians are more concerned with 
constrained public expenditure and public sector activities in the interest of macroeconomic 
control (Blom-Hansen, 1999:239-241). 
Botswana's central-local relations in policy-making certainly resemble the tendencies of 
macroeconomic control at the expense of the two other policy actors. The central government 
is capable of maintaining its control over local government decision-making (policy-making) 
due to a highly-centralised economic planning and management; inadequate capacity of the 
local authorities to run their affairs or assigned functions on their own without recourse to the 
national government for assistance. In fact, the expenditure responsibilities of local authorities 
have been expanded regardless of their constrained capacity to perform those already assigned 
prior to the newer ones; lack of political will to actualise the initiatives aimed at ensuring that 
local authorities play a significant role in the economy; vested political interests in local 
78 
'topocrats' is from the Greek, topos, meaning place or locality. Kratos means authority. Beer as referred by 
Blom-Hansen, 1999:239). 
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affairs by the national government to maintain its political influence. In fact, one government 
official stated that the national government does not want to let go of the councils, because of 
the political repercussions that may not work in favour of the sitting government or vested 
national government officials' interests in local government affairs to amass their power and 
influence at municipal government level. 
It is therefore reasonable to argue that the more the dominant role of the actor, the more the 
political system pursues this actor's policy goals. Blom-Hansen (1999:243) is quoted 
describing this phenomenon as follows: 
"Formally, the policy goals of the weak actor may be adhered to, since these may be 
legitimate, but the pursuance of such goals easily turns into symbolic politics". President 
Festus Mogae of the Republic of Botswana is quoted as saying that "local authorities must 
start sharing costs of development and other services with consumers and beneficiaries" 
(Quoted from Maundeni, 2004: 19). However, the government through a White Paper on the 
Second Presidential Commission of Local Government Structure in Botswana, Government 
Paper No. 1 (2003 :35) rejected a recommendation by the SPCLGS that advised the 
government to repel a statutory authority of the Minister of Local Government to approve 
Council bye-laws. The approval of bye-laws on property rates have a negative impact on the 
political significance of property rates, because they do not necessarily reflect the local 
political decision making that can be challenged by local communities but that of the national 
government. 
GoB's policy goals, with regard to the development of local government as an important tier 
of government for economic development, have been explicitly expressed in almost all NDPs 
policy documents, albeit without deterministic approach to actualise their role. The minister of 
Finance and Development Planning remarked that "Government remains committed to the 
principle of decentralisation to the Local Authorities and communities to ensure that they 
have effective control over their destiny and are held accountable for their actions" (Budget 
Speech, 2004: 16). Despite this assertion by the minister, the government rejected a further 
recommendation by the SPCLGSB that suggested that municipalities be acknowledged as 
autonomous governments established and created through a constitutional clause (White 
Paper on the Second Presidential Commission of Local Government Structure in Botswana, 
Government Paper No. 1, 2003:35). 
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"Since actors cannot be expected to be altruistic, it is crucial who makes the balancing act. 
and this is where the structure becomes important. Policy networks may be so closed that 
some actors are virtually organised out of politics, while others are organised in. Structure 
thus constrains or facilitates the actors' pursuit of interests" (Blom-Hansen, 1999:242). This 
is a fair refection of the multi-year development budgeting in Botswana that appears to 
extensively involve councils in the drafting of the DDPs!UDPs, yet these policy documents 
reflect the views and aspirations of the local authorities from a national perspective (see 
section 3.4.1). 
The determination of intergovernmental transfers lacks transparency. This is worsened by the 
fact that each ministry funds or finances development projects at municipal level that are 
under its mandate. Notwithstanding this, MLG coordinates all activities of other ministries at 
municipal level. This ,more often than not, creates confusion and conflicts because various 
ministries interpret policies differently. For example, all ministries fund the functional 
activities that they have decentralised, such as the roads department and the Ministry of 
Health for HIV I AIDS activities. The Office of the President (OP) is the overall national 
coordinator of disaster management, although it has decentralised a significant portion of 
disaster activities to municipal level. OP expects all municipal governments to integrate 
disaster management into their development planning, in order to prevent, mitigate, and be 
prepared to respond, should a disaster strike. Local authorities in turn expect OP to fund all 
the disaster-management-related activities and create a unit at municipal level solely 
responsible for this function. Municipal governments expect OP to fund the commemoration 
of the international disaster day at local government level as an awareness programme. Local 
authorities are not prepared to undertake these activities, because they consider them as 
unfunded mandates. MLG appears to be of the same view. This illustrates that one concept 
can be understood differently by different stakeholders and eventually undermine the reasons 
for which the decentralisation reforms were undertaken. 
Moreover, the funding mechanism for such departments as that of roads at municipal 
government level, does not reflect genuine decentralisation. SPCLGSB had recommended that 
funding that was intended for roads construction should be allocated to councils at the 
beginning of each financial years in order to facilitate forward planning rather than the current 
practice of disbursing funds in blocks whenever they are available. The government rejected 
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this recommendation as well on the basis that such funds are released whenever they are 
available (White Paper on the Second Presidential Commission of Local Government 
Structure in Botswana, Government Paper No. 1, 2003:35). 
Finally, the employment, development and promotion of local governments' permanent (and 
critical) staff by the national agencies, as well as the replication of nationally developed 
training programmes, do not augur well for the development of autonomous local 
governments that should account to the electorates without blaming their failures on centrally-
developed programmes. The rollout of the Work Improvement Teams (WITs) and the recent 
Performance Management System (PMS) (meant to promote employees' productivity in the 
work place) bear testimony to a centrally-controlled local public sector. Both programmes 
were implemented at the national level and later replicated at municipal government level, 
without having been necessarily tailor made for the environment prevailing at the 
districts/urban councils. It is therefore, not strange that WITs did not achieve its intended 
objectives. (Kaunda, 2004). It is also justifiable that there are some scepticism as to whether 
PMS would bring any positive changes to local governments including the councillors 
(Botswana Press Agency, 2006: 1-3). Lack of institutional capacity ?? a clear initiatives by the 
government to build institutional capacity at municipal government is a drawback for fiscal 
decentralisation. 
The discussion above represents some of the indications of an overly-controlled local public 
sector. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that the list has been exhausted. The execution of 
capital and/or development projects that are funded through specific transfers and the setting 
of fees on their behalf by the sectoral ministries leave the district and urban councils with no 
power and authority to direct their developmental trajectories but rather to observe the 
instructions from the centre without taking into consideration the financial implications 
against their governments in the long-term. This finding is corroborated by the Report of the 
Second Presidential Commission on the Local Government Structure in Botswana (2001 :23, 
30-31). 
This discussion thus concludes, on the basis of available data, that the institutional framework 
defining the interactions between the national and local government indicates an element of 
grandmotherly government that interferes on almost every aspect of local affairs. This is even 
more pronounced in local government policy making (more especially the preparation of 
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DDPs/UDPs) as well as the appointment of a large number of councillors without 
constituencies to represent. This undermines the notion of political accountability and 
democracy as major sine qua non for legitimate governments that strive to serve the 
preferences of their constituents accordingly within the limited resources at their disposal. 
This does not embody fiscal decentralisation that is aimed at inducing innovation in the 
delivery of local public goods and services as well as finding the most innovative means of 
generating significant revenues for their governments in order to perform their statutory 
functions efficiently. Hence this situation effectively being described as fiscal decentralisation 
. . 
m regressiOn. 
4. 7 Summary and deductions 
In order to make an objective measurement of the performance of local government within the 
period under study (NDP8 and NDP9) reference is made to the objectives that the Ministry of 
Local government had set to achieve at local government level. 
Firstly: Budgeting has not been decentralised to the municipal governments because they still 
rely heavily on financial transfers from the centre. The transfers lack elements of revenue 
certainty and predictability in the short and the long term. Thus forward and informed 
budgeting is not practical at municipal government level, due to the absence of a transparent 
formula that distributes revenues according to a standardised formula that is known to all role 
players. This means that municipal governments prepare their budgets on a trial-and-error 
basis and, at most, their budgetary estimations reflect the rule of thumb rule, because each 
expenditure item appears to be attracting increasing revenues (incremental budgeting) on an 
annual basis without any sign of redirecting revenues to newer demands and challenges 
brought about by increased populations and the phenomenon of urbanisation; 
Secondly: Extensive use of specific transfers leaves local authorities without the authority 
over their development budget. Such programmes as the labour-intensive, public-works 
programme has been implemented since the 1980s, but local authorities have not perfected 
their capacity to deliver it according to the expectations of the electorates and the national 
government. Lack of cost-effectiveness and good time management are traceable to the 
extensive use of non-matching specific grants, because such projects, although designed to 
benefit local governments implementation have not been integrated into municipal 
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governments' organisational structures. Lack of political ownership of this programme also 
contributes to significant time and cost overruns. This in turn has primed MLG's officials to 
spend more time enquiring about physical and financial reports concerning projects 
implemented through LIPWP. This is a costly exercise; 
Thirdly: The capacity of the local authorities to implement their assigned statutory functions 
remains far behind the sophisticated nature of their expenditure-assigned functions, because 
increase of functional assignments was not complemented by improved local institutional 
capacity; 
Fourthly: Lack of revenue-raising effort and limited avenues of generating revenues from 
local communities impede the development and role of Community-Based Organisation 
(CBOs) and/or civil society in local economic development, because there is nothing 
motivating them to participate in the development of their areas. High default rates of SHHA 
loan repayments in urban areas as well free services like water and garbage collection in rural 
areas have resulted in a weak civil society (creating a dependency syndrome at local level). 
This situation has blunted an element of local political accountability in Botswana's fiscal 
decentralisation strategy because even chargeable services that have low technicity levels are 
provided at no cost to the communities, as if they are social goods and services 
(displacement); 
Fifthly: National aid from the centre has a fly-paper effect on local government spending and 
revenue generation. Increase in grants from the centre has had a complementary impact on the 
spending patterns of municipal government, yet is restraining their revenue-raising efforts and 
actual revenues; 
Sixthly: Lack of data on expenditure needs and revenue-raising capacity per municipality have 
resulted in inequitable distribution of nationally-generated resources to councils. Highly 
populated districts, which happen to be urbanised, benefited most from the fiscal transfers, 
because the determination of aid is predominantly based on the overall population of each 
district, rather than on the fiscal capacity and expenditure needs of each locality. This 
promoted elements of dependency syndrome among residents and dulled councils not to find 
innovative ways of generating own revenues because aid from the national government often 
exceeded their total expenditure at the end of financial years; 
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Seventhly: The demarcation of sub-districts, administrative districts and service centres 
benefits larger villages (district and sub-district headquarters) at the expense of smaller 
settlements, because the former continue to attract more development funds yet such funds are 
generally assumed to be equally benefiting the entire district. This means that there is 
centralist approach to decentralisation within districts. That is, districts fail to serve the 
different preferences of their constituents within their large jurisdictional areas. Allocative 
efficiency, targeted cost recovery and redistribution of nationally-generated resources are 
difficult to achieve because there is inadequate decentralisation within districts79; 
Eightly: Government tax policy choices on property taxation undermine the revenue 
productivity, simplicity, equity and neutrality of urban taxation to the extent that the 
administrative action (the amount of tax collected or collection ratio, coverage ratio and 
valuation ration) was below the economic potential of the urban areas; 
Ninethly: The appointment of a large number of unelected councillors undermines good 
governance and democracy because the criterion for such an exercise is known only to the 
minister responsible for local government. This is counterproductive to the notion of fiscal 
decentralisation that views political accountability to constituents as a reflection of thriving 
democracy, when it engages politicians and their voters-cum-tax payers on issues of interest 
to both parties; and 
Tenthly: There is extensive involvement of national government on local government affairs 
through policy making that gives them an upper hand on issues that can better be addressed by 
local authorities such as the employment, training and promotion of local personnel by central 
structures as well as the preparation of local development plans that largely mirror the 
perception of national government on the critical development challenges of municipal 
governments. The presence of District Commissioners (DCs ), as overall coordinators for the 
preparation and implementation of DDPs, undermines the philosophy of autonomous local 
authorities as tiers of governments accountable to their electorates, as opposed to the current 
79 It must be noted that for decentralisation to be effective there has to be limited differences of tastes within a 
defined jurisdiction, as well as large differences between two demarcated jurisdictions. This is applicable to 
large districts that have characteristics of urbanised and rural regions within their statutory boundaries. 
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arrangement where they account to employees ofthe national government (DCs) (see section 
1.2.1); 
Finally: Local authorities cannot account for the financial resources in their custody because 
they continue to fail to produce their audited accounts in time as a result of lack of political 
will and incapacity because of limited human resources (See Appendix 7). This does not 
reflect well on municipal governments as tiers of government that can be entrusted with more 
responsibilities and more financial powers to generate and manage financial resources for the 
benefit of their communities through good governance practices. 
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CHAPTERS 
REINVIGORATING BOTSWANA'S INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL 
RELATIONS SYSTEM: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The analysis presented in this thesis has thus far generated an inter-related set of findings and 
conclusions that could be instrumental in reinvigorating the current intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in Botswana. 
5.2 Summary 
Firstly: The discussion found that the current institutional framework of Botswana's 
intergovernmental system exhibits an element of an over-regulated public sector that inhibits 
and constrains own initiative at local government level. This, the national government 
maintains: 
• through centralised economic planning that constrains the role of municipal 
governments in the economic developments oftheir localities; 
• by ensuring that policy making at municipal level is unduly influenced from the centre 
through the appointment of unelected councillors by the minister responsible for Local 
Government as well as by the presence and influential role of DCs; 
• through an intergovernmental structure that places influential authority in the hands of 
government officials, more especially those in the Ministries of Local Government and 
Finance and Development Planning at local government decision-making level. Thus 
furthering their vested bureaucratic interests at the expense of genuine decentralisation 
that could have brought about the management of own affairs at local government 
level; 
• through an ambiguous definition of the roles of District and Urban Councils in various 
sectors of the economy, as well as the role of the government ministries at municipal 
level. This undermines coordinated approaches to decentralisation at the expense of 
the autonomy of local authorities; 
• through lack of institutional capacity building m municipal governments which 
translates in failure to implement all assigned functional responsibilities without 
assistance from the central government; and 
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• through a centralist approach to fiscal decentralisation, with grandmotherly tendencies 
by the national government towards municipal governments on matters of local policy 
making. 
Secondly: The fiscal transfer mechanism is done on an ad hoc basis. The oscillatory nature of 
fiscal transfers from the centre is such that local authorities cannot objectively prognosticate 
the expected Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) on an annual basis or for the six-year 
development planning period. In fact, the government officials confirmed that there is 
currently no formula for the determination of vertical and horizontal equalisation transfers. 
The fiscal transfers are determined incrementally at the beginning of every financial year. 
This arrangement results in: 
• ineffective multi-year budgeting or fiscal rules-driven budgeting that relies on unstable 
intergovernmental transfers that inhibit long-term planning at municipal level; 
• budgeting at municipal level that is not based on revenue certainty and security from 
the central government. As a result local authorities do not have room to exercise their 
innovative discretions to ensure that such financial transfers have a net direct 
additionality impact on local spending rather than an indirect net additionality impact, 
as is the case currently; 
• the absence of strategic fiscal policy within municipal governments; 
• incremental budgeting that at most creates optimistic expectations at local 
governments about the amount of potential transfers from the centre. In short, finances 
do not follow functions; 
• high welfarism and an element of entitlement at district and urban councils, because 
the transfers do not take into consideration their capacities to generate own revenues. 
In fact Revenue Support Grants are greater than municipal budgets in some district 
councils, leaving them without any incentive to optimise their effort to finance their 
statutory functions. It is for this reason that municipal expenditures on social services 
that are not development oriented increases with time; 
• RSGs mechanism that is outdated and irrelevant to the current developmental stages of 
most, if not all, district and urban councils; 
• soft-budget constraints in local government budgeting as indicated by budget surpluses 
and significant unspent revenues in the general fund; and 
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• fly-paper effect on local government spending and restrained generation of own 
revenues. 
Thirdly: The expenditure assignment of functional responsibilities is one-size-fits-all for all 
municipalities, large and small. The expenditure assignments fail to categorise municipalities 
according to their human and potential financial capacities. The national government has not 
established the expenditure needs of each local government and thus they are not categorised 
according to their peculiar characteristics that may constrain or optimise their financial and 
human resources capacity to implement efficiently their statutory and permissive expenditure 
assignments. As a result: 
• the government is not in a better position to classify municipalities according to their 
budgetary or expenditure needs to deliver their mandates efficiently; 
• there is increased utilisation of welfare services that are not development oriented, 
even in areas that do not need increased expenditures on such services, because of 
their constituents' access to the economic opportunities that could sustain their 
livelihood; 
• expenditure assignments do not reflect the economic or development status, nor the 
level of urbanisation within the localities. As a result the spending decisions or 
municipal governments do not reflect the contradictory needs, tastes and preferences 
of residents within different regions of municipal governments. Large urban villages 
obviously have different preferences when compared to those of smaller settlements. 
This means that sub-national spending is centralised; 
• the joint provision of such services as internal and tertiary roads is not subsidised in 
favour of local authorities because of lack of capacity-building initiatives for the 
benefit of all municipal governments. There is as well a duplication of efforts and 
inefficiency in the provision of water by up to three different authorities within the 
same areas80· 
' 
80 There are inconsistencies in the supply of water, in part- reflecting such factors as the capacity constraints on 
the part of municipalities, historical and institutional mandates and boundaries demarcating districts. Four 
authorities are involved in the supply of water within a small area. Water Utilities Corporation supplies the 
Greater Gaborone, Department of Water Affairs supplies Tlokweng in the South East District and Mogoditshane 
in the Kweneng District, while Kweneng District Council supplies Gabane, Mmopane and Metsimotlhabe. 
Kgatleng District supplies Morwa, Oodi and others within the district. See Appendix Ill Map 2 for these areas. 
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• the assignment of expenditure assignments is not concomitant with their financial and 
human resources capacity, but a reflection of the national government's expectations 
from them; and 
• there is significant mcrease of local spending which is incrementally driven by 
significant increases of government's aid to local authorities. 
Fourthly, the analysis found that local own revenues are too limited to finance their own 
affairs without recourse to the national government for financial assistance. The insignificance 
of internally-generated revenues has created grant economies at local government level. All 
districts councils depend on a centrally-generated and administered tax system, while urban 
councils have access to property taxation. The discussion thus concludes that: 
• the local government revenue reforms did not take into account the capacity of the 
districts/urban councils to exploit the widened revenue sources and that is why their 
willingness to utilise such revenue sources assigned to them has not been fruitful. 
(incompetence and incapacity). Refer to Appendix 4 for local government revenue 
reforms; 
• while sources of local revenues are limited to finance local government functional 
expenditures, local authorities lack political will to maximise revenue sources at their 
disposal because national grants are more than enough to cover their budgetary needs; 
• centrally-transferred revenues at most reflect the aspirations of national policies at the 
expense of the local governments; 
• the significance of urban property taxation is small partly as a result of national 
government's insensitivity to the right of access to this revenue source on time and 
without unnecessary delays from the central political powers; 
• the insignificance of property taxation as a local political tool is a disincentive to the 
active participation of local residents in the affairs of their governments without 
unnecessarily resorting to the involvement of national political representatives to solve 
small local issues that could be better left to the elected members of municipal 
governments; 
• lack of a stable sources of own revenues and revenue certainty thereof, remams a 
major incentive for under spending at municipal level. This is exacerbated by the aim 
of generating more interests for the councils on unspent end-of-year surpluses; and 
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• cost recovery or public charges have not been institutionalised at municipal level. 
Such services as garbage collection are funded through transfers from the national 
government in district councils. This is called displacement of intergovernmental 
transfers. 
5.3 Conclusion81 
Overall, the discussion did not deny the effort that the Government of Botswana has invested 
in signifying the role of the local government as an important partner in delivering public 
services to the people of Botswana, rich and poor. However, the discussion concludes that the 
common pool approach to intergovernmental fiscal transfers and the soft-budget constraint 
impacts created grant economies that pork-barrel local welfare policy is not development 
oriented, but in turn heighten an element of entitlement from the councils as well as their 
politically unprovoked constituents. This more often than not comes at a high cost, as a result 
of high economic inefficiencies that are generated by an incomprehensive and outdated fiscal 
decentralisation system governing the relations between the national and local governments in 
Botswana. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the institutional framework is not conducive to 
a successful implementation of fiscal decentralisation reforms that would ensure that local 
authorities enjoy the same privilege or even more privilege from local policy making. The 
determination of RSGs for each municipal government is also not supporting truly 
decentralised spending. There is, as well, considerable revenue uncertainty, because the total 
amount of transfers fluctuates frequently on an annual basis. Finally, lack of data on 
expenditure needs and a limited revenue raising capacity in each locality complicates the 
determination of fiscal transfers that are due to municipal government. 
5.4 Recommendations 
It is recommended that the following, with regards to the institutional framework, 
intergovernmental financial transfers, expenditure assignments and local internal revenues 
should be implemented, in order to bring about economic efficiency, political accountability 
81 The thesis did not discuss borrowing at municipal government as an important instrument of developing local 
development because this is outside the scope of the discussion. However, this is an important factor in local 
government finance therefore more research should be done on this issue because it may unlock the much needed 
and untapped private capital into urban cities' development projects that are in backlog. 
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and achievement of the envisaged objectives, as outlined m section 4: 4.1 above, m an 
innovative fashion. 
5.4.1 Institutional framework 
In order to ensure an autonomous local government tier m Botswana, that is politically 
accountable and efficiently run (economically), this thesis recommends that a comprehensive 
redesign of the intergovernmental relations be put in place. The following should be observed 
when carrying out such a politically-sensitive process: 
• the government should set a specific time-frame to devolve more decision-making to 
local authorities, without unnecessary interference from the centre, more especially on 
statutory functions and finances assigned to them. Such an arrangement operates 
practically within an environment where the right of existence of each tier of 
government is established and circumscribed. Hence, it is recommended that local 
governments should be creatures of the Constitution of Botswana with their statutory 
functions clearly outlined and differentiated from those of the national government. 
This will ensure that there is integration and coordination of functions as well as 
adaptability of the local authorities on changing circumstances that have governmental 
and financial implications; and 
• local governments' budgets should be separated from that of the Ministry of Local 
Government in the national budget speech. This will allow for capacity building at 
municipal level to complete realistic estimations confidently and through bargaining 
skills from their governments at national level rather than through the MLG officials. 
• the government should create an agency that would determine objectively each 
locality's expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and ultimately recommend how the 
total distributable pool, as well as the equalising transfers, should be determined for 
each municipal government. 
5.4.2 Intergovernmental financial transfers 
It is important that the government acknowledges that intergovernmental fiscal 
decentralisation requires a political champion to take a lead in directing it through 
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bureaucratic obstacles that may arise from senior civil servants who may be reluctant to 
ensure that the reforms actually see the day. 
Financial transfers form an integral part of local governments' finances in Botswana. Revenue 
Supports Grants (RSGs) from the centre should be designed in such a manner that they ensure 
revenue security and certainty at municipal governments. This requires that a transparent and 
predictable formula be generated to facilitate strategic fiscal and long-term planning at local 
governments. The formula should take into account the following, in order to facilitate 
financial accountability, whilst provoking and encouraging the constituents to take interest in 
the financial management of their government closest to them: 
• the level of urbanisation must be enhanced (as well as development) and thus the 
capacity to generate own revenues. Through this mechanism, the Government should 
be in a position to calculate the level of fiscal effort exercised by each government 
within the available avenues of revenue sources. This will avoid soft-budget constraint 
at municipal level, which indicates excess transfers from the centre that ignore the 
capacity to utilise them within the stipulated timeframe, and offer well-increased 
capacity to generate own revenues; and 
• the transfer mechanism should take into consideration the distance of the municipality 
from the major primary centres such as Gaborone and Francistown (the cost of 
providing local public goods and services). This will ensure that those peri-urban 
districts that are within the vicinity of primary centres do not unfairly benefit through 
spill-over effects at the expense ofthose that are remotely located. 
It is further recommended that the transfer system should have guidelines that clearly indicate 
gap filling (or vertical transfer mechanism) as well as the equalisation of horizontal 
inequalities among all municipalities. 
5.4.3 Expenditure assignments 
The efficient implementation of the local government statutory functions requires that they 
should have an informed idea of their expenditure needs in order to guide the Government in 
allowing them to perform permissive functions within their financial and human capacities. 
The expenditure needs of the districts should thus take into account their sizes in terms of 
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population and land sizes as well as their urban and rural status. All these factors having been 
taken into consideration, an average income of residents will be instrumental in ensuring that 
municipals tap into specialised services, based on the residents' ability to pay within their 
areas of jurisdictions. This discussion therefore recommends that: 
• the government should classify local governments based on the financial and human 
capacity; and 
• the arrangement of joint provision of services, more especially on such services as 
potable water that have the potential to generate stable internal revenues for districts, 
should be scaled down within a given time framework for larger municipalities. The 
government should build up the human capacity of local authorities and thus transfer 
the provision of water in urban villages to them so that they could widen the internal 
revenues cost-effectively where yards are not as dispersed as in rural villages; 
• the government should further allow for decentralised expenditures at municipal 
government level by allowing local authorities to further redemarcate their areas of 
jurisdictions into smaller and manageable sub-districts and administrative districts so 
that they may serve the differing, peculiar tastes of their constituents. However, in 
order for the government to compensate for lost economies of scale, closer relations 
and better sharing of resources between different districts in neighbourhoods should be 
encouraged; 
Capacity-building is the most fundamental aspect of the intergovernmental fiscal 
decentralisation reform. It sets the platform for a balance between the capacity to implement 
(or the extent to which municipalities are ready for devolved functional and financial decision 
making) and thus the ability to manage own financial affairs through increased authority to 
generate and implement locally-generated policies. This discussion recommends that the 
Government should set a clear time-frame within which more devolution of financial decision 
making on specified standard statutory functions should be fully managed at local government 
level. This should be in conformance with the categorisation or differentiation of 
municipalities in terms of the extent to which they could fully manage their own affairs. 
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5.4.4 Local internal revenues 
No matter how insignificant own revenues are, it is important that local governments have 
marginal revenues that they have control over. Local government tax and property tax are the 
most appropriate revenue sources that could be topped up by user charges. It is therefore 
recommended that: 
• local government tax be re-introduced; 
• property taxes should be introduced in peri-urban areas and specially selected urban 
villages. To ensure that this is politically acceptable and successfully implemented the 
following should be observed: 
o property taxes should be centrally administered to ensure cost-savings through 
economies of scale; 
o the structure should be standard country-wide to ensure that a large pool of 
qualified personnel could be attracted without inter-regional inconsistencies; 
o however, this should be a temporary arrangement that should within a specified 
period of time be decentralised to local authorities82. Capacity building is thus 
the most determining factor; 
• the government should reform its tax policy choice so that the tax base identification is 
broadened to cover government and public enterprises real properties because they 
benefit from the local public goods and services. This will give urban local 
governments more control over their resources. Hence decentralised expenditures. 
Capacity building in property administration and management will certainly ready 
municipalities to optimise the already allocated, new revenue sources that they are currently 
under-utilising due to incompetence; not because they are not prepared. 
In conclusion, it is critically important that the Government of Botswana should develop a 
strong policy framework, build a strong consensus within the political and bureaucratic 
circles, coordinate and integrate these reforms through strong capacity building mechanisms 
at local governments. Finally, the capacity of the national government to monitor the process 
82 Dillinger (1991 :29) calls this a decentralisation dilemma: "A trade-off between indifference and 
incompetence". It is the responsibility of the government to remedy the incompetence in tax administration at 
local government level and thus fully decentralise. 
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cannot be overemphasised. That is, the decentralisation process should initially be centralised 
with gradual decentralisation processes to allow for flexibility, well aware of the fact that: 
decentralisation structures are always in transition. 
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APPENDIX 3: THE GREATER GABORONE METRO PO LIT AN MAP 
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APPENDIX4 
SECOND SCHEDUELE 
(Section 6 (1) 
Services for which service and user fees shall be set by bye-law 
NO. SERVICES 
I. Abattoir services 
2. Certificates of rights conversions 
3. Clinical services 
4. Matimela or pound services 
5. Property rates services 
6. School services 
7. Issuing of trade licences 
THIRD SCHEDULE 
(Section 7 A) 
Services for which service and user fees shall be set by resolution of a township authority 
NO. SERVICES 
I. Advertising signs 
2. Cemetery services 
3. Community services 
4. Day care centre services 
5. Hiring of classrooms 
6. Provision of markets or factory shells 
7. Pest control services 
8. Plan perusal and building control services 
9. Plant hire services 
10. Refusal removal services 
11. Road reinstatement services 
12. Sanitation services 
13. Septic tank emptying services 
I4. Sewer connection services 
I5. Sewerage services 
I6. SHHA services 
17. Shrub and plant sale services 
18. Stadia sport facilities 
19. Staffhouse rentals 
20. Stock sales commission 
21. Surveys and plans services 
22. Leasing of boreholes 
23. Water connection services 
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Appendix 6: 
Kgalagadi District Council 
Expenditure estimates and actual expenditures 
• 2001/02: real expenditure underestimated by 2.60% 
• 2002/03: real expenditure overestimated by 23.17% 
• 2003/04: real expenditure overestimated by 50.05% 
Revenue estimates and actual income 
• 2001102: real income underestimated by 32.56% 
• 2002/03: real income underestimated by 26% 
• 2003/04: real income overestimated by 65.18% 
Estimates Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) and actual RSGs 
• 2001/02: real transfers perfectly matched the projections from the district 
council 
• 2002/03: the district council's projections ofRSGs were overestimated or 
17.19% 
over-optimistic against real transfers 
• 2003/04: RSGs were overestimated by 40.42% 
Deficits/Surplus 
• 2001/02: 0.04% deficits 
• 2002/03: 12.08% budget surplus 
• 2003/04: 15.57% budget surplus 
NB* RSGs were greater than the overall budget for financial years 2002/03 and 
2003/04 by over 9% per annum in the K weneng District Council. 
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Kweneng District Council 
Expenditure estimates and actual expenditures 
• 2001/02: real expenditure overestimated by 15.11% 
• 2002/03: real expenditure overestimated by 1 0% 
• 2003/04: real expenditure overestimated by 16.32% 
Revenue estimates and actual income 
• 2001/02: real income underestimated by 18.19% 
• 2002/03: real income overestimated by 0.48% 
• 2003/04: real income overestimated by 17.8% 
Estimates Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) ) and actual RSGs 
• 2001102: RSGs perfectly matched the projected financial transfers from the 
centre 
• 2002/03: RSGs perfectly matched the projected financial transfers from the 
centre 
• 2003/04: Kweneng district council overestimated RSGs by 40.42% 
Deficits/Surplus 
• 2001/02: 16.65% surplus 
• 2002/03: 9.97% budget surplus 
• 2003/04: 14.86% budget surplus 
NB* 2001/02: RSGs were 8.79% more than the overall annual expenditure of the 
KDC 
2002/03: RSGs were 3.22% more than the overall annual expenditure of the 
KDC 
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2003/04: RSGs were 8.57 more than the real overall expenditure of the 
district 
Gaborone City Council 
Expenditure estimates and actual expenditures 
• 2001/02: real expenditure underestimated by 9.13% 
• 2002/03: real expenditure underestimated by 6.59% 
• 2003/04: real expenditure underestimated by 2.56% 
Revenue estimates and actual income 
• 2001/02: real income underestimated by 14.8% 
• 2002/03: real income overestimated by 4.80% 
• 2003/04: real income overestimated by 28.41% 
Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) projections and real RSGs 
• 2001/02: GCC underestimated real RSGs by 3.64% 
• 2002/03: GCC was 1.68% overoptimistic in their annual projections ofRSGs 
against those received from the centre 
• 2003/04: RSGs received were 2.27% less than those budgeted for 
(overestimated). 
Deficits/Surplus 
• 2001/02: 1.95% annual deficit 
• 2002/03: 36.19% budget deficit 
• 2003/04: 10.96% budget deficit 
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NB* Income was overestimated in all the financial years because of under 
collections of revenues from the Building Material Loan (BML), property rates 
and service levies. 
The gap between actual annual expenditure and the estimated expenditure in the 
Francistown City Council (FCC) was so wide that the report of the Auditor General 
opined that budgeting was not prudent while in the South East District Council 
(SEDC) high default rates on house rents and under-expenditures characterised annual 
budgets. Under expenditure in the district was largely a product of the desire of the 
authorities to maximise interests on investments. 
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Appendix 7: Status of Accounts and Reports for LAPAC as at 07/10/05 
CODE AUTHORITY ACCOUNTS 
REPORTS 
PUBLISHED 
AVAILABL UPTO 
FORLAPAC 
Cl CENTRAL DISTRICT COUNCIL 2002/03 
1999/00 
C2 CITY OF FRANCISTOWN 2002/03 
C3 GABORONE CITY COUNCIL 2003/04 
C4 GHANZI DISTRICT COUNCIL 2001/02 
CS JW ANENG TOWN COUNCIL 2004/05 
2001/02 
C6 KGALAGADI DISTRICT COUNCIL 2001/02 
C7 KGA TLENG DISTRICT COUNCIL 2003/04 
C8 KWENENG DISTRICT COUNCIL 2001/02 
C9 LOBATSE TOWN COUNCIL 2004/05 
ClO NORTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL 2004/05 
(96/97)-03 
Cll . NORTH WEST DISTRICT COUNCIL 2003/04 
1998/99 
CI2 SELIBE-PHIKWE TOWN COUNCIL 2003/04 
2001/02 
Cl3 SOUTH EAST DISTRICT COUNCIL 2002/03 
Cl4 SOUTHERN DISTRICT COUNCIL 2001/02 
CI5 SOWA TOWNSHIP AUTHORITY 2003/04 
2001/02 
Source: An extract from the Local Government Audit Section, Office of the Auditor General 
(Botswana) 
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